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ABSTRACT
Water institutions are highly diffused throughout society. These
institutions interact with one another in various ways. As water needs
and services expand, collaborative and cooperative arrangements are
commonly sought as a means of meeting common goals of providing a safe,
dependable and least cost water supply to particular constituencies. Of
the many different institutions involved in the development, management,
distribution, and use of water, perhaps the most significant in terms of
extensive interactions with other institutions is the kind that is
typified by Water Conservancy Districts and Metropolitan Water Districts
in Utah. The sLatutory and operating framework of counterpart organizations in Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska, Oregon, and South Dakota are
compared in this report.
Significant differences in procedures for
creation and termination, selection of officers, powers and legal
rights, opportunity for input to policy formulation, sources of financing, planning responsibility, and coordination are identified.
Interstate comparisons provide the backdrop for more specific
examination of the interactions of districts in Utah with other organizations and agencies.
The results indicate that districts have tended
to embrace large scale projects as solutions to projected water shortages. The continuing and long term financial obligation constrains the
districts flexibility to adjust to alternative supply options that may
become visible to retail users as demand patterns change during the
drawn out construction schedules of large projects. Because the Bonneville Unit of the Central Utah Project is presently engaged in a large
and active investigative and construction program, and is negotiating
water purchase contracts, examples of some of the kinds of impediments
to effective institutional interaction were more readily identified in
that region by those interviewed.
In situations where institutional
differences occur, their mediation could be more readily effected if
districts were more directly linked to general purpose government and
particularly to state oversight.
State government might promote more
harmonious coordination of district operations by inviting periodic full
and open appraisal of district plans and policies in a search for
mid-course corrections that might better serve the public interest
without abrogating contractual commitments.
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PREFACE
Urban-industrial development changes the amounts and timing
of water use, generally in the directions of diverting more water
while consuming less and a demand spread more uniformly over the
year. It also changes water quality requirements and effects, generally
in the direct ions of greater concern over drinking water safety and
lesser concern for the agricultural effects of salinity.
These new
demands are met through large investments in water supply facilities
bringing larger volumes of water from greater distances, water treatment
facilities to provide safe drinking water, and waste water treatment
facilities to protect aquatic environments.
The new systems are often
accompanied by diminished use and eventual abandonment of the earlier
irrigation facilities.
These new needs are met by large capital investments achieved
only at the culminat ion of major po litical efforts and necessitat ing
a long term financial commitment for payback.
Failures to make the
needed investments can lead to calamitous water shortage or water
quality problems.
The wrong investments can require a generation to
continue paying for white elephants.
Yet these critical decisions are
made in a period of uncertainty over future needs in an often unstable
period of political transition.
This report explores the institutional aspects of this phenomenon.
It seeks criteria for good organizational arrangements, ones that
combine wise investment decisions, reliable water services, and a
flexibility to respond to changing situations. It attempts to recommend
effective organizational arrangements for the future from the lessons of
history.
The look backward to past examples is not to criticize or
Monday morning quarterback but to observe and learn, all the time
realizing that the observations necessarily combine facts with interpretations and are bound to be associated with differences of opinion.
The important point here is to emphasize that neither the Utah
Water Research Laboratory nor Utah State University are taking policy
pos it ions on either the side of the authors of this report or of the
districts whose histories are discussed as examples.
This report has
provided a forum for the authors, the districts discussed, and interested citizens from a variety of viewpoints to make points and stimulate
discussion.
It does not produce the answers, but hopefully the positions exchanged will contribute to the expressed study purpose of more
efficient urban water investment and management decisions in the future.
The spirit of the day is one of rethinking and articulating positions
in good will and in the interest of objectivity and progress.
L. Douglas James
Director
Utah Water Research Laboratory
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

As a growing populat ion steadily expands its use of technology
and its natural resources as factors in the production of goods,
services, and amenities, so also is there an increase in the complexity
of social structures and their interactions with one another.
Many of
the early foundations of small scale self-sufficient enterprises and
institutions have been modified or superseded by institutions more
compatible with large scale development.
With growth has come various
transforms In institutional structures, shifts in political power, and
adjustments in cost burdens.
Private and community actions in pursuit of "increased well-being"
goals translate into a myriad of water uses which change over time as
social aspirations and priorities change.
Water problems are derivatives of the many InItiatives taken to enhance economic, social, and
environmental well-being.
The pervasive need for water in practically
every human activity and enterprise has led to the creation of many
different organizations and institutions with responsibility to plan,
develop, and manage water.
Entities established to marshall technical and financial resources for project development and for designing,
constructing, and operating projects must also be capable of adapting
organizational structures,
functional
responsibilities,
and jurisdictional domains if a timely matching of water uses with public
preferences is to be maintained.
Water related institutions are diffused throughout society and have
evolved on an "as needed" basis.
Decisions about water are made by
individuals, irrigation companies, municipalities, districts, states, or
the nation.
Each entity in this hierarchical array may be affected by
the actions of every other entity (in different degrees of course).
Thus, intentions need to be communicated if common or conflicting
interests are to be amicably addressed.
The interaction and interdependency of a growing number of social interests to be served by water,
and the number and complexity of the political and institutional
entities involved, complicates the communication process which is so
vital in forestalling conflict and avoiding counterproductive decisions
and actions.
Over the past two decades, numerous initiatives at the state
and federal level aimed at abating water pollution and improving
the utilization of land resources In the face of economic growth
and pressures of population expansion have aggravated institutional
1

coordination problems.
Out of these new management thrusts have
emerged new institutions (often specifically mandated in the legislation) which have fostered new and different interactive patterns
on the ongoing operations of existing institutions.
Unless adequate
accommodation of exist ing and new programs and insti tut ions can be
achieved, hoped for goals of these recent legislative expressions
may never be realized.
It is important, therefore, that water organizations not only
be internally efficient, but that they also foster effective and
meaningful interactions with other water planning/management entities
(both vertically and horizontally).
Such coordination and communicat ion is essent ial in minimizing duplication, overlap, and conflict ing
jurisdictions. Eftective interaction suggests institutional connectives
to general purpose and state governments in order to properly coordinate
water and related land resources planning and management programs and
objectives.
It connotes a sensitivity and responsiveness on the part of
organizations and agencies to the queries, comments, and suggestions of
one another and to their constituencies.
For interactions to be effective, decision and policy making must be made openly with opportunity
for review and input by interacting units as well as affected citizenry.
Unless institutional officers are representative and accountable to
those bearing the cost burdens, institutional interactions may be
prejudicially effected.
Effective interaction is ·facilitated as financial ties and/or obligations are understood and the institutional and
constituency liabilities are known.
A paramount consideration in the quest for appropriate institutional interaction should be the efficient utilization of the water
resource itself.
Hence, institutions should have flexibility to
mod ify or rest ruc t ure operating rul es and working re lat ionshi ps where
such changes promote cost effectiveness and resource conservation and
do not violate repayment commitments or other obligations.
Of the many different institutions involved In the development,
management, distribution, and use of water, perhaps the most pivotal
is the kind that is typified in Utah by the Water Conservancy District
and the Metropolitan Water District.
Because of their size, broad
authority in kinds and levels of water service provided, and the
spectrum of options available for producing revenue, most of these
organizations have extensive direct and indirect linkages with other
water oriented entities as well as those institutions with responsibility for the management or coping with the urbanization process.
Water Conservancy Districts (WCD) and Metropolitan Water Districts (MWD) typify a kind of multi-purpose water serVIce organIzation that has become a part of governmental structure in many states.
Commonly, such districts are formed in anticipation of some federally
sponsored development of rather large scale whose serVIce area transcends the boundaries of cities and/or counties.
Such organizations
are political subdivisions of the state, governed by a board of directors wi th broad powers to I) raIse the necessary fi nanc ing to build
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water project works; 2) to negotiate repayment contracts for long term
debt; and 3) to make and enforce rules and regulations for the management, control, delivery, and use of water.
One of the most significant
features of such organizations is their power to levy ad valorem taxes
on real and personal property within the district, including property
owned by both rural and urban taxpayers.
They commonly have considerable fiscal and administrative independence from other units of general
purpose government.
Most WCD's and MWD's are operating under statutes that were
enacted decades ago.
In light of changing patterns of water uses and
users, a reexamination of their enabling features is in order.
Individually and collectively, WCDs and MWDs represent a substantial
influence on the direct ion of water deve lopment programs.
Experiences
gathered may suggest some modification and restructuring of laws/policies so as to permit districts to perform their roles with a minimum of
institutional friction and a maximum of economy and public accountability.

Study Approach and Scope

Institutional problems sometimes trace to the enabling statutes.
Within a given state, statutory authority of different agencies may
be overlapping, inconsistent, or ambiguous.
Under such circumstances,
there .may be sources for friction or discord as institutions interact with one another.
The study approach was to first analyze the
statutory basis under which multi-purpose water districts operate in
Utah and then broaden the perspective by examining the statutes governing the operation of counterpart organizations in Arizona, Colorado,
Nebraska, Oregon, and South Dakota.
Visits to each of these states
provided opportunity to meet with officials and managers to see what
kind of operating policies were being employed to cope with problems
emanating from urbanization.
The interstate comparisons provide a backdrop for more comprehensive examination of the operation of Water Conservancy Districts
and Metropolitan Water Districts in Utah and their interaction with
other organizations and agencies.
Although Utah's operating experience
may vary from other states, the example can illustrate problem sources
and (regardless of the success experienced in resolving them) suggest
the direction of measures to cope with problems identified.
A set of questions was prepared to guide interviews conducted
with elected and appointed officials of state and local government,
professional planners, water util ity managers, water users, and land
developers in order to identify difficulties pending or resolved in
providing cost effective water deliveries to retail users (see Appendix
A).
Information was obtained about how the major water oriented institutions make policy and operating decisions; their perspectives regarding jurisdiction and operating latitude; the extent to which the program
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and operating policies of others influence their actions; and the
influence that sources of financing and repayment obligat ions have on
operating policies.
The interviews were a principal source of informat ion from which
specific impediments were identified and which provided insights into
the general ation of certain institutional relationships. Associating
viewpoints with specific individuals is avoided although interview notes
and tapes are on file.
In selecting the individuals to be interviewed,
the authors tried to identify individuals whose present or past positions provided a basis for representative response.
Although no set
number of interviews was planned, those thought to be capable of providing some analytical depth to the questions posed were sought out.
Time and financial resources were limitations to the number of interviews possible.
Interview materials acquired in connection with a
previous exploratory study accomplished under the auspices of the Utah
Water Research Laboratory and the Utah Division of Water Resources were
available and utilized to supplement information obtained during the
current study (unpublished draft report ent i tIed "A Cursory Review of
Utah Water Conservancy Districts--Their Role and Operation" by Jay M.
Bagley, Frank W. Haws, and Carl H. Carpenter). A list of those interviewed in both studies is included in Appendix B.
Those interviewed
comprise a cross section of backgrounds and institutional associations.
Individual perspectives were at variance on many points. Therefore, the
findings as reported should not necessarily imply concurrence of all
those interviewed.
Although the set of questions in Appendix A was used as a guide in
the interview process, the answers to initial questions often led to
other interesting commentary and questions on aspects of the subject not
fully anticipated.
The authors soon came to appreciate that institutional interactions are time-dependent and that citation of certain
interactive problems today would not have been cited yesterday and might
not be cited tomorrow.
It would have been useful to have been able to
visit with each individual interviewed a second time, having the benefit
of the aggregation of information obtained in the first set of interviews.
Information was not collected in a standardized format.
All
questions included in the interview guide materials did not apply to all
organizations whose representatives were interviewed because of the
diversity of organizational function and individual position. There was
no plan to collect the interview information with a view toward quantification in order to employ statistical analyses. Rather, the approach
was to visit with knowledgeable/representative people in their own
setting and let the interview range over examples or instances which
the person being interviewed wished to draw from in answering questions.
In other words, the authors accepted what was given by those interviewed. Interviews were not tightly held to a uniform set of questions,
but freedom was allowed to comment about the subject in general. In
most cases a copy of the interview guide questions was left with the
individual interviewed extending an invitation to follow up the interview with additional information as a second review of the questions
might prompt.
4

Through an analysis of interview contributions, statutory comparisons and other related information, it is hoped that a better
understanding of the institutional features or factors that affect
coordination and cooperation in the implementation of land use and water
use policies will emerge.
Results should be helpful in revealing
whether defects in institutional interactions are of statutory origin,
a result of operating policy conflicts, or whether they may stem from
administrative rules and regulations.
Frame of Reference for Examining Interactions
All water supply management entities. regardless of water supply
purpose or geographic jurisdiction, have their genesis in a common
objective to provide a safe, dependable water supply at lowest cost
over time.
The best means for achieving this common objective, however, are seen differently by different water management entities.
This is understandable because water source options are different;
revenue generating capabilities and authorities vary; and vertical and
horizontal interfaces with one another are mult iform.
The options a
part icular water supply organization has for developing and utiliz ing
its own resource base will greatly influence the kind of cooperative
arrangements or purchase! sale agreements it may seek as it strives to
fulfill its charge.
Each water management entity must weigh the
economic and financial feasibility of its own decisions and options
in its efforts to provide a safe and sure supply in the most costeffective way.
Meeting a cost effectiveness criterion prescribes a water development logic in which each incremental acquisition is the least costly
alternative.
Of times , the least costly alternative may be achieved
through collaborative arrangements between entities.
Utah municipalities have found the most cost-effective sequence of water supply development to be:
(1) develop springs and flowing wells; (2) acquire
spring and groundwater supplied from irrigation companies by exchange or
purchase; (3) develop pumped wells; (4) acquire surface water supplies
with first priority on those not requiring extensive "conditioning,1I and
second priority on acquisition of water sources requiring more complete
treatment; (5) construct and place in operation water treatment facilities; and (6) obtain water from participation or subscription from large
project development in which participation offers prospects for minimizing costs through scale economies.
While this development logic and
sequence holds generally, at any given point in time water supplying
institutions find themselves at different positions in the development
sequence.
The position of a given institution in this development
sequence has a substantial influence on the kind of collaboration it
seeks with others in meeting its perceived needs.
Its standing also
influences the kind of operating policy it would prefer in any collaborative arrangement.
As water needs and services expand, collaborative advantages
are recognized.
Subsequently, cooperating entities experience a
need for some reallocation of powers, functions, and jurisdictions
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pursuant to meeting the continuing goal of a safe dependable and
least cost water supply. The adjustment in powers and responsibilities
must be accompanied by corresponding adjustments in informational flow
paths.
Otherwise those who ultimately pay the costs (directly or
indirectly) may be denied the information and knowledge needed to
understand the full implications of policies and actions pursued in the
context of collateral involvement.
Managers of smaller water supply organizations providing water
services from uncomplicated physical works have a high degree of
political accountability to their users (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 1974). Communication is usually direct and voter
influence is strong. Cost and financing issues are readily extrapolated
to individual liability so that the potential beneficiary can readily
assess the merits of a proposed improvement or system enlargement.
Thus, in smaller water supply systems, beneficiaries are readily identified and have the kind of involvement that assures the understanding
needed to be an effective voice into policies and actions of the water
supply entity.
Large water development projects characteristically involve a
"super" agency wholesaling water to ent~t~es who have more limited
capability to raise capital to finance large projects.
In theory, the
economies of scale which attend large projects should be enjoyed by
subdistributors/retailers who obtain supplies from wholesaler and
condition them as may be necessary for delivery to their own customers.
In practice, policies followed by the wholesaler may limit the-ease with
which a sub.agency can optimally integrate the large project supply in
with other owned. supplies.
This illustrates how water problems and
"best" solution perspect ives will differ among the various water supply
entities.
Unless special effort is directed toward compromising these
perspect ives as plans are formulated, achievement of necessary reconcilations when design and construction features have been completed may
be difficult to achieve.
When joint involvement in a large project
appears to offer that "best" solution, the multiplicity of individual
perceptions about the solution matrix may have to be compromised.
Compromise is ultimately accomplished in the political process.
As new and larger institutions are created, and as linkages are
forged with state and/or federal government organizations, economic
and political power generally becomes more concentrated. Operating with
greater independence may result in insufficient attention being given to
the communication of the information needed for informed choice by the
c~t~zen water user.
Unless informational flow paths are maintained and
fitted to the new institutional structures, the general public cannot
choose intelligently nor judge the merits of actions recommended by
others (Sowell 1980).
As a general rule, the quality of policy and
decision making increases in direct proportion to available policy and
choice information.
A reduced ability of the electorate to influence
policy decisions is one of the consequences of more layers of water
organizations.
In summary, the consideration of the interactions between multipurpose water districts and other governmental institutions in the
6

formulation and implementation of land and water policies and programs
needs to be grounded in the notion that water institutions operate from
a basic objective that the public be provided with a safe dependable
water supply at lowest cost over time.
In meeting that objective,
public input and choice should be perceived and/or decisionmakers should
be made responsible for their acts; those who benefit should bear the
cost burden; powers and rights of each institution should be commensurate with purposes and necessary functions; policies and decisions
should be made openly and subject to constituency approval; and procedures should be followed that insure fiscal and financial integrity.
Ac tions and interactions should be evaluated within the above context
and the appropriateness of particular interactions judged within this
framework.

7

CHAPTER II
COMPARISON OF STATES USE OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS
TO SPONSOR WATER PROJECTS

All states have enacted legislation which enables groups of
citizens to form subgovernments or districts to provide special services
or facilities available only to members of the district.
Although the
specific cri teria which guided part icular states in the formulat ion of
their district statutes is unavailable, important standards have been
cited by Hawkins (1976).
These criteria serve as an evaluation base in
this report and are outlined in the following paragraph.
As sub-governments of the state, special districts should be
designed and organized to solve governmental problems as citizen needs
transcend the boundaries of cities and counties.
State laws should
therefore require a significant community interest to exist before a
district is created.
The requirements of formation should not be so
low as to allow minority groups to form districts, nor should the costs
of formation be so high as to discourage
timate desires for district
government.
And, since a district is a means to an end and not an end
in itself, state law should provide for district dissolution when the
need is no longer perceived.
Control of the district should be in the
hands of those persons or voters &ho pay the expenses of the district
and costs of projects; who receive the benefits of the district; and who
are therefore most interested in the success of the district.
Citizen
access to their representatives and to policy and program information is
important in maintaining system accountability. Elections are pertinent
to districts because of the informational flow generated in the process.
Districts should not be adverse to public argument and debate because
such discuss ion adds to the information in the system.
The fiscal
structure of districts should be a function of the type of good provided, the problems being addressed, and the preferences of the constituency. A mixture of taxes and fees may thus be specified.
The presumption is that productive and effective institutional
interaction is likely when the above characteristics are operative and
the different ent it ies are invo lved in common-resource/multiple use/
spillover kinds of problems.
Hawkins (1976) has also found that where
water districts serve more urbanized areas there is greater likelihood
that they will have intert ies with adjoining producers.
Other statutory provisions might serve to adapt or specialize the district to
particular objectives, such as water supply or wastewater disposal.
As has been indicated earlier, the most important kind of special
purpose district in Utah in terms of its extensive interaction with
other institutions is the water conservancy district. On the assumption
that counterpart organizations in other states play similar roles, it
was desired to compare such organizations with respect to criteria noted
in the paragraph above.
Organizat ions in Arizona, Colorado, Nebraska,
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Oregon, and South Dakota were selected for comparison with the water
conservancy and metropolitan water districts in Utah. Differences, and
the justification for them, should be interesting and provide a basis
for reassessment of the operating mandate of any given institutional
form.
In the following paragraphs, the organizations used 1n the comparison are briefly described and comparisons of statutory provisions
for each organization with respect to categories derived from the
criteria noted above and which may influence interactive patterns are
discussed.

Public Water Districts by States

Utah
Quite commonly in Utah metropolitan water districts and water
conservancy districts have been formed in anticipation of some major
water resources development which requires an "agent" organization with
authority to organize financial and technical resources, issue and
monitor contracts for construction, and to operate and maintain the
completed physical works.
The Utah Water Conservancy District Act was passed by the Utah
Legislature in 1941.
The first district created thereafter was the
Carbon Water Conservancy District.
Over the years, 15 more districts
have been formed (including two subconservancy districts).
Some large
districts contain smaller districts and subdistricts within'their
boundaries. The areas of the state not now having conservancy districts
are Box Elder, Cache, Rich, Daggett, Tooele, Beaver, Iron, and Kane
Counties.
The geographic boundaries of WCD's in Utah contain approximately two-thirds of the land area of the state.
Cumulatively, these
districts manage (or will manage upon completion of planned projects) an
extremely large portion of the water supply of the state.
Water conservancy districts are formed by judicial action upon
petition of property owners within the proposed district boundaries.
This advocacy petition must represent 20 percent of the landowners
(or 500 signatures, whichever is less) in the unincorporated county
areas proposed for inclusion in the district, and 5 percent of the
landowners (or 100 signatures, whichever is less) of each incorporated
city or town to be located within the boundaries of the proposed
district.
After the petition has met these requirements, the district
court will conduct a hearing to determine whether the petition should
be granted.
The same law which enables a right of advocacy also preserves
the right of protest, although this action follows a path somewhat
different than that of the advocacy action.
The protest must be by
petition and must represent 20 percent of the landowners of the unincorporated county area and 20 percent of the assessed valuation of the
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lands contained therein, and also represent 20 percent of the landowners
of each municipality within the boundaries of the proposed district and
20 percent of the assessed valuation of each municipality.
In the
absence of a protest petition which meets all these more demanding
requirements, the court is instructed to create a water conservancy
district as described in the advocacy petition.
Executive officers (a board of directors) for a newly formed
WeD were formerly appointed by that district court which created the
district.
The 1983 legislature modified the statute to transfer the
board selection authority from the judicial to the legislative and
administrative branches of government.
Single county districts have
directors appointed by the board of county commissioners of the county.
MUltiple county districts have directors appointed by the governor with
the advice and consent of the senate from nominees submitted by the
boards of county commissioners and (under certain conditions) by a city.
The modified statute also contains provisions to obtain representation
more in accordance with levels of water subscription by various user
categories.
Once empowered, the board of directors of a water conservancy
district is given broad discretionary power to guide the affairs of that
district.
The powers of this board are essentially those of a "quasi
municipal corporation" as defined by the courts.
A WeD is not constrained with respect to water rights and water service in the same way
as municipalities.
The decision to carry out any of the necessary
funct ions may be made by a simple majority vote of the 'directors in
attendance (quorum necessary) at a board meeting.
The decision making capacity of the WeD board of directors is
exercised in the levying of property taxes, the modification of district boundaries, and the investigation and approval of the water
deve lopment project features.
The board is charged by law to hold an
annual meeting on a date fixed by the court and special meetings at
least quarterly. An annual report of business transacted and financial
status must be filed with the clerk of the district court.
The statutes indicate that WeDs are expected to:
1.
Be for the public benefit and advantage of the people of the
State of Utah.
2.

Indirectly benefit all industries of the state.

3. Directly benefit the State of Utah in the increase of its
taxable property valuation.
4.
Directly benefit municipalities by providing adequate supplies
of water for domestic use.
5.
Directly benefit lands to be irrigated or drained from works
to be constructed.
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6.
Directly benefit lands now under irrigation by stabilizing
the flow of water in streams and by increasing flow and return flow
of water to such streams.
Promot ion of water development within the district is mandated.
The WCD board is charged by statute to adopt plans and specifications
for the works for which the district was organized and make such plans
open to publ ic inspect ion. There is no mandate for the WCD to "prepare"
the plans it adopts.
The WCD may issue bonds to be redeemed by revenues from a particular water market area.
If this particular market area is not
located within the boundaries of a municipality at the time that the
bonds are issued, then the WCD shall thereafter be the sole public
corporation or political subdivision authorized to supply water to
such area and no subsequent modification of boundary lines by another
district or municipality through annexation or incorporation will
provide to that newer entity either an authority to supply water
or a franchise to supply water to the newly incorporated area.
This
restriction may be modified so long as changes do not jeopordize payment
of principal and interest on the bonds of the district.
The WCD may levy four kinds of property taxes:
Class A.

To levy and collect taxes upon all property within
the district on an ad valorem basis.

Class B.

To levy and collect assessments for special benefits
accruing to property within municipalities for which
use of water is allotted.

Class C.

To levy and collect assessments for special benefits
accruing to lands within irrigation districts for
which use of water is allotted.

Class D.

To levy and collect assessments for special benefits
accru1ng to private lands for which use of water is
allotted.

These taxes, together with water charges and user fees, may be used to
pay for district indebtedness, operations, and any reserve fund which
the district might see fit to maintain against contingencies, debt
service, or temporary shortfalls in revenue.
Metropolitan Water Districts were authorized by the Utah Legislature in 1935 ancillary to construction of the Provo River Project by
the Bureau of Reclamation.
Shortly after its passage, six metropolitan
water districts were formed, five in Utah County and one in Salt Lake
County.
Each was created with boundaries to serve a particular city
or cities, and each was located geographically to enable it to take
water from the Salt Lake aqueduct.
No other metropolitan water districts have been formed.
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The primary justification for creating a metropolitan water
district was to avoid being constrained by the debt ceilings that apply
to cities and which make it more difficult for cities to participate in
projects that involve large and long term encumbrances.
By forming a
district as a legally separate entity, taxing and bonding authorities
are not counted against constitutional or statutory borrowing limits
imposed on the municipal corporation itself.
As a contracting agent,
the MWD is favored by the Department of the Interior over dealing
directly with municipalities because of the more explicit lien on tax
collections through which repayment is secured.
A Metropolitan Water District (MWD) is formed by municipal ordinance declaring the intent to create such a district, the names of other
municipalities to be included within that district (if more than one
municipality is to be included), and an apportioned cost of district
incorporation for each municipality to be included.
This ordinance is
then mailed to the chief executive officer for each included municipality.
The legislative bodies of these municipalities have 60 days to
accept or reject the ordinance with amendment.
If the municipal legislative body chooses to accept the ordinance, it must, within 120 days
from its acceptance, submit the proposition to the electors within each
of the participating municipalities for their approval.
Only in those
cities where the majority vote is for approval will the incorporation
take place.
The selection of executive officers for a MWD depends on the
number of cities served.
If the MWD is composed of only one city, a
board of five or seven members will be chosen by the legislative body of
that city and given votes of equal weight. The term of office for such
a director is six years unless no qualified replacement is presented,
~n which case he shall hold office until he decides to resign.
If the incorporated metropolitan water district comprises more
than one municipality, the board will have at least one director from
each city, and each city will have one vote for each $10 million of
assessed valuation.
The city may have more than one representative
on the board, but its total vote will not be increased.
The only
municipal government officer eligible for appointment to the MWD board
is the Commissioner of Water Supply and Waterworks or other comparable
officer.
The legislative intent is that the directors be continually
reappointed to their positions. This suggests a concern for continuity
in operation despite changing political administrations. Qualifications
are that board members be of good standing in the community and of high
integrity and proven competence.
The board of directors of a metropolitan water district (MWD)
has a large amount of discretionary power to carry out its necessary
functions within the limitations of its financial constraints.
Any
activity that will cause the MWD to incur indebtedness requires the
submission of the proposal to the electorate and majority approval.
Furthermore, the intent of the legislature is that the district pay
its obligations, as far as is practicable, from water rates rather than
in property taxes.
In the event that rates become insufficient to
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cover the operating and indebtedness expenses, a tax may be levied, but
only until the indebtedness is repaid. The tax levying rate is limited
to 2 1/2 mills and the total indebtedness limited to 10 percent of
total assessed valuation.
Although the MWD is a corporate entity
separate and independent from the municipal corporation, the close
electoral links and officer appointment procedure may serve to limit
the discretionary power of the board.
The function of a MWD is described by statute as:
Metropolitan water districts may be organized hereunder
for the purpose of acquiring, appropriating, developing,
storing, selling, leasing, and distributing water for,
and devoting water to, municipal and domestic purposes,
irrigation, power,
and any and all other beneficial
uses, and ... may be formed of the territory included within the corporate boundaries of anyone or more municipalities,
wh ich need not be cont iguous. , , .
Each such district when so
incorporated shall be a separate and independent political
corporate entity,
Both types of districts, the WeD and the MWD, have similar property powers. The enabling legislation grants each the power to:
take by appropriation, grant, purchase,
and to
hold and enjoy water, water works, water rights, and sources
of water suppl y and any and all real and personal propert y of
any kind within or without the district necessary or convenient to the full exercise of its power; to sell or dispose
of within the district (WeD only); to acquire any or all
works ... necessary for the exercise of its powers .,. within
and without the district
within and without the state
(MWD only) for use within the district (WeD only),
A significant difference in the two enabling codes is that a weD
The MWD
may use or sell water only within the district boundaries.
statutes do not contain this restrictive language.
Both the WeD's and
the MWD's are granted the power of eminent domain to engage in the
condemnation of private property for public purposes; however, the
water conservancy district cannot utilize this power to acquire the
title to or beneficial uses therefrom of any vested water rights for
transmountain divers ion, nor can it act as a carrier for any water
source which has been obtained in such a manner by any other municipal
entity.
Both kinds of districts may incur debt in order to finance
their development activities.
This debt may be redeemed by rate
charges and taxes in each case.
However, there are some significant
differences in the redemption provisions.
The MWD legislation contains no provision for preserving future
market areas since most of its services are already located within the
boundaries of incorporated municipalities.
The law is not clear
regarding the annexation process and the possible interaction between
munic ipal water departments, metropolitan water district s, and other
water management districts.
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Arizona
Two enabling statutes have been selected from the Arizona experiences for comparative purposes.
Both originated in response to
federal rec lamat ion projects and only one district has been formed
under each statute.
In 1971 Arizona passed legislation enabling the creation of
Multi-county Water Conservation Districts (MCWCD).
This was in direct
response to the demands of the Secretary of the Interior for a tax-levying agency of the state empowered to contract with the federal government to repay and manage water allocation of the Central Arizona Project
(CAP).
The CAP will direct water from the Colorado River and transport
approximately 1.5 million acre-feet annually to the urbanizing areas
from Phoenix to Tucson embracing Maricopa, Pinal, and Pima Count ies.
The legislation is narrow and restrictive making it necessary for
at least three counties to combine in forming one district.
Petitions
are directed to the Arizona Water Commission which must approve the
form and effect the corporate organizat ion after conduc t ing hearings
and satisfying objections.
Only one district has been approved to
date, with no opportunity in sight for other similar districts to ever
be formed.
The district is governed by a board of elected directors.
Each
county is entitled to one director for each 100,000 people in the
county, and the term of office is four years.
Any district organized under the act is specifically directed
to enter into contracts with the Secretary of the Interior for the
repayment of the cost of the CAP and for the delivery of water in
accordance with the provisions of federal law PL-90-537.
The district
is also directed to levy an ad valorem tax not to exceed 1 mill to pay
for the expenses of the district and to assist in the repayment of the
CAP to the federal government.
At present the Central Arizona Water Conservation District is
strictly a repayment organization to satisfy the requirement that the
Secretary of the Interior contract with one responsible state agency
for development of the CAP.
It remains for future state legislation
to determine the assignment of operational responsibilities.
However,
the master cont ract wi th the Secretary of the Interior for CAP water
includes some provisions not contained in any other reclamation contract.
One provision is that municipal and industrial use has a
100 percent priority over agriculture in the event of shortage.
Another provision is the requirement that an agricultural user has to
gIve up pumping groundwater acre-foot for acre-foot of CAP supply.
The groundwater overdraft in Arizona has reached a critical stage.
Annual groundwater withdrawals exceed 2,500,000 acre-feet while natural
recharge is approximately 300,000 acre-feet producing an overdraft of
2,200,000 acre-feet.
For this reason the Secretary of the Interior
indicated it would be necessary for Arizona to establish a groundwater
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Arizona commismanagement regime before CAP water is made available.
sioned a comprehensive study of groundwater management needs which
led to some rather basic changes in water laws and water administration.
The other Arizona district statute of interest is that which
enables the creation of Agricultural Improvement Districts (AID).
The initial act was passed in 1922 and was designed to accommodate some
of the special problems arising from the operation of the federal
reclamation project on the Salt River.
Landowners in the Salt River Valley having water rights pledged
their land as security to repay the federal reclamation project, the
Roosevelt Dam, and associated diversion water on the Salt River.
They
formed a private corporation known as the Salt River Water Users
Association as the legal contracting agent for the project.
When it
became evident that electric power could be generated in connection
wi th the dam, the associat ion gained concession from the Reclamation
Service that allowed the association to sell the power to landowners
and use the revenue to reduce the cost of water to the user and to
essentially have independent control over the marketing of excess
power.
The private nature of the association soon incurred problems
with taxation on revenues and on potential bonds to pay for capital
construction.
By transferring the power revenue and management responsibility
to a public district the taxation problems were averted.
Hence, the
formation of the Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power D~strict
in 1922 was accomplished and the Salt River Project became the unique
private-pub lic ent ity it is today.
The as sociat ion remains as the
trustee for the landowners with water rights pledged as security for
repayment while the district is the corporate manager of the water and
power facilit s and services.
The Salt River Project is at once an
electric water utility, a municipality type organization, a nonprofit
community service company, and a federal reclamation project.
The overall organization of the district is patterned after a
representative type municipal government.
The project has 10 voting
divisions and each division elects one member to the board of directors
and three members to a district council.
In 1976 two at-large members
were added to the district board by revision of state law that enables
urban population to increase its voice in project affairs.
Two additional at-large members were added in 1980 on the basis of one vote per
property owner.
The pres ident and vice pres ident of the board are also
elected and the board becomes the corporate business manager of the
district.
The 30 member council can enact and amend bylaws relating to
the government of the district, the management of its business, and the
conduct of its affairs. The council meets at least once each year.
The Salt River Project has water contracts with eight of the
valley cities within the project boundaries.
The project contract with
Phoenix provides that the city pay the annual assessment for urban
acreage which is no longer irrigated.
In turn, the water to which
this urban acreage is entitled is delivered by the project through its
transmission system to the Phoenix water filtration plants.
Other
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cities which have similar domestic water supply contracts for surface and underground water are:
Tempe, Glendale, Mesa, Scottsdale,
Chandler, Peoria, and Gilbert.
These contracts provide cities within
the project boundaries with a stable water supply at the same rate as
irrigation customers.
Since water cannot cross project boundaries the
City of Phoenix is split with a portion having available project water,
but not one drop can go to the thirs ty area of the city beyond the
project pale.
In a period of water scarcity there is no priority of use of
water within the project such as culinary usage before agriculture.
The land has the right to the water regardless of the beneficial use
to which it is applied.
Colorado
Metropolitan Denver and other Front Range cities, all within the
eastern rain shadow of the Rocky Mountains, are the principal urban
and urbanizing areas of Colorado.
At least 80 percent of the state's
population is within 10 counties along the eastern slope.
The entire Denver metropolitan area contains approximately 23
agencies supplying water and nearly 200 participating in water distribution.
The responsibility of supplying water to most incorporated
areas in Colorado rests with the municipality.
Many of these municipalities supply water beyond their boundaries, thus the large number
of distribution agencies as compared to supply agencies in the Denver
area (Walker et ale 1973).
Colorado was the first western state to adopt a comprehensive
water development act which created districts with general power of
taxation, and broad authority to contract for services.
This was done
in 1937 in anticipation of the proposed Colorado-Big Thompson reclamat ion project.
The Water Conservancy Act of Colorado provides that a water
conservancy district may be organized if the proper number of landowners petition for organization and if no protests are acknowledged.
The petition must be signed by not fewer than 1500 owners of irrigated
land in unincorporated areas and a Iso by at least 500 owners of nonirrigated land or lands embraced in the incorporated limits of a city
or town.
No city having a population of more than 25,000 shall be
included within the district unless approved by the chief executive
officer and legislative body of such municipality.
Less exacting
provisions are specified for proposed districts having irrigated lands
valued at less than $20 million.
The district court is empowered to establish a water conservancy
district in an area over which it presides after appropriate hearing.
If a protest is filed, signed by not fewer than the number required
for the petition, then the court shall order an election on the question of the formation of the district.
If the petition conforms to law
and protes ts have not been filed or have been dismissed, the court
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shall declare the district organized as a political subdivision of the
state with all the powers of a public or municipal corporation.
The
court shall then appoint a board of directors of the district consisting of not more than 15 persons who are owners of real property and
residents of the counties in which the water conservancy district is
situated.
The district has broad powers for water development including
contractual arrangements with the United States.
The board each year
is empowered to determine the amount of money necessary to be raised
by ad valorem taxation and shall fix a levy on assessed property within
the district.
The rate shall not exceed one-half mill on the dollar
prior to delivery of water, and thereafter shall not exceed one mill,
except in the event of accruing defaults when an additional one-half
mill may be levied.
The board may allocate water to petitioning
municipalities within the district in such quantity as will in the
judgment of the board make adequate available water supply for the
municipality and shall fix and determine the rate per acre-foot.
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, created in
1937, was the first and most important of 36 water conservancy districts in Colorado created under this act.
The ad valorem tax levied
by NCWCD raised about $400,000 in 1962 and in 1978 raised more than
$1,500,000 (NCWCD, Annual Report, 1978).
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District divided the
assumed 310,000 acre-feet of water supply into 310,000 units.
Because
of the variability of supply the directors early each year declare the
availabili ty of water quant ity varying from 60 percent to 100 percent
of the 310,000 acre-foot units under contract.
All the water was
allocated soon after it became available, with each unit valued at
about $30, while recent individual sales have been between $2,000 and
$2,500 per unit.
Water can be transferred within the district by private sale
but the transfer requires the approval of the board which at leas t
theoretically can deny the transfer.
The board wi 11 approve trans fers
to cities within the district up to twice their current use.
Excess
acquisitions by cities are rented back to farmers at agricultural water
market rates until needed by the city.
At present approximately 30
percent of Colorado-Big Thompson water is allocated to municipal,
domestic, and mUlti-purpose uses, with the balance to agriculture.
However, about half of the municipal allocation is rented back to
agriculture (NCWCD, Annual Report, 1978).
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District is only a wholesaler of water.
Agricultural allot tees are served by 125 mutual ditch
and reservoir companies.
Similarly, the residents of 16 cities and
towns and rural residents within the service area of 25 rural domestic
water distributing agencies receive water delivery service under the
same operating rules.
Special problems have been created by the
existence of rural domestic water districts adjacent to municipalities.
An example is the rural area between Fort Collins and Loveland which
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is served by a rural domestic water system.
As the cities annex
additional land within the rural district problems of water supply and
treatment require adjustment as the district is faced with a shrinking
base.
One solution would be for the cities to purchase the district
facilities and continue to supply present users beyond their corporate
limits.
Apparently both the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District and the counties involved have played a relatively passive role
in land use planning as it is linked to domestic water supply.
Nebraska
In an effort to deal more adequately and efficiently with growing
state resource problems, Nebraska has recently undergone a major
reorganization or restructuring of its resource related organizat ions.
Over the years many different kinds of special purpose political
subdivisions and organizations had been established.
With time, also,
their scope of permissible activities had expanded resulting in overlapping boundaries, duplication of actIvIties, and substantial Infighting (Marlette and Williams 1978).
In order to provide more effective coordination, pl anning, deve lopment, and general management of
areas wi th related resource prob lems, Nebraska implemented legislation
creating nonoverlapping but contiguous Natural Resources Districts
(NRD's) whose boundaries followed approximate hydrologic patterns.
The
NRD statute (and amendments) directed the Nebraska Natural Resource
Commission to define and create not less than 16 nor more than 28
NRD's.
Consequently, the commission established 24 such districts
resulting in the merger of more than 150 special purpose districts.
Certain special districts were excluded from mandatory merger but were
encouraged to cooperate with the NRD's and were given the opportunity to
merge if they wished.
As presently operated, each NRD is governed by a board of directors which may vary from 5 to 21 (an odd number required) as determined by the commission.
Apparently, districts have the option of
choosing whether subdistricts are represented by one or two individuals.
A candidate for director must file a petition signed by 25 electors
residing in the appropriate subdistrict.
Elections are held In connection with a state general election and candidates receiving a "plurality of the votes cast" in the subdistrict are elected.
NRD's have broad power and authority which have
as (Marlette and Williams 1978):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

been

To acquire property by eminent domain.
To promulgate and enforce land use regulations.
To promulgate and enforce groundwater regulations.
To make studies, surveys, and investigations.
To conduct demonstration projects.
To store, transport, and supply water to users In
tricts.
To acquire and dispose of water rights.
To furnish financial aid.
To construct facilities.
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enumerated

the

dis-

10.

To levy a general purpose tax not to exceed 3 1/2 mi ll.
However higher levies may be imposed upon a favorable referendum within the district.

Districts may establish improvement project areas within which
special assessments may be levied.
In addition, districts may borrow
money and issue revenue bonds.
NRD's may also levy a one-quarter
mill general purpose tax for purposes related to groundwater management.
Little or no use has been made to date of the revenue bonding
authority.
Nebraska has a modest Resources Deve lopment Fund which receives
annual appropriations by the state legislature and is administered by
the Nebraska Natural Resources Commission which may be used in cost
sharing with NRD projects the commission approves.
NRD's are required to prepare and adopt a master plan.
This plan
must contain a statement of goals and objectives for each statutory
purpose enumerated for the NRD' s.
This master plan must be updated
at least every 10 years and a "long range implementation plan" must be
updated annually. District plans must conform to the state water plan,
the state outdoor recreation plan, and the state fish and wildlife
plan.
Although institutional coordination 1.S improved with the establishment of the NRD' s the enabling legislation limits the powers to
coordinate at the district level by making certain coordinating efforts
subject to acquiescence by other local agencies.
County and municipal
regulations have priority over those of an NRD.
Contracting authority
does not extend to water delivery to those within boundaries of a
municipality, county, or metropolitan utility district without permisS1.on of the respective agency.
Nebraska makes very heavy use of groundwater for irrigation and
has initiated legislation to provide for its prudent and orderly
management.
The legislat ion provides that NRD' s after recogn1.Z 1.ng a
groundwater problem within its district may petition the State Department of Water Resources (DWR) to establish a control area.
After
designation of a groundwater control area, the NRD must adopt, with the
approval of the DWR, specific regulations to conserve and manage
groundwater supplies.
Oregon
Oregon has a number of statutes enabling the creation of water
districts, but only one which provides for a district with general
taxing power.
The statute was first enacted in 1955 at a time when
the state water resources administration was being reorganized.
Although the statute 1.S intact, to date no district has been formed.
Under the act, formation of a district follows a petition-hearingelection format with the board of county supervisors as the authorizing
agency.
Petitions signed by 50 or a majority of landowners initiates
the process.
The county board of supervisors notifies landowners and
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schedules a hearing.
If the objections are satisfied, the county board
then schedules an election.
Of the votes cast, a 60 percent majority
~s necessary for creating a district, otherwise the issue is dead.
The governing board of the district is elected and has power to
conduct the business and fulfill all the purposes of the district. The
board can levy a general tax but the tax is limi ted to that approved
by the voters in the formation.
Special assessment can be made to
beneficiaries of project works and bonds can be issued after voter
approval. Fees or tolls for services can also be charged.
Oregon retains considerable state oversight in all water projects,
and plans prepared by the district must be approved by the State
Engineer as well as by the landowners.
Projects can be suggested by
landowners and receive a hearing before the County Board of Supervisors.
Landowners may also protest proj ects and prevent them from deve 10pment
if protested by 50 percent or more of the landowners.
Oregon also has a state water policy board which sets guidelines
and priorities for project development which all subdivisions of state
government must follow.
South Dakota
Historically, South Dakota has sought to maintain a strong state
oversight wi th respect to water development and management.
The South
Dakota Conservancy District, legislatively created in 1959, ~s a
statewide district whose principal function is to coordinate all local
water resource project activities and to maintain a close liaison with
the governor and legislature concerning water policies and programs.
South Dakota has maintained that because of the vital nature of water
in the development and use of other resources and as a necessary
ingredient in pract ically every human enterprise, the sovereign powers
of the state needed to be employed to coordinate and integrate the
multiple uses of water.
The statewide water conservancy district
enactment was a companion to a legislat ive act which provided for the
creation of subdistricts.
The South Dakota subdistricts are quite
similar in purpose and function to water conservation districts as
provided for in other states. The use of the nomenclature "subdistrict"
is to make clear the organizational linkage to the South Dakota Conservancy District.
The subdistricts are created through a vote of the landowners
of the geographical area of the proposed subdistrict.
A petition
calling for such an election must originate with landowners whose
signatures represent 25 percent or more of the area and must be presented to the governing board of the statewide district.
If the
board approves the petition, the question is placed on a separate
ballot at the next general election for approval of voters residing
in the proposed area of the subdistrict.
A 60 percent favorable vote
is required for the subdistrict to be organized.
The board governing
the statewide district determines the number of directors the subdistrict shall have (not to exceed 11) and sets out the criterion to be
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followed in maintaining equitable representation geographically.
Municipalities are considered separate election districts so that only
their residents may determine whether or not the city is to be a part
of the subdistrict.
Any election district may withdraw from the
proposed subdistrict in a manner similar to that required for creation.
A petition must be signed by 25 percent of the landowners and presented
to the board governing the statewide district within 60 days of a board
resolution to create the subdistrict.
The board then sets up another
election in which a 60 percent vote in favor of withdrawal
required.
A subdistrict has power of eminent domain and may contract with
public or private agencies for construction of water facilities and
repayment of costs associated with water development projects.
Such
contracts must receive electoral approval, however, and are not discretionary with the board of directors.
All taxable property within
a subdistrict may be levied.
Prior to any contractual agreements for
project development, the tax limit is set at 1/10 of one mill.
After
entering into contractual agreements, the levy may be raised to a
maximum of one mill.
There are no spec ial taxing authorities related
to different water supply purposes.
Since authority to issue bonds is
. not ment ioned in the statutes, presumably costs that exceeded the one
mill taxing revenue would have to be obtained through water charges.
The responsibility of the board of directors governing the statewide district has been enlarged as certain reorganizations in state
agenc ies have occurred.
While the statewide district still maintains
its supervision over subdistricts, its board now has principal policy
authority for the Department of Natural Resources Development.
Thus,
it has responsibility for reviewing and approving all water development
plans .and reports both to the governor and the legislature with recommendations for programs and financial schemes for carrying them out.
The statewide district has' no taxing authority but has authority to
issue bonds if projects have been legislatively sanctioned.
Bond
security is obtained in the form of liens on income revenues.
They
are not enforceable against the state.
The board may seek legislative
appropriations for meet ing costs which have been determined to be the
state share for bene fits accruing to the general taxpayer.
However,
legislative policy is that each purpose of water projects is to pay
the full costs associated with providing their benefit.
Thus, legislative approval of financing schemes requires a comprehensive evaluation
of costs and benefits and their distribution on a project by project
basis prior to any establishment of loan funds.
The board has been
given the responsibility for preparing a comprehensive statewide water
plan and development system.
In this connection, it must provide
yearly progress reports and develop updated plans not less than once
every four years.
The board recommends to the governor and the legislature those portions of the statewide water plan considered necessary in some prioritized fashion and proposes means of financing the
state share of costs of water facilities that may be authorized for
construction.
Analysis and Comparison of
Language by States
Statutes of Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Oregon, Nebraska and South
Dakota which create or enable the creation of special water districts
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have been examined and comparisons made with respect to certain features considered important in effecting or directing the performance of
the organization.
The statutory elements compared are:
legislat ive
purpose, procedure for creat ion, procedure for terminat ion or wi thdrawal from the district, selection of officers, powers and legal
rights, opportunity for input or approval of policy options, sources of
funding and financial responsibility, planning responsibility, and
legislative requirements for coordination with or subordination to
state, regional and general purpose local governments. This information
is summarized in Table 1.
Legislative Purpose
In most states the state legislature has not created a county,
ci ty, business corporat ion, special improvement district, or a water
district by statute. Rather the state provides the enabling legislation
by which subdivisions of the state can be created and it can specify
conditions that must be observed such as number of petitioners, qualifications of electors, taxing authority, etc.
The legislature also
provides in some form the limitations and purposes for which specific
subdivision of government can be created. In doing this it may reveal a
philosophy about resource development or the policy of the state with
regard to water use and development.
The enabling statute is in some respects similar to the article
of incorporation of a business venture.
Since a corporat ion cannot
engage in activities not granted by the articles of incorporation, it is
common practice to include very broad purposes to cover any unforeseen
future needs. The articles of incorporation are not useful instruments
in the management of a business because the manager must still set the
specific goals and guide the organization into successful decisions.
Likewise, while the incorporators of water conservancy districts are
limited to the powers specified in the enabling statutes, the district
has latitude to set specific objectives and employ available resources
in order to accomplish them.
The statutory language is important,
however, in revealing the thinking and philosophy of the legislature at
the time of the creating act.
As originally adopted, Utah and Colorado language authorizing the
creation of water conservancy districts was the same. Both wrote
statutes in anticipation of federal reclamation projects and in compliance with Department of Interior desires for a contracting agent for
water users.
Both were written and passed in the late 1930s and early
1940s during a period of substantial western water development under
the federal reclamation program.
Both statutorily declare the WCD
to fulfill a public need as a prerequisite to general taxing authority.
Both recognize that projects have direct and indirect benefits.
Arizona passed a law to create districts for much the same reason
as Utah and Colorado--to provide an "agent" organization with good
repayment capability.
The specific project which prompted the need
for the Arizona Multicounty Water Conservation District was the Central
Arizona Project. The district function is restricted to tax collecting
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Table 1.

Statutory comparison of state organizations for multi-purpose
water management.
UfAHWATER
CONSERVANCY ACT

UTAH METROPOLITAN
WATER DISTRICTS

(U.CA.73-9)

(U.cA.73-8)

ARIZONA MULTICOUNTY
WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICTS
(ARSA-45-2601)

Declared to be a public use which will
benefit indirectly all industry; benefit
state by increasing taxable property
valuation; provide adequate supplies of
water for domestic use; benefit lands to
be irrigated or drained; benefit irrigated
lands by stabilizing flow in streams; and
promote comfort, safety, and welfare of
people of state.

A quasi municipal organization for acquiring, apprppriating, developing,
storing, selling,leasing, and distributing
water for, and devoting water to, municipal and domestic purposes, irrigation,
power, milling, manufacturing, mining,
metallurgical, and any and all other
beneficial uses.

To create legal body as contracting agent
with Secretary of the Interior with
power to levy and collect ad valorem
taxes on aU district property and make
payments to U.S. in accordance with
contracturalobligations.

Initiation Advocacy petition must repre·
sent 20% of the landowners (or 500 sig·
natures, whichever is less) of each in·
corporated city or town location within
proposed boundaries. Signature must represent $300 or more of assessed valuation.
Protest petition must represent 20%
of the land owners of the unincorporated area, and 20% of the assessed valuation of lands contained therein, and
also represent 20% of owners of land in
each municipality within proposed district and 20% of the assessed valuation
of each munici pality.
Authorizing Body District Court.
Public Notice and Hearing After filing
petition, hearing date set within 60-90
days. Public notice of hearing published
by clerk of court. Specifically required
to notify county commissions.
Voter Approval No election required.

May be formed of the territory included
within the corporate boundaries of any
one or more municipalities, which need
not be contiguous.
Initiation Legislative body of any municipality passes ordinance expressing desire for MWD, listing all cities to be
included.
Authorizing Body Legislative body of
each city. Ordinance must be approved
or rejected within 60 days. Secretary of
State provides certificate of incorporation.
Public Notice and Hearing No special
hearings required. Ordinance published
once at least 10 days before election.
Voter Approval Special election held
in approving cities and pass by vote of
majority of electors in each city. New
area may be added as a result of municipal annexation. A city desiring annexa·
tion must be approved by electors in
petitioning municipality.

Initiation Three or more cou:lties must
combine to form a district and each
county must submit a petition signed by
the chairman of the Board of County
Supervisors to the Arizona Water Commission or its successor organization.
Alternately, qualified electors equal
to at least 1 % of the votes cast for gover·
nor in the last election may submit a
signed petition to the Arizona Water
Commission.
Authorizing Body Arizona Water
Commission.
Public Notice and Hearing The Arizona
Water Commission posts notice and conducts a hearing. At the hearing any affected person may appear and be heard
on any matter relating to the establishment of the proposed district. After
hearing, the commission will make decision and, if affirmative, declare the dis·
trict organized. Appeals to this decision
may be taken by special petition to the
supreme court.
Voter Approval No direct voter ap·
proval req uired.

No provision for termination.
Owners of lands may petition board
for wit hdrawal, if no outstanding bond
or other indebtedness. If under contract
with the U.S. no dissolution shall take
place without consent of Secretary of
the Interior.

No statutory provision for termination.

District may be dissolved by resolution
of its board after approval by the At·
torney General and the Secretary of the
Interior and the pa yment of all indebtedness and satisfying of all legal obliga·
tion.
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Continued.
ARIZONA AGRICULTURAL
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICf
(ARS Chapter 45.901-1041)

COLORADO WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICfS
(CRS 37-45)

NEBRASKA NATURAL
RESOURCES DISTRICTS
(Revised Statutes 2-3200)

An enabling act and no specific legislative purpose or intent is stated. It is an
organization of land owners within the
boundaries of a federal reclamation
project. Function is business and economic, not governmental. Owned by private land holders.

Declared to be a public use which will
benefit indirectly all industry, benefit
state by increasing taxab Ie property
valuation, provide adequate supplies of
water for domeStic use, benefit lands,
to be irrigated or drained, benefit irrigated lands by stabilizing flow in
streams, promote comfort. safety,
and welfare of people of state.

Essential to welfare of people of
Nebraska to conserve, protect. develop
and manage natural resources of state.
Most efficient and economical method
of accelerating these achievements believed to be the creation of natural reo
sources districts. Functions of soil and
water conservation districts, watershed
conservancy districts and watershed districts to be consolidated into NRDs.
Other special purpose districts including
rural water districts, groundwater conservation districts, and irrigation districts
are encouraged to cooperate with and,
where appropriate, merge with NRDs.

Initiation A petiticn, signed by five or
more landowners within the boundaries
of a federal reclamation project, propose
the formation of a district to accomplish
specified water related purposes.
Authorizing Body County board of
supervisors.
PubDc Notice and Hearing The board of
supervisors sets the time of hearing not
less than 3 weeks nOr more than 6 weeks
after date of order and publishes notice
of hearing not less than 2 weeks nor
more than 4 weeks prior to hearing date.
If more than one county is involved each
county must be similarly notified.
Voter Approval After the hearing and
any subsequent appeal, a notice of elec·
tion is published for the purpose of determining whether or not the district
shall be organized. Only qualified voters
may cast a ballot. Qualifications include
ownership of real property of 1 auce or
more and possessing the qualifications of
electors for State offices under general
election laws.

mHiation f or districts having an assessed valuation of over $20 million, the advocacy petition must be signed by 1500
owners of irrigated land outside the
limits of incorporated towns, and by
500 owners of nonirrigated land within
limits of cities and towns. Assessed valuation for each irrigated tract must be at
least $2000; for nonirrigated tracts,
$1000. Protest petition must be signed
by eit her 1) 1500 owners of irrigated
land having aggregate assessed value of
not less than $2 million; and also be
signed by 500 owners of nonirrigated
land within the limits of cities and
towns, or 2) the owners of taxable property regardless of n umber having aggregate assessed valuation is more than 50%
of the total assessed valuation of all
property in the proposed district.
For districts having an assessed valuation of less than $20 million; the advocacy petition must be signed by 25% of
the owners of irrigated land, each having
an assessed valuation of $1000, and also
signed by 5% of the owners of nonirrigated lands located in incorporated limits
of a city or town, each having an assessed valuation of $1000. Protest petition
must be signed by 25% of the owners of
irrigated land and also by 5% of the owners of nonirrigated land, or must be signed by owners representing an assessed
valuation of more than 50% of the total
assessed valuation of all property in the
proposed district.
Cities of 25,000 or more shall be Induded only with consent of chief executive and legislative body. The maximum tax to be levied is specified by the
city.
AuthOrizing Body District Court.
PubDc Notice and Hearing After filing
petition, hearing date set within 60-90
days. Public notice of hearing published
by clerk of court. Specifically required
to notify County Commissions.
Voter Approval No election required.

Initiation State legislation directing
establishment of not less than 16 or
more than 28 Natural Resource Districts
(NRD) to cover state based on hydrologic patterns.
Authorizing Body State Legislature.
Public Notice and Hearing Legislative
hearing.
Voter Approval None.

No provision for withdrawal or
termination.

May be dissolved if district has not been
authorized to incur bonded or other indebtedness under election procedures
specified. If agency has entered into con·
tract with United States no dissolution
shall take place unless consented to by
Secretary of the Interior.
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Not specified.
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Continued.
OREGON WATER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
Oregon Revised Statutes
(45-552)

SOUTH DAKOTA
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
(Chapter 46-17,
South Dakota Statutes)

SUBDISTRICTS OF SOUTH
DAKOTA CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT
(Chapter 46-18.
South Dakota Statutes)

For constructing works to prevent damage and destruction of life and property
by floods, to improve the agricultural
and other uses of lands and waters and
to improve the public health, welfare,
and safety. May also provide domestic
or municipal and industrial water supply and water related recreation and can
enhance water pollution control, water
quality, and fish and wildlife resources.

To benefit from more effective development and utilization of the land and
water resources of the state in terms of
greater economic security, protection of
health, prosperity and general welfare of
the people of South Dakota. Public concern necessitates the exercise of the sovereign powers of the State. It is in the
public interest that a coordinated integrated, municipal use water resource
policy be formulated and adivated.
For any water resource projects developed under this act, it is the legislative
inte It that financing should relate reason! bly and equitably to the benefits
rece ved, by each level and beneficiary_

To obtain the objectives of the South
Dakota Conservancy District (Chapter

Initiation By petition to the County
Court or County Board of Supervisors.
If over 50% of the land is represented
by the petitioners, the County Board
of Supervisors can declare the district
formed. If less than 50%, the proposition must be submitted to the voters.
The petition must state the maximum
ad valorem tax that can be imposed.
If municipalities and/or other organized districts are included in the region
of the profosed district, they must be
notified 0 the proposed action, and may
withdraw by filing a resolution with the
County Board of Supervisors.
All registered voters owning property
or residing within the proposed boundaries are eligib Ie to vote.
Authorizing Body County Court or
County Board of Supervisors.
Public Notice and Hearing If less than
50% of land proposed for the district is
represented, a hearing is scheduled by
the County Board of Supervisors. Board
decides whether or not to submit to
vote. Voting is at time of state primary
or general election. Of those voting 60%
or more must be in favor.

Initiation The South Dakota Conservancy District was created by the legislature as a separate corporate body with
boundaries coinciding with the boundaries of the state of South Dakota.
Authorizing Body State legislature.
Voter Approval None required.

!nitiation Petition I/lUSt represent 25%
of the landowners from each separate
geographical area within the subdistrict.
Petition is for an election on the establishment of SUbdistrict and is presented
to the state Natural Resources Development Board. If the board approves the
petition, the question will be placed on
a separate ballot at the next general election in the proposed area of the subdistrict for voter approval.
Authorizing Body Board of Natural Resources Development of South Dakota.
Public Notice and Hearing Not rnention~
ed in statutes.
Voter Approval Proposed subdistrict requires 60% favorable vote in any election
district. Municipalities are considered
::eparate election districts.

An election on dissolution is req uired
and must be held concurrently with a
primary or general election.

Not specified. Legislature could repeal
act and dissolve.

46-17).

Subdistrict can be dissolved by an affirmative vote of 60% in election called by
the Natural Resources Development
Board following receipt of a petition
signed by 25% of the landowners within
the subdistrict.
Upon dissolution, the powers of the
subdistrict board of directors is exercised
by the South Dakota Conservation District until responsibilities, Obligations,
and contractural commitments are
satisfied.
Any election district may withdraw
from a pro posed subdistrict by petitioning the Natural Resources Development
Board within 60 days of Board resolution to create. The withdrawal petition
must be signed by 25% of the land owners of the election district and then a
,.~______~______________________________L -____________________________~60%
____________________________
vote is required in another electio.n.~
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UTAH WATER
CONSERVANCY ACT
(U.C.A.73.9)
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UTAH METROPOUf AN
WATER DISTRICTS
(U.C.A. 73·8)

ARIZONA MULTICOUNTY
WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICTS
(ARSA.45·2601)

The number, representative and votes of
directors for each district is established
by court in decree creating district. For
a WCD of 1-4 counties, not more than 11
directors permitted. For a WCD of 5 or
more counties, 21 directors permitted.
Directors must be residents of district
and serve for three year terms. Directors
are selected as follows: WCD of single
county, director appointed by board
of county commissioners. WCD's of
more than one county have director
appointed by governor with advice and
consent of senate from nominee Submit ted by board of county commissioners and/or cities. Director chou.a chairman of board. MajOrity constitutes
quorum. Majority req uired to create
policy and excercise powers.

Directors appointed by legislative bodies
of municipalities they represent. For
more than 2 cities, each city allowed at
least 1 representative who is allowed 1
vote for each $10 million of assessed
value of property taxable for MWD pur·
poses. A city may appoint more repre·
sentatives, not exceeding 1 for each $1
million of assessed value. The total votes
allowed a city remains the same. For a
single city MWD, the legislative body of
the city shall cPoose 5 or 7 directors.
In each munidpality within MWD. 1
representative shall be the designated director of water supply and waterworks.
All ether elected, iippointed officia!::, or
employees of city are ineligible for
board. Municipalities adhere to a policy
of continuing reappointment of repre·
sentatives. Term is 6 years.

Membership to board of directors is by
election conducted the same time as a
U.S. presidential election. Candidates
are nominated by petition signed by not
less than 200 qualified electors. Term of
office is 4 years and director must be a
qualified elector of one of the counties
included in district. Each county entitled
to one director for each 100,000 people
in county (as certified by the Secretary
of State) based on the last decennial
census of the United States.
Majority of the Directors constitutes
a quorum.

Not a municipality. No statutory or con·
stitutional debt limitations. May create
reserve funds. Not req uired to spend in
the same year collections made for that
year. May invest any surplus or reserve
funds. May bOrTOW money and incur in·
debtedness. May study, investigate, and
promote water development within the
district. May obtain by any legal means
water rights, water works, etc., from
within or wit hout WCD boundaries and
dispose of for use within the district
boundaries. May construct and operate
all facilities necessary for carrying out
functions within or without the WCD.
Possesses power of eminent domain.
Full contract ural capacity. May contract
with the government of the United
States or any agency thereof. May ac·
quire perpetual rights to the use of aU
water from such works and sell and dis·
pose of perpetual rights from such works
to persons and corporations public and
private. May allot water to irrigation
lands. May fix rates at which nonirri·
gation water shall be sold or otherwise
disposed of. May make and collect fees
and charges for water connections. Has
power to levy and collect general and
specific taxes on property.
May generate a'nd sell electrical
power that is generated incidental to
the development of water under cer·
tain conditions.

Not a municipality. Statutory debt
limitation is 10% of assessed valuation.
May invest surplus or reserve funds. May
borrow money and incur indebtedness
with voter approval. May acquire water/
water rights within and/or without the
state. Develop, store, and transport
water. May join with other public or pri.
vate corporation for purpose of carrying
out any of its powers. Possesses power
of eminent domain. Fixes rates for delivered water in accordance with legisla·
tive intent to recover operating, capital,
and overhead costs through water
charges. Should taxes and charges be inadequate for obligations, the MWD may
authorize a special tax. Cities within
MWD have a preferential right to purchase water from the district.

A municipal corporation to the extent of
powers conferred by law and state con·
stitution. Funds may be expended at di·
rection of Board to effectuate purposes
of the act. May establish and maintain
surplus or reserve account in amounts
that may be 'required by contracts with
Secretary of the Interior. Cooperate and
contract with the Secretary to carry out
provisions of the Reclamation Act and
the Colorado River Project Act. May
contract with other governmental agen·
cies and organizations and may enter in·
to subcontracts with water users for the
delivery of water through facilities of
the Central Arizona Project.
May establish (and cause to be col·
lected) charges for water consistent with
federal reclamation law.
District is specifically not authorized
to determine how CAP water is to be
allocated.

One annual meeting plus special quarterIy meetings scheduled. Board sets annual
hearing date to receive objections to
property tax assessments. Minutes and
records open to public inspection. Per·
sons asserting invalid actions or unfair
tax assessments may appeal through the
judicial system.
Interested parties may be heard in
any petition for a board-initiated judi·
cial determination of acts with respect
to taxing, contracts, and powers.
When expenditures are greater than
income and revenue for a given year or
period of time, the issue must be sub·
mitted to the electors with published
notice followed by an election to be
held not less than 10 days following the
fmal notice. A majority vote by the el·
ectorate authorizes bonding or other
indebtedness.

All policy created by resolution or
ordinance. Regular and special meetings
are scheduled, subject to usual open
meetings, laws, and public access.
District sched ules publi c hearing an·
nually with adeq uate notice for input
to purposes and necessities of tax rate
recommended by board.

Holds annual and special meetings open
to public. Water user may file a petition
in the superior court of the county to
determine validity of his contract with
the District. Court hOlds hearing and
examines contract.
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Continued.
ARIZONA AGRICULTURAL
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
(ARS Chapter 45-901-1041)

COWRADO WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICTS
(CRS 37-45)

Management is by a board of directors
and a council. District is divided into 10
SUbdivisions. The board of directors consists of 10 directors. one elected from
each division. The council consists of 30
members, three elected from each division. President and vice president of the
board are elected along with councilmen
and directors and serve a term of 2
years. Nomination for councilman and
director is by petition signed by 2S
landowners within division. NOmination
for president is by petition signed by
250 landowners.

District Court shaH appoint a board of
directors of the district consisting of not
more than 15 persons who are residents
of the counties in which the water conservancy district is Situated, all of whom
shall be owners of real property in the
district. Term of office is 4 years. Members may be reappointed. A majority of
the directors shall constitute a quorum.
A concurrence of a majority of those in
attendance is sufficient for conducting
business of the board.

A public, political. taxing subdivision of
the state, and a municipal corporation,
... having immunity of its property and
bonds from taxation. No statutory debt
limit but, because bonds are lien on
iaod, bonds cannot exceed the value of
the land within the district. May create
reserve funds. May invest surplus, borrow and incur indebtedness. Survey,
plan, locate, and estimate costs of necessary works for irrigation, drainage, or
power. May enforce rules and regulations necessary to carryon any bUSiness
of district. Fix rates fo r power and
water. May not acquire water rights.
May acquire bonds, easements, and
other property, real and personal. Construct, operate and keep In repair all
works and property used for purposes
of district. May act as agent for land·
owners in district in all matters pertaining to purposes of district. Has right of
eminent domain. The council makes the
by-Iawa and sets policy for the government of the district. Management of the
bUSiness is by the Board of Directors
and its presiding officer. Profits from
sale of electricity can be used to defray
expenses of irrigating private lands.

Organized as a political subdivision of
Districts are political subdivisions of the
Colorado with the powers of a public
state, havin~ perpetual succession, and
or municipal corporation .
may sue an be sued. District has power
May take by any legal means water,
to adopt rules and regulations, may ac·
waterworks, water rights and sources of
quire property by eminent domain. May
water supply, and real and personal
promulgate and enforce land use and
property of any kind within or without
groundwater regulations. Make studies
the district convenient to the full exer·
and investigations relative to storing and
cise of its powers. May sell, lease, encum· transporting water for domestiC, irrigaber or otherwise dispose of water, water- tion, milling, manufacturinl! and all
works, water rights, and sources of sup·
other beneficial uses. May IX terms and
ply of water for use within the district.
rates for water supplies made available.
Has power of eminent domain. May
May acq uire and dispose of water rights.
make and execute contracts. May con·
May levy property tax not to exceed 1
tract with United States for construe·
mill. May borrow money and invest surlion, preservation, operation, and mainplus money in bonds or treasury notes;
teJ:l3DCe of t IInnels, reservoirs, regulating establish sinking fund; use grants and
basins, diversion canals and works, dams, state appropriations.
power plants, etc. and to acq uire per·
Board has authority to cooperate
petual rights to the use of water from
with other organizations and agencies
such works. Allocates water to land and
as deemed appropriate.
determines maximum beneficial use.
Fixes rates for water not allocated to
land. May borrow money and incur indebtedness. Board may be majority vote,
raise mill levy to maximum authorized
by law. May create reserve fund.
No authority to generate or sell electric energy except for district works and
fucilities.
Board may adopt bylaws not in con·
flict with the constitution and laws of
the state for carrying out the business,
objects, and affairs of the board and of
the district. It may organize subdistricts
upon petition and with court approval
and serve as directors of such subdistricts.

The council (30 members) holds an annual meeting and special meetings as
needed. Voters have access to policy
through the council and president of
the Board of Directors. Larger number
of representatives from each subdivision
provides better user access. Bonded inilebtedness requires vote approval.

Annual and other scheduled meetings
open to public, as are copies of minutes
and records.
Board will hear objections to assessments. The eourt shall not disturb the
findings of the board unless the findings
of the board are manifestl y disproportionate to assessments imposed upon
other property in the district.
Expenditures for district water proj·
ects in excess of annual income and
revenue shall be submitted to the elec·
torate for approval or rejection.

NEBRASKA NATURAL
RESOURCES DISTRICTS
(Revised Statutes 2-3200)

Number of board members for a given
district determined by the Natural Resources Commission. Boards elected for
4 year terms on nonpartisan ballot held
at the time of general state elections.
Majority of directors constitute a
quorum. A majority of the quorum is
necessary for initiating policy and
action.
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Districts give notice of, and hold, reguIarty scheduled open meetings. Annual
report of financial condition and scheduling of open discussion. Copies of
minutes and records reflecting opera·
tion, management, and business of dis·
trict open to public inspection.
Any pr0fterty owner may file a petition asking or amendments or repeal of
resolution or actions.
An appeal may be taken to the district court by any person aggrieved, by
f'tling an undertaking.
Boards within each river -basin meet
jointly at least twice a year for purpose
of coordinating their efforts for maximum benefit to the basin.
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Continued.
OREGON WATER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
Oregon Revised Statutes
(45-552)

SOUTH DAKOTA
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
(Chapter 46-17,
South Dakota Statutes)

SUBDISTRICTS OF SOUTH
DAKOT A CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT
(Chapter 46-18,
South Dakota Statutes)

Voters of a district shall elect a board of
directors whose number shall be fixed by
the County Board at the proceedings of
formation at either 5, 7, or 9. Directors
(3 year term) shall be owners of land in
district but not req uired to reside in
district.

Seven persons serving 4 year staggered
terms a ppointed by the governor with
the advice of the senate.

The South Dakota Natural Resources
Development Board shall determine the
number of directors (not to exceed 11)
and fix qualifications to effect an eq uitable representation of all areas within
the subdistrict. This first Board of Directors are elected at the time of creation. Subsequently, director candidates
are then nominated by a petition of 25
or more owners of real property in the
area to be represented. The petition is directed to the existing subdistrict board.
If only 1 individual is nominated, the
certificate of election is automatic. If
more than 1 individual is nominated,
names are then placed on a nonpolitical
ballot at the next general election. Directors ~v elected serve 4 year terms. A
majority of the directors constitutes a
quorum. Vacancies are filled by remaining directors from among any nominated
candidates. Directors choose chairman,
vice-chairman, secretary, and treasurer.

A governmental subdivision of the state,
and a public body, corporate and politic,
exerciSing public power. Full power to
carry out the objects of its creation. May
have perpetual succession, sue and be
sued. May also acquire by condemnation,
purchase, devise, gift or grant real and
personal property located inside or out·
side of district boundaries. May contract
with United States, or with any county,
city or state, or public district, for construction, preservation, improvement,
operation or maintenance of any works.
can build all works necessary and appropriate and acquire water rights and
sell. lease and deliver water.
May fix charges for water made available for any use so that the water system
is self sustaining.
May levy general tax, set service
charges and user fees. All indebtedness
to be paid from revenue collected. Deliveries of water to lands upon which
there are delinq uent 3ssessmen t is
withheld.
The board of directors manage and
conduct the affairs of the district, employ and appoint agents and employees,
establish rules and regulations for administration of affairs of district. Establish
and maintain funds and accounts for
funds, obtain an annual audit of books,
fix the location of the principal office of
the district, and keep and furnish to
county a record of all board proceedings.

Board acts as principal a uthorit y for the
Department of Natural Resource Development. Reviews and approves water development plans and supervises special
resource project districts. Makes comprehensive evaluation and allocation of the
total benefits and costs of all water facilities. Coordinates all federal, state, and
local water resource project activities in
the state. Presents req uests to legislature
for carrying out recommended programs
and projects.
District assists in the organization of
subdistricts including the conduct of referendums and elections. May cooperate
with subdistricts/agencies as guarantor of
payments.
May sue and be sued; aCQuire by purchase or lease all property as may be
needed and to dispose of same as needed;
exercise power of eminent domain; construct, operate, and maintain water resource development works not within a
subdistrict; contract with federal agencies, public entities. local groups, and individuals; cooperate with other agencies
in studying, investigating, and planning
water resource projects; perform independent investigations; accept gifts.
The district board does not have authority to generate, transmit, distribute,
or sell electrical power.

May acquire by purchase or lease all real
pro pert y necessary for the construction,
maintenance and operation of any or all
water resource projects. Ma y exercise
power of eminent domain. May accept
assistance, financial or otherwise, from
federal, state, and other public and private sources (excepting contributions or
gifts of money from private sources).
May enter into contract with United
States of America or any agency thereof,
public agencies of South Dakota, and
private corporations or persons. May
enter into contracts for supply of water
and distribution facilities to furnish
water for irrigation districts, persons,
public or private corporations, state and
federal agencies. May levy taxes not to
exceed 1 mill for each dollar of taxable
property after development contracts
have been signed. May accumulate a reserve fund from aforementioned tax
revenues.

Any land owner or qualified voter may
bring proceedings in the circuit court of
the county to determine the validity of
any order or act of the district.
Land owners may request construction of particular works. Completed
plan of project must be subjected to
hearing. After the nearing. board may
issue order of approval with amendments
or modifications. Land owners have opportunity to file written objections to
the order. Owners of more than 50% of
the land may reject the plan and kill
project.

Close legislative oversight on policy and : Subdistrict keeps accurate minutes of
programs.
meetings and boo ks of accounts; available during reasonable business hours
Board makes annual report to the
governor and legislature of activities, acfor public inspection. An annual audit
counting for all expenditures from the
must be filed with the South Dakota
South Dakota water facilities construcSecretary of State. Must give notice of
tion fund.
public hearings on granting the subdisBoard provides plan for financing of
trict board the authority to enter into
construction of projects to the legislacontracts for payment of costs associture. Legislature determines whether
ated with water development projects.
proposed financing plan is appropriate
Hearings must be held at places deemed
and may authorize issuance of bonds.
to give all persons, public entities, and
interested parties, 0 pportunity to be
heard. Must receive electoral approval
for contracting authority. After entering
into contract with United States government, board must submit contract to
circuit court for judicial exa mination.
Judge will give notice of hearing. Bud~
gets related to contracts with Unit ed
States government must be approved
by the South Dakota Natural Resources
Development Board.
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UTAH WATER
CONSERVANCY ACT
(U.CA.73·9)

ur AH

METROPO LIT AN
WATER DISTRICTS
(U.CA. 73·8)

ARIZONA MULTICOUNTY
WATER CONSERVATION
DISTRICTS
(ARSA45·2601)

~n~al Ta~ng All property taxable
WIthin DIStrict. May levy up to 2 y, mills
for administration, operation and maintenance of facilities. Tax rate for bond
repayment and obligations to United
States not limited.
Special Taxing Permitted for identified
purpose.
Bonding/Borrowing General obligation,
and general obligation-f'evenue bonds
with voter approval; 50 year maximum
matw:ity date. Reven ue bonds may be
submitted to electorate at the discretion
of the board.

Geneta1 Taxing The district levies an annual tax to defray costs and expenses
and for repayment obligation to the
United States. Such tax shall not exceed
10 cents per each 100 dollars (I mill) of
assessed valuation of the taxable property within the district.
Special Taxing None specified.
Miscellaneous The district further establishes and collects charges for water consistent with federal reclamation law.
May accept grants, gifts, or donations.
Disbursement of funds is limited to
meeting purpose of act which is to
guarantee repayment of construction
and operation costs of the CAP. Reserve account may be established and
surplus funds may be invested as regulated by laws pertaining to public bodies.
Restrictions of reclamation law and
Colorado River Basin Project Act also
apply.

To study, inVestigate, and promote
water development within the district.
To adopt plans and speCifications for
the wor ks for which the district was
organized.

No explicit mention of planning responsib ilit y.

None authorized. Subject to planning
powers vested in the Arizona Water
Commission.

No explicit requirements mentioned in
the statute.

No requirements mentioned explicitly
in the statute. While somewhat autonomous, the structure of the Board of Directors does creal e a de [acto coordinating link between the MWD and the
municipalities served.

District is subordinate to the Arizona
Water Commission and governed by
contract provisions to the Secretary
of the Interior.

General Taxing All taxable property
within District is levied. Maximum general property tax (Class A) rates established by the legislature. Levy is 1/2 mill
prior to any construction. After commencement of construction limit is 2
mills in areas of Utah served by water allotments from the Colorado River Compact to the Upper Basi nand 5 mills in
area served by Compact allotments to
the Lower Basin, and 1 mill in WCDs not
using Colorado River water. Up to 1/2
mill may be assessed additionally to meet
indebtedness requirements.
Special Taxing Qass B general property
tax on property located within munici~~.ti~les for contract':ld water services;
pro perty tax on irrigation and
districts; and Qass D property
Itax on individuals
and corporations.
The board has authority to raise
taxes and assessments to meet indebtedness requirements.
Bonding/Borrowing General obligation,
and general obligation-revenue bonds
must receive voter approval. Revenue
bonds may be issued upon board resolution. May borrow from private or public
lending agencies_
Miscellaneous May collect service
charges, user fees, interest on investments, rentals, etc.
No constitutional or statutory limitation on the amount of debt that may be
incurred.
Wide discretionary authority to expend funds for any water or water related activities and projects.
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Table 1.

Continued.
NEBRASKA NATURAL
RESOURCES DISTRIcrS

ARIZONA AGRICULTURAL
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICf
(ARS Chapter 45-901-1041)

COWRADO WATER
CONSERVANCY DISTRICfS
(CRS 37-45)

General Taxing No authority.
Special Taxing A tax to raise money to
maet expenses can be assessed to all
landowners on a per acre basis. District
tax can be paid separately without paying other county taxes. (Statute has
provisions for district to make contributions to tax rolls in lieu of tax.)
Bonding/Borrowing Bonds can be issued
after approval by the landowners, and
after testing for validity in superior
court. Cannot be issued for periods long·
er than 40 years. Become a lien on all
land within district. Repaid from taxes
assessed against land. If other reven ue
of district is sufficient, the bonds may
be paid therefrom and the tax may be
remitted. District may incur short term
debt as permitted by any municipal
cor poration.
Miscellaneous The district may collect
service charges, user fees, interest on in·
vestments, rentals, etc. on water service,
drainage service, and electrical power
service.

General Taxing Oass A general property
tax on all property within the district
not to exceed 1 mill except in event of
potential default when mill levy may be
increased up to 1/2 mill.
Special Taxing dass B general property
tax for special benefits accruing to property within municipalities for which
water is allocated. Oass C property tax
for benefits accruing to public corporations (other than municipalities) for
which use of water is allocated. Oass D
assessments to owners of lands for which
use of water is allocated.
Bonding/Borrowing May issue bonds
and interim notes. General obligation,
and general obligation-revenue bonds
must rezeive voter approval.
Miscellanenll8 May collect service
charges, user fees, interest on investments, rentals, etc.
No statutory limitation on the
amount of debt that may be incurred.
Broad discretionary authority to expend fundS for any water or water related activities and projects.
Required to deposit funds in special
account established by state treasurer
and to expend funds for district
purposes.

General Taxing Each district may levy
and collect a property tax not to exceed
1 mill annually unless a higher levy shall
be authorized by a majority vote of
those voting on the issue at a regular
election. May levy an additional 1/4 mill
for purposes related to groundwater
management.
Special Taxing May levy special assessment in amounts and for periods of time
needed for repayment of improvement
projects. Assessment is on the basis of
the val ue of water delivered.
Bonding/Borrowing May issue revenue
bonds for purpose of financing construction of facilities. Issuance of raven ue
bonds must be approved by 2/3 of the
board of directors.
Miscellaneous May sc~k state funds
available through the NRD Fund administered by the Natural Resources Commission.
Funds disbursed at the discretion of
the board of directors.

The district may do planning as necessary to successfully meet the needs for
electric power and water service within
the district.

No specific mention of planning function. Adopts plans and specifications for
the works for which the district was
organized.

Each natural resources district shall prepare and adopt a master plan to include
but not be limited to a statement of
goals and objectives for each of the purposes stated in section 2·3229. The master plan shall be reviewed and updated
as often as deemed necessary by the dis·
trict, but in no event less often than
once each 1 0 years.
Each district shall also prepare and
adopt a long range implementation plan
which shall summarize pl~nned district
activities and inelude pr(,."ctions of financial manpower, and land rights
needs of the district for at least 5 years.
Plans are for 1) erosion prevention
and control, 2) prevention of damages
from flood water and sediment, 3) flood
prevention and control, 4) soil conservation, 5) water supply for any beneficial
use, 6) development, management, utilization and conservation of groundwater
and surface water, 7) pollution control,
8) solid waste disposal and sanitary
drainage, 9) drainage iml?rovement and
Channel rectification, 10) development
of fish and wildlife habitat, 11) development and management of recreational
and park facilities, and 12) forestry and
range management.

No requirement mentioned explicitly in
the statute. Has heeded legislative blue
ribbon committee recommendation that
the district ma ke an annual contribution
from earned revenues to the county tax
roUs in lieu of taxes collected. A superior court decision has stated the district
function is purely business and economic and not political and governmental,
and that it is owned by private landholders and not by the public.

No explicit req uirements in stat utes.

All plans, facilities, works, and programs
must conform to state water plans, state
outdoor recrea tion plan, and the state
fish and wildlife plan. Agencies have 30
days to comment on proposed plans.
Copies of rules, regulations, COfltracts audits, agreements, etc. must be
furnished to the Natural Resources Commission. Rules and regulations must not
conflict with municipal, county, or regional land use regulations.
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(Revised Statutes 2.3200)

Table 1.

Continued.
OREGON WATER
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT
Oregon Revised Statutes
(45·552)

SOUTH DAKOTA
CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
(Chapter 46-17,
South Dakota Statutes)

SUBDISTRICTS OF SOUTH
DAKOT A CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT
(Chapter 46-18,
South Dakota Statutes)

Genm:al Taxing Ad valorem tax levy on
all property within the district up to
limit speCified in the initiating petition.
May also assess additional tax if needed
specifically for bond debt service. Up to
l'h mills of ad valorem taxes may be
used to maintain a revolving fund for
planning and construction of district
works. The maximum rate of tax levy
as stated in the petition cannot be
changed except by voter approval.
Spedal Taxing May also assess against
lands to be benefited for all or part of
c.osts for building, purchasing, operating,
maintaining, and improving the district
works. An owner of land is not considered a beneficiary unless under a contract
with the district.
Bonding/Borrowing May issue general
obligation bonds as authorized by voters.
Outstanding bonds may never exceed
more than 2 'h% of true cash value of all
taxable property within the district.
Bonds must mature within SO years of
issue date. May pledge as additional security any or all of net revenue. May
borrow from state or federal loan agency under loan contract.
MiscellallBoUB May levy and collect service charges and user fees for operation,
maintenance, and administration.

General Taxing No authority.
Spedal Taxing No authority.
Bonding/Borrowing Legislature may authorize issuance of bonds for projects it
has previously accepted. The board may
at its discretion issue bonds in an amount
not to exceed in aggregate of $5 million
at any time for the purpose of financing
projects. Bonds must not exceed maturity date of more than SO years and may
bear interest at rates determined by the
district .
District has power to req uire security
in form of liens of income revenues and
rentals: it shall create a reserve fund for
prevention of default of its bonds by
charging an insurance premium upon
interest charged on its loans.
The district may in no way cbligate
debt on behalf of the State of South
Dakota or make encumbrances not
specifically provided by the legislature.
Bonds issued by the district are not enforceable against the state, nor shall payment on bonds be from any income of
the district except that pledged and assigned to the holders of district bonds.
The special revolving fund is established in the state treasury. Disbursement is by warrants drawn by the state
auditor pursuant to vouchers approved
by the district.
May borrow on interim notes with
restrictions on duration and collateral
security.
Each project separately audited.
Miscellaneous Board may seek legislative appropriations for meeting state
share of costs and establiShing loan
funds.

General Taxation All taxable property
within a subdistrict may be levied. Prior
to any contractural agreements, the
limit is set at 1/10 of I mill on each dol·
lar. After entering into contractural
agreements, levy may be raised to a maximum of I mill on each dollar.
Special Taxation No special taxing
authority.
Bonding/Borrowing Not mentioned in
statutes.
Miscellaneous May receive reimbursable
funds from the revolving fund of the
South Dakota Conservancy District. All
monies collected shall be deposited
either in accounts of the state treasurer
to credit of subdistrict or depository approved by the board of directors.

The district shall prepare general plans
of watershed improvement shOwing existing and proposed works of the district and other public and private agencies relating to water use and control.

Preparation of a comprehensive statewide water plan and development system with yearly progress reports and updates not less than once every 4 years.
State Planning Bureau sets procedural
guidelines and receives recommended
components of statewide water plan
submitted by Department of Natural
Resource Development, Environmental
Protection and Wildlife, and Parks and
Forestry. Planning staffs of each department work jointly in developing
proposed components.
Board recommends to governor and
legislature those portions of the statewide water plan considered necessary.
For facilities established by legislature as
part of state water management system,
board ma y coo perat e wit h appropriate
agencies and private interests in assessing
economic feasibility and requesting legislative authorization. Board must determine the priorit y of any or all such facil·
ities and present findings of benefits,
costs, cost-sharing and other pertinent
factors to the governor and the legislature. Board req uests legislative appropriations and other means of financing
state governments share of costs of
water facilities as may be authorized.

Mentioned only as "planning costs"
which might be financed through use of
the South Dakota Conservancy District
revolving fund.

Plan may be in cooperation with the
state engineer and shall conform to the
state declared water resources policy.
Project plans must be approved by state
engineer if costing more than $5000, un·
less developed by federal agencies. District shall demonstrate a basis for the coordination and planning of future works
to assure the maximum beneficial use
and conservation of the water resources.
Plans shall be based on inventory of
water supplies and water needs and
plans and programs -developed by the
State Water Resources Board.

Board responsibility to both the statewide district and the State Depart ment
of Natural Resources Development integrates state and district policies and
programs. aose legislative oversight in
approval of projects and funding a uthorization makes board responsive to
legislative requirements. Liaison to
statewide system of subdistricts having
own procedures for board selection and
policy formation provides consideration
of local needs and desires.
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Several of the aforementioned powers
can be exercised only ,vith approval of
the South Dakota Natural Resources
Development Board.

and transferring money to the federal government with no policy making
powers.
The Oregon Water Improvement District statute provides broad
latitude in purpose including flood control, agricultural, municipal,
industrial, and other water uses, as well as water management related
to recreation and the enhancement of water quality and fish and wildlife.
The specific mention of flood damage prevention and water
quality enhancement in the Oregon statute contrasts with the emphasis
on water supply for irrigation, municipal, and industrial uses
fied in the Utah, Colorado, and Arizona statutes.
The Nebraska and South Dakota statutes stress the general public
welfare objective in the establishment of their districts.
However,
the purpose of consolidating overlapping and duplicative organizations
seems a clear intent also.
The South Dakota act expresses particular
concern for the sovereign role of the state in achieving the coordinating and integrating objective sought.
Nebraska and Oregon statutes
reveal this concern also.
South Dakota is unique in specifying that it
is the legislative intent for any water resource projects developed
under the act to relate cost burdens to benefits received by any
beneficiary (including the general public).
Procedure for Creation
The principles of due process are generally a guide 1n developing
the procedures for creating a districi.
The creation of a special district with power to tax, to condemn,
and to use property and natural resources carries the risk that individual property rights might be impaired or that the production
capacity of some might be reduced.
Special district governments
are usually concerned wi th produc ts or services that are d iscernib Ie
and measurable and somewhat predictable from the outset.
However,
adequate provision should be made for making the purpose and funct ion
of the new organization known and the obligations under which members
will be placed if created.
The statutes generally require that after the
made known the following steps should ensue:

intent

to form is

1.

Proper notice should be given to all persons likely to be
affected.

2.

A hearing should be held.

3.

Arguments both for and against should be heard.

4.

A judgment should be rendered after all facts are in.

Provision must also be made for continued input and surveillance
by the governed.
This is most ordinarily done through the election
process.
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Oregon and South Dakota adhere closely to the above principles in
the formation of districts.
The intent to organize can be voiced
either by the board of county supervisors, who are probably listening
to a vocal constituency, or by the property owners themselves who do so
by signing a petition and delivering it to the county.
A hearing is
held to obtain citizen views and when these are considered, the county
supervisors reject the plea or accept it and call for an election.
A
60 percent majority of all votes cast must be in favor for the new
district to be organized.
Utah and Colorado have almost identical statutes and requirements
for creation, however, Utah has revised and added to the statute with
time, generally to facilitate the creation.
The intent to organize a district in Utah and Colorado must be
made known by petitions filed with a district judge.
The number of
signatures required is very minimal.
In Utah, not over 500 signatures
of property owners living in unincorporated areas and not over 100
signatures required from land owners living in each incorporated
area are required regardless of the size of the county or city.
When a district judge receives a properly signed petition to organize a
district, the judge publishes notice that a petition has been filed and
sets the time for a public hearing. After the formalities of the
hearing are over the judge must rule on the technical correctness of the
petition (number of signatures, whether from incorporated or unincorporated areas, and whether assessed valuation of property is correct),
and take notice of whether a protest has been filed. If no protest has
been filed by petition, or if protest petitions are incorrect in any
way, the judge must rule in favor of the "for" petition and declare the
district created. In order for a protest petition to meet the requirements of law, 20 percent of all land owners in both unincorporated and
in each incorporated area must sign and these land owners must represent
20 percent of the assessed valuation within the county. These signatures must be collected within the time period from the date of filing
the original petition and the date set for hearing, a period from 60 to
90 days.
Protest petitions are not received at the hearing. The
hearing will only accept objections to the statements in the original
petition. Due process may be served in that notice is published that a
petition has been filed, but the authorizing agent, in this case a
district judge, does not render judgment on the wisdom of creating or
not creating a district or on the determined desires of the majority of
land owners. The judge rules only on the technical correctness of the
papers filed.
Notable changes in the Utah WCD statutes over the years has
been (1) to substantially reduce the proportion of property owners
needed for a valid advocacy petition and to make the requirements for
the protest petition more stringent; and (2) to make it almost impossible for incorporated cities or towns to be excluded. Thus, the
statutes appear to have been progressively changed to favor the adoption
of WCD' s.
Although the Utah WCD law was patterned after the Colorado
WCD statutes initially, the Colorado statutes have maintained provisions
to exclude larger municipalities from inclusion unless authorized by
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governing bodies.
Colorado statutes have also maintained a balance 1n
signatures required for either a for or against petition.
In Oregon,
South Dakota, and Arizona (Agricultural Improvement District) where
petitions begin with property owners the same as Utah and Colorado,
voter approval is required to create a district.
The Arizona Multicounty Water Conservancy District is formed more in the manner of Utah
and Colorado requiring a specified number of qualified voters to sign a
petition in favor of formation.
Instead of district courts scheduling
hearings and declaring a district organized, the Arizona Water Commission performs this function in Arizona.
Utah and Colorado use the district court as the authorizing body,
while the other states use either the county board of supervisors or
Some administrative branch of state government.
The elements of district creation are summarized and compared in
Tab Ie 2.
Procedure for Termination or
Withdrawal from District
People organize to accomplish what could not be done individually.
The organization is the means to the end.
When the end has been
realized, the organization should be terminated.
Of course dissolution
should not be a way of escaping commitments.
Provisions for withdrawals from a district or termination of its life are always conditioned by requirements to satisfy all legal and financial obligations.
Where special districts are created by a legislative act and
are intended to be a permanent governmental entity, such as the natural
resource districts in Nebraska, there is little need for a dissolution
prOV1S10n.
Should a change be desirable, the legislature could repeal
the act and dissolve the districts.
However, where legislation is
enabling, and districts are organized by those sensing the need, there
should be prov1s10n for withdrawal or termination if those residing
within the district should conclude that it is no longer needed.
Of the different special districts examined, only four have
statutory prov1s10ns for termination, Oregon, South Dakota subdistricts, Utah MWD, and Arizona MCD.
Because the Arizona MCD is an
agent organization having repayment contracts with the federal government, the Secretary of the Interior must approve the dissolution of the
Arizona MCD.
Similar conditions are placed on the Utah and Colorado
WCD's.
The Colorado WCD statute provides for dissolution of a WCD i f
it has not been authorized to incur bonded or other undebtedness by its
constituency.
Utah makes no such provision.
Utah has several WCD's
created in anticipation of specific projects.
In instances where the
projects have failed to material ize, di strict organizations have continued with activities mostly directed toward promoting other projects.
The Utah MWD can be terminated upon resolution of the governing
board and when voter approval is obtained.
The dissolution requirements are summarized 1n Table 3.
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Table 2.

Statutory method of creating special ,districts.

Signed
Petition
Utah WCD

Ordinance
or
Resolution

Legislative
Act

Yes

0

Utah MWD

Notice
Published

Pub lie
Hearing
Yes

CD

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Arizona
Agr.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Colorado
WCD

0

Yes

ill

Notes
~ Protests must be

-

Yes

Arizona
Mul t 1.

Authorizing
Body
District
Court

0

Yes

CD

Voter
Approval

City Legislative Body

~

0

County Board
of Supervisors

Voter qualification include
ownership of 1
acre or more and
21 years of age

District
Court

Protests must be
filed by petition.
Hearing will accept
objections only.

Q'\

Oregon
So. Dakota CD
So. Dakota SCD

2

Yes
Yes

State legis1ature
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

County Board
of Supervisors
State legislature

Yes

Yes

Ordinance is published one time

Arizona State ~ Petition or resoWater Commislution, not both
sion

VJ

Nebraska
NRD

filed by petition.
Hearing wi 11
accept objections
but not protests.

Yes

Table 3.

Procedure for district dissolution.
Fonnal
Procedure
for
Dissolution

No
Provision

Notes

x

Utah WCD
Utah MWD

x

Requires a resolution by
ci ty governing board and
voter approval

Arizona
Mult
ounty WCD

x

Requires approval of Arizona
State Water Commission and
Secretary of State

Arizona
Agr. Impr. Distr.

x

Colorado
WCD

x

Nebraska
NRD
Oregon WID

x

x
x

So. Dakota CD
So. Dakota SCD

Voter approval

x

Voter approval

Selection of Officers
Statutory provisions for the selecting of officers who govern
the activities of a district show concern for proper representation
of those to be served by the organization and accountability to them.
Thus, qualifications for candidacy are often outlined and directors are
nonnally selected through an election process. Colorado and Utah WCD's
have been unique in providing for district courts to appoint directors
to the governing board. Utah just recently altered its statutes to make
the district board of directors appointive by the legislative and
administrative branches of government.
Since Colorado has a system of
district water courts, the use of the judicial branch in the appointive
process may have some credence in that state.
Although Nebraska drew
heavily on the Colorado water conservancy district act in providing for
similar districts in 1947, it avoided use of the courts in its creation
and officer selection process.
The reclamation districts fonned under
37

Nebraska fS 1947 act have since been merged into the natural resource
districts, organized under more recent legislation.
For the statewide conservancy district in South Dakota, directors
are appointed by the governor.
South Dakota subdistricts, which are
comparable to districts in other states, choose their officers by an
election process.
The Arizona, Nebraska, and Oregon districts select
membership to their board of directors by election also.
The Utah Metropolitan Water District Act provides for board' of
director appointments by the legislative bodies of municipalities
invo lved.
Municipal officials are accountable to the constituency to
be served by the MWD by having to stand for election periodically.
The process is summarized 1n Table 4.
Powers and Legal Rights
All of the districts studied are corporate entit ies and have the
same generic power and legal rights of most public corporations relative
to water matters.
Most are given very broad authority to act independently and to have substantial disgressionary power. The Utah WCD, Utah
MWD, Colorado WCD, Arizona AID, and the South Dakota subdistrict s are
the least restricted by statute. The Arizona MCD is single purpose and
limited in fiscal authority and project activity.
The South Dakota
statewide district is more of a coordinator of projects and water
resource planning and development rather than their initiator.
The
Arizona AID is a municipal corporation with the tax immunities granted
municipali ties.
The district s in Utah are defined by the courts as not
being municipalities and therefore not restricted in the amount or
length of time of indebtedness.
The powers and legal rights of districts as outlined in state statutes are shown in Table 1. Multi-purpose water districts of the kind examined in this study have taxing,
bonding, and borrowing authority.
They may enter into contracts for
construction and operation of facilities and may fix rates at which
water will be sold.
States have differed 1n the granting of certain powers and rights
to districts.
For example most state statutes prohibit districts
from generating electrical power for sale.
However, the generation
and sale of power is an important function of the Arizona AID and
profits from the sale of power have been used to defray costs of providing water for agricultural lands.
Most states allow districts to acquire water rights and to sell,
lease, or dispose of them as well.
The Arizona AID
specifically
prohibited from acquiring water rights.
A significant difference between states is in the legislative
preservation of political or electoral linkages to the executive
or legislative branches of state and local government.
In most states,
water conservancy districts have direct administrative control by the
state.
This has been notably absent in Utah and Colorado, although the
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Table 4.

Selection of officers.
Appointed
by
Legislative
Body

Appointed
by
Governor

Utah WCD

x

x

Utah MWD

x

Appo inted
by Court

Election

Arizona
Multi-county
WCD

x

Arizona
Agr. Impr.
Distr.

x

Colorado
WCD

Notes

x

x

Nebraska
NRD

Oregon WID

X

So. Dakota
CD

South Dakota
conservancy
district is
statewide and
governed by
the board of
the Water and
Natural Resources
Department.

X

So. Dakota
SCD

X

lFor single county districts.
2For multiple county districts but with advice and consent of the
senate from nominat ions provided by the board of county commissioners
and cities in special cases.
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new appointment authority (pertaining to multi-county districts) in Utah
gives the gover~or a measure of state administrative control.
Opportunity for Input/Approval
of Policy Options
Probably one of the most difficult things in government is to
get appropriate feedback from the constituency so that officials can
know if the things they are doing are right or acceptable to those
paying the bills.
General purpose government must respond to voter
approval and lobbying pressure. Policy making in special districts does
not normally receive the public scrutiny it deserves (Hawkins 1976).
When governing boards are appointed by the courts as in Colorado (and
previously in Utah) there is little opportunity for policy issues to be
debated or discussed as in an election.
It is more difficult for
unelected or appointed board members to maintain the kind of constituency contact that would be ideal.
There is no statutory language directing districts governing
boards to keep the public informed, to hold forums or elections on
specific decisions, or to sense the public mood on particular issues.
If motivated, the public can attend open meetings and peruse the minute
books and financial records which are open for public inspection. Some
districts are required to file an annual report and some, on their own,
promote public relations-type activities which emphasize engineering
features and project benefits with little stress on possible disbenefits.
Two states, Oregon and the South Dakota subdistricts require that
projects receive the approval of the voters and hold public hearings
to debate issues.
The states are compared in summary form in Table 5.
Sources of Funding and
Financial Responsibility
The method of acquiring money and the accountability for the
spending of that money are important factors by which district governments may be judged and compared.
Statutod ly, di strict s have several ways of obtaining revenues.
The most distinctive method for the kinds of organizations reviewed in
this study is the power to levy taxes.
These can be general taxes,
usually assessed to property owners on the basis of the value of the
property, or special taxes assessed on a unit basis.
Use of the
general tax assumes that all taxpayers are beneficiaries either directly, or indirectly.
The special tax recognizes the more specific
benefit and collects only from those who are direct beneficiaries.
Other revenue sources include tolls and fees collected for services
rendered, and direct appropriations from state government.
In addition, districts have the use of credit and can borrow or bond with
repayment spread over short or long periods of time.
Federal funds may
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Table 5.

Opportunity for input/approval of policy.
Open Meetings
Regularly
Scheduled

Water Approval
of Debts or
Contracts

Utah WCD

1 annually,
special
quarterly

Yes

Utah MWD

Regul ar
meetings
time fixed
by directors

Yes

Arizona
Mul t i.

Annual plus
special as
required

Arizona
Agr.

Quarterly
meetings,
special as
required

Yes

Colorado
WCD

As needed
set by board

Yes

Nebraska
NRD

Monthly

Oregon

Annually,
special as
needed

So. Dakota CD

Quarterly
upon call by
chairman

So. Dakota SCD

Annual Meeting, others
as set by
directors

..,..
I-'

Individual Access
to Jud ic ial Systern on District
Contracts, etc.

Legislative
Oversight

Hearings on
Projects

Annually

Yes

Yes

Yes

Annually

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Hearings to
Object to Tax
Levies

Annually

Yes

Yes

Yes

Electoral
Selection of
Officers

Yes

Yes

also be managed by districts with repayments guaranteed through taxes or
revenue.
The WCDs ~n Utah and Colorado have multiple layers of taxing
authority and frequently utilize a mix of taxes and rate charges for
services rendered.
This mixture is often influenced by the nature of
the production process within the district.
For example, large water
development projects may see a great deal of time elapse between the
initial expense and the availability of a marketable good.
If the
length of time is great enough, the district may be unable to utilize
the normal financing tool of bonding and have to seek a financial
instrument that will postpone the repayment obligation over a long
period of time until the product is available.
Other production processes, such as well drilling, may show sufficiently short gaps between
construction and product availability.
Such short time periods could
possibly accommodate better the use of bonding.
Within the State of
Utah, the Central Utah Water Conservancy District has faced enormous
delays that span decades between the initial construction and the final
availability of water. Thus, this district has utilized the general tax
(Class A) to provide revenues until such time as a product is available
to begin rate charges. The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District
uses a combination of rate charges and general taxes to secure revenue
needed for operations. In 1976, the district obtained 76 percent of its
total revenues from water sales, and 17 percent of revenues from taxes.
The Weber Basin Water Conservancy District also utilizes a mixture of
water charges and taxes to obtain needed revenues.
The water conservancy district uses bonding 'as a financial tool
under certain circumstances.
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy
District had, in 1980, an outstanding bonded debt of $8,740,725 which
represented various bond issues sold in the period 1953-1980. The Weber
Basin Water Conservancy District had, in 1980, an outstanding bonded
debt of $2,674,000 which represented various bond issues sold in the
period 1971-1979.
This bonded obligation compares to an outstanding
1980 government contract obligation of $72,164,768.
The Salt Lake
County WCD had no such outstanding obligation. The Central Utah Water
Conservancy District does not appear to have been active in using bonds
as a financial instrument. While tax revenues may provide a sure way of
meeting repayment requirements, taxes almost always redistribute cost
and benefit burdens in ways that are difficult to follow. South Dakota
district statutes state a legislative intent that financing should
relate reasonably and equitably to the benefits received by each user.
Since rate charges are most suitable for accomplishing this perhaps the
use of taxing powers are to be sparingly used in South Dakota.
The Arizona AID produces and sells electric power in addition to
water and as a result has sufficient income to eliminate the need to
tax.
Electric revenues are used to subsidize the costs of water
distribution and have been sufficient to allow the district to make a
contribution to the county in lieu of taxes paid.
The statutes of the several states are summarized in Table 6.
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Table 6.

Sources of funding and financial responsibility.

Utah WCD

General
Tax

Special
Tax

1,2,5

Yes

User
Fees

Reserve
Accounts

Debt
Limitation

Yes

Yes

Yes

None

No
No

Bonding (G.O.
Revenue, G.O.
Revenue)

Spending
Limits

Notes

mi lls
Utah MWD

2.5 mills

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

10%

Arizona
Multi-county
WCD

1.0 mill

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Colorado
WCD

1.5 mill

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Nebraska
NRD

1.25 mill

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Unless raised by majority
vote.
Revenue bonds only.

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Mill levy set by voters.
G.O. only.

No

0J

No

Yes

0)

No

Bonds are revenue only and
not a state obligation.
Reserve account for bond
retirement and default.
Bonding limit set by legislature for each authorized
project. In addition, district may bond up to $5
million to fianance construction of subdistrict
projects.

Ar izona
Agr. Impr.
Distr.

"'"
W

Oregon WID
So. Dakota CD

So. Dakota SCD

CD
Yes
CD

No

1.0 mill

No

o
@

No

No

CD

®

No

Yes
for CAP
only

No

Limited by bonding capacity
which is secured by value
of property owners
21 Limited to prudent investvestment

®

No

No

Planning Responsibility
The two states with statewide districts, Nebraska and South
Dakota district statutes reflect a definite planning responsibility
fitted to statewide water development plans.
Oregon districts are
required to mesh any project plans with state policy but other states
make little or no mention of a planning function in enabling statutes.
The Arizona AID operates more like a private-business corporation than
do districts of other states.
It makes independent projections of
needs and plans to provide future service accordingly.
Districts in
Utah and Colorado have traditionally done little or no independent
planning as such, but rely on plans developed by others, principally the
Bureau of Reclamation. Districts not contractually obligated to Department of the Interior financed projects have made plans and designs as
needed or commissioned the work done.
Requirements for Coordination with or
Subordination to State, Regional, and
General Purpose Government
Three of the states studied have specific reference in the statutes to statewide policies and goals and establish lines of authority
to state government.
Oregon has a water policy review board as part of
its Department of Natural Resources which has power to issue policy
statements to which all subdivisions of the state are subject.
The
legislation which created the policy review board also sets the guidelines for state policy and specifically states that,
the principle of sovereignty of this state over
all waters within the state [shall] be protected and preserved, and such cooperation by the board shall be designed so
as to reinforce and strengthen state control.
(536.310,(10»
Any project plans made by Oregon districts must be submitted
to the State Engineer for approval.
Nebraska and South Dakota have a statewide perspective with
regard to district organization. District structure in these states is
designed to establish state sovereignty and to consolidate and coordinate small governmental entities.
Statewide oversight and cooperation
is made more certain with regard to the operation of water conservancy
districts in those states.
There are no explicit statutory requirements given for Utah,
Colorado, and Arizona with respect to formal coordination or subordination to state level agencies.
There are no statutory ties to the state
executive nor to local general purpose governments. The Arizona WCD is
a contracting agent of the Secretary of the Interior subject to the
control and supervision of the Arizona Water Commission.
The Arizona
AID is autonomous but has shown a relatively high sensitivity to public
opinion and to the wishes of the Arizona legislature.
The Utah and Colorado WCDs in the past have possessed substantial
autonomy with no legal state executive control, nor any required coordination with local or regional governments.
The recently acquired
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authority of the governor of Utah to appoint board members of WCDs
embracing more than one county will subject Utah's larger WCD's to a
measure of state executive direction.
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CHAPTER III
ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO APPROPRIATE
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTIONS
As new water management agencies come into being and as soc ial
institutions, values, and circumstances change, interactive patterns
between and among water related institutions are subject to change
also. The form of these associations and interactions may be peculiar
to a part icular set of circumstances and may be short lived.
On the
other hand, water management with long-term objectives and commitments
may result in long-lasting linkages.
It is difficult to generalize an
optimal form or framework of interaction or to anticipate the form
that will best serve the needs of future generations. It is reasonable
to assume that each generation is capable of determining what framework
of interaction meets its needs. The concern is whether the achievement
of the desired framework is impeded or denied because of earlier decisions and commitments.
Recognizing that what is socially acceptable
and effective at one point in time may come to be seen as cumbersome,
counterproductive, and socially inefficient at a later point in time,
the need is to maintain the capacity of a social system to self-adjust
and change its institutions and their operating policies.
What is
desirable is to minimize the institutionalization of impediments that
prohibit systems from self-correction.
The kind of impediments which
tend to become institutionalized and/or those which seem to be chronic
over time are perhaps the most important to jdentify.
Although most water management entities may have their jurisdictions explicitly defined, those jurisdictions are not always mutually
exclusive.
Sometimes water-related legislation will anticipate or
foster certain kinds of institutional linkages. At times, an operating
po Hcy of a broad-based agency will set the pattern of re lat ionsh ips
among organizations with cooperative ties.
Factors of growth and
change, i.e., urbanization, have a significant influence on the way
water management entities choose to interact with one another.
Impediments to mutually satisfying and effective interaction may
result from structural arrangements which create unacceptable balances
or conflicts of agency autonomy and power; from procedures or processes
inadequate to maintain clear communicative channels and make all relevant information available; from incompatible operating policies which
obstruct the proper meshing of agency functions and activities; and from
unpredictable and/or uncontrollable exogenous influences.
The inquiry and analysis of impediments to effective institutional interaction is largely confined to Utah examples ln the more
rapidly urbanizing areas along the Wasatch Front.
The information
coming from interviews, discussions, and written materials were categorized according to the evaluation criteria outlined in Chapters I and
II.
It appeared that the more predominant and persistent sources of
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impediment to effective interaction among water management
could be best presented under the following headings:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

entities

Decision-making Processes
Authorities and Functions
Institutional Operating Policies
Federal Program Relationships
State Program Relationships
Special Interest Group Relationships
Financial Sources and Options

Because identified impediments often exhibit influence ln more
than one of the above general categories, some overlap in discussion
is inevitable.
An improportionate share of the problem examples within the above
categories are related to the Central Utah Water Conservancy District.
Being by far the largest WCD in the state, with a large and active
construction program, and with negotiations in progress with many
potential customers, it is inevitable that reference to interactions
with that district are made by a large majority of those interviewed
in Utah.
As has been mentioned previously, interview responses have
a time dependency and CUP issues are currently active.
Decision-making Process
As has been indicated, decision-making units, decision-making
processes, and the nature of decisions faced are highly diverse.
Some
decisions are sequent ial; others are once and for all. Some decisions
made independently have little impact on other institutions and their
operat ions.
Other independent decis ions init iate a significant ripple
effect.
Where decisions and actions of one entity may generate an
adverse reaction from another, there is need for transmitting or exchanging knowledge and information not just to verify the original
decision but to authenticate and modify it over time.
Institutional interactions can be triggered by decisions of many
different kinds.
Put in form of questions, the following may illustrate some situations where decisions or actions of one entity may
affect or be affected by those of another. How is the location, kind,
and size of physical works (i.e., pipelines, reservoirs, treatment
plants, etc.) decided?
Are water service needs set out in city,
county, or state master plans or must a water manager make independent
decisions based on its own projections of use patterns?
How do institutions responsible for land use planning and management and water
planning and management obtain information about the intentions of each
other and how do they provide comment and input to the decisions of one
another?
Do suppl iers of water in any given locale review or confirm
projections for services with city and county planners?
Must water
service plans of the separate organizations be submitted to other
entities for review and approval? What are the provisions for citizen
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participation and feedback in the decision-making process? What is the
impact of special interest groups (i.e., realtors, developers, landowners, etc.) on water management decisions?
Are decisions influenced
by federal programs or mandates?
Are decisions influenced by state
programs and controls? Do state laws authorizing cities and counties to
carry out land planning and zoning activities influence operational
decisions of water suppliers?
The search for answers to such questions may reveal potentials
for disputation when organizational decisions are made unilaterally
and may point in the direction of measures to mitigate these potentially
troublesome situations.

Colorado River Development Priority
and Its Effect on Institutional
Decision Making
The long held and broadly supported state objective to develop and
use Utah's share of the Colorado River provides an example of how a
single major decision can effect the evolution, character, and interactive patterns of many other water institutions.
Driven by a conviction that highly desirable social and economic transformations would be
triggered by development of Colorado River water, and spurred by a
concern that other states may somehow gain possession of Utah's entitlement if not promptly put to use, getting Utah's share of the Colorado
River developed and in use has been an accepted goal of every state
administration.
The Central Utah Project (CUP~ has been viewed as the
ultimate solution for utilizing Colorado River water in meeting the
growing water needs of a chronically water-short state. The project "has
been pursued over many years with the expectation that there will be
ready markets for the water to be made available.
From its early conception, the CUP sponsors have sought to obtain
Department of the Interior financing with the attractive subsidies
obtainable under the reclamation program. The state has been willing to
accept development under Department of the Interior ground rules and to
allow the Bureau of Reclamation great latitude in the planning and
design of project features.
The acceptance of financing, planning, and
cons truc tion within the framework of federal rec lamation law, together
with an a priori presumption about the net public benefits of this
development decision, has in turn set bounds and directions to the
decision processes of a broad spectrum of water management entities.
Certainly, those institutions within the geographic region of the
Central Utah Conservancy District have experienced changes in their
own decision-making processes.
As an integral part of a large scale
prescription for solving water supply problems, most affected entities
must give significant consideration to policy and program directions of
CUP as they grapple with their short and long term management problems.
The acceptance of the CUP solution to water supply problems, pending
complete feasibility analysis of its components and the determination
of its correspondence to statewide development options, has constrained
the examination of alternate ways of meeting water needs.
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Decision Conflicts Arising From Incongruent
Perspectives About Project Options
The Central Utah Project in Utah provides an example of how
general public endorsement of a development concept may wane and
diverge as project completion approaches and specific conditions about
water availability are made known.
Utahns have generally perceived the Central Utah Project as a
perpetuation of successful water projects of the past. They have been
willing to embrace federal sponsorship and the agent multi-county water
conservancy district (knowing that the resulting local participation in
planning decisions would be more difficult to maintain) understanding
that conceding some decision-making authority o~ self-determination as
to the plan formulation and financing was a reasonably safe tradeoff for
the expected benefit to be gained from the relatively inexpensive and
abundant water supply promised.
As the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) and the Central Utah Water
Conservancy District (CUWCD) have developed plans, designs, and cost
estimates, and as certain local groups have become aware of project
features and have assessed their implications, they have found aspects
that run counter to local desires and expectations.
The Bonneville
Unit, with much of its supply earmarked for municipal and industrial
purposes within commun1t1es along the Wasatch Front, provides some
examples of the way decisions about meeting water supply needs under a
large project option requ1r1ng many years to complete may become incongruent with more current plans and aspirations of local water management entities.
Consummation of water delivery and repayment contracts between the
district and prospective water users is often impeded in the meshing of
perspectives of BOR/CUWCD and those of local water management entities.
The BOR has made evaluation of the water supply needs of each community
in the Bonneville Project service area with the expectation that the
project would be the means for meeting projected shortages. The CUWCD
has suggested to prospective customers that their future needs could be
conveniently and economically met by petitioning the district for
the amount of water called for in the needs projection studies.
The
expectation that communities would subscribe for water made available
from this large scale project is the financial basis for the huge
investments in dams, tunnels, pipelines, etc.
This is a crucial presumption because commitment to this capital intensive approach for
solving water supply problems is very inflexible. Yet, the demand for
Bonneville Project water will only materialize for a community if the
price is competitive with other options open to communities for meeting
water supply needs. Public entities are fiducially obligated not to pay
more for water than is necessary.
Although the Bonneville Project water is correctly referred to
as I1supplemental" to present ly developed. and owned water s~p?l ies, its
basis of availability and the accompany1ng repayment cond1t1ons w?uld
suggest it to be equivalent to a firm or I1primary" supply. F1xed
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amounts must be contracted for and paid for by each subscriber whether
the water is actually used or not. The BOR properly maintains that the
cost of providing all project facilities is the basis for establishing
water rates. The capability of the CUWCD to meet its repayment obligations to the U.S. is jeopardized without contracts for definite and
fixed quantities of water. WCD's supplying subdistricts and communities
from large federally financed projects have difficulty providing a
delivery system to meet supplemental and peaking needs from project
water and still meet contractual commitments to the federal government.
On the other hand, community water managers want to examine
alternate sources for augmenting existing supplies and consider different management options to extend the utility of current supplies.
Options may include acquisitions and exchanges that preclude the need
for expensive treatment.
They may also involve conservation measures
such as delivery of indoor and outdoor supplies from separate distribution systems so that outside uses do not draw from sources that must
be maintained to drinking quality standards. Where communities have not
contracted for water to the BOR/CUWCD, they will logically weigh the CUP
option with other options or seek to integrate the CUP supply with other
sources in ways not planned/programmed by BOR/CUWCD. Such incongruency
in the deve lopment perspect ives of communities and BOR/CUWCD requires
compromise.
Another example of incongruent perspectives about project options
is in connection with conjunctive use of surface and groundwater supplies.
Some supporters of large project solutions have lamented the
lack of conjunct ive use of surface and groundwater sources suggest ing
that water spilling from project reservoirs makes its way to the Great
Salt Lake unused while at the same time communit ies meet their water
supply needs through pumping from groundwater reservoirs. They contend
that users should be compelled to take the project water in plentiful
supply and reserve the groundwater for use in extremely dry years when
project water may become insufficient. This perspective of conjunctive
use starts from the premise that the large project solution is a given.
Project configuration, use projections, and contractual conditions and
arrangements are fixed.
To the extent that these things are unchangeable, it is true that conjunctive use considerations must be fitted to
these realities.
However, this is not conjunctive use planning in the
normal sense of seeking that optimal mix of groundwater and surface
water providing the least cost supply to an array of retail consumers.
Communit ies often find that water needs can be met (at least in
part) from wells at less cost than to satisfy them from large scale
storage projects.
Hence, an operat
optimum for a municipality or
subdistrict may be to pump local wells as a base load supply seeking
supplies of project water for supplemental and peaking purposes.
As an illustration of the "meshing" of perspect ives (or incongruency) dilemma, some communities in northern Utah County have examined
the use of dual water systems as part of a long run solution to their
water needs. They have determined that this would allow them to accommodate considerable growth by us~ng a low cost raw water for outside
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watering while cont inuing to rely on existing suppl ies of safe, high
quality, and low cost spring and well water for inside uses.
These
communities have proposed that CUP monies scheduled for expansion of the
district-owned Utah Valley Water Treatment Plant and construction of the
Alpine aqueduct be used instead for construction of a regional dual
water system. They reasoned that they did not need additional treated
water which the district had planned to provide through the Alpine
aqueduct, but only some additional irrigation quality water for an
outside distribution system.
According to community officials, the
BOR/CUWCD response to this was that a community may purchase water to be
used in a dual system for outside watering but it must pay the M&I price
for the untreated water. The justification for this is that repayment
commitments on the Bonneville Unit requires the marketing of municipal
grade water at relatively high prices set for such water by project
planners and analysts.
This policy was not necessary in the Weber Water Conservancy
District.
Under the Weber Basin Project it was found advantageous to
market a class of irrigation water for outside use in municipalities
and subdivisions. Through the use of connection fees, a charge structure was developed which allowed higher charges for irrigation water in
residential areas.
Such sales helped make project repayment more
secure. Such is not the case with CUP. The BOR/CUWCD must give careful
consideration to effects on expected revenues in accommodat ing design
changes.
~rovo City has officially approached the CUWCD about treating some
of its Provo River water in the Utah Valley Water Treatment Plant,
expressing a willingness to pay the full costs associated with providing
such a service.
Although there is currently excess capacity in the
plant, until very recently the district would only agree to such a
request if Provo would purchase a prescribed quantity of CUP water. In
connection with a commitment to build a water treatment plant in the
Vernal area the CUCWD board reversed its policy decision about treatment
of non-project water and has advised Provo of this change.

The plan of BOR/CUWCD to serve northern Utah County communities
with treated culinary water by means of the Alpine aqueduct apparently
doesn't turn out to match the expectations or preferences of the communities in that region. Local entities are inclined to consider management improvement measures as a means of extending the utility of present
supplies as well as the acquisition of new supplies.
Communities are
aware of opportunities that are site specific but outside the BOR/CUWCD
focus on the large scale capital intensive new development solution.
The consideration of integrating the large scale regional system and its
interbasin transfer features with existing local supply options and
physical configurations requires periodic updating.
If the district
flexibility to meet needs is low because of the irreversible nature of
certain commitments and protection of repayment capacity, then it seems
to have no choice but to bring customers into compliance with its own
perspectives of development and design.
Compromise is difficult.
According to community officials the district reaction to suggestions and questions is to convince the questioners of the superiority of
the centrally conceived plan.
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The solution to Orem City's water needs seems to illustrate a good
meshing of local and regional project objectives. Where a community has
progressed in its development to the point that its next most costeffective supply option is the construction and operation of a water
treatment plant, the operating interaction between communities and CUWCD
is likely to be more compatible. The City of Orem, for example, did not
even exist when the Provo River Decree was issued and older communities
were adding to their supply sources.
Orem's phenomenal growth and
limited spring and well options made it a candidate for treated water
earlier than many sister communities.
Fitting Planning Decisions to
Federal Budgeting Realities
Projects constructed under federal sponsorship receive congressional authorization based on design and cost information provided in
agency definite plan reports.
Appropriations for constructing authorized projects are made on a year by year basis. However, appropriations are based on agency requests with amounts justified according to
planning and construction schedules. In the year to year appropriation
process, compromises are made which force modifications in construction
schedules to fit amounts of money made available. Because of the
incrementalism of federal appropriations, project constituencies must
accept what funding they can get and spend it on those features believed
to be most appropriate within some general development strategy.
Project planners are expected to follow a certain systematic logic
in comparing a lternat ives, assess ing the ir economic, social, and
environmental impacts, and arriving at choices through the political
process.
However, federally sponsored programs experience problems in
correlating the planning and construction processes of the executive
branch with the authorization and appropriation processes of the legislative branch. The planning process, with its feedback and plan modification through the impact analysis and hearings procedures is often out
of synchronization with funding availability. Under such circumstances
construction schedules are based on funding availability and may be
advanced or slowed in ways that override careful planning and the
opportunity for citizen involvement.
Political expediency may operate
to disenfranchise local sponsors in the design of their own project.
Using a recent time period, for example, the environmental impact
statement for the entire Central Utah Project with its participating
units, contained very limited detail on the municipal and industrial
facilities of the Bonneville Unit at the time it was prepared.
The
EIS of the Bonneville Unit municipal and industrial water came several
years later. This might have created some confusion as to the role of
the EIS. At the time the first draft of the M&I EIS for the Bonneville
Unit was issued in 1979, the Utah Valley Purification Plant was under
construction, I mile of the Alpine Aqueduct had been completed, 16
miles of the Jordan Aqueduct had been completed, 12 miles of the
Strawberry Aqueduct had been completed and 15 miles were then under
construction.
The construction of water treatment plants and sections
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of aqueducts and tunnels may have been propelled by congressional
appropriations and available revenues rather than adherence to a well
structured plan.
Effects of Information Dissemination
and Communication on Decision Making
Some institutional problems result from poor communication or lack
of information.
Informed and intelligent decisions regarding the
choice of water use options rely heavily on cost/benefit information.
The BOR/CUWCD has stressed the great needs for water implying that
these could be best met under the CUP concept. Much less emphasis has
been given to publicizing costs and, more importantly, how they will be
distributed so that a citizen might sense his own liability. The focus
on benefits and physical works that make them possible implicitly
presumes that CUP costs will be comparable to other options for meeting
water supply objectives.
Without being able to make cost comparisons
the general public cannot provide effective feedback to the district nor
influence adjustments in project decisions.
While arguments could be made that many aspects of projects are too
complex for their features to be effectively described such that lay
individuals could make meaningful inputs, simple information about
projected water prices can provoke very useful feedback from prospective
purchasers. Price information is a way of economizing on the knowledge
a user must acquire in order to arrive at a useful judgment. With price
information, prospective wat~r users can make more informed decisions
about water use options available to them. Interviews indicate that the
dissemination of this kind of information, so valuable in decision
making and prospective user feedback, is not emphasized by the BOR/
CUWCD.
Since the financial feasibility of the Bonneville Unit requires
that water be sold to users who can pay a relatively high cost, the
target market is municipal use. This being the case, there is need for
close communication between the BOR/CUWCD and community leaders.
Yet
complaints voiced by community representatives in Salt Lake and Utah
Counties are 1) lack of representation of municipal interests on the
CUWCD Board of Directors, 2) lack of adequate information about project
plans and design features, and 3) lack of information about costs and
their distribution.
A recent controversy regarding the location and design of an
aqueduct (known as the Jordan Aqueduct or J-4) for bringing Bonneville
Project water into Salt Lake County reveals some problems in institut ional communication.
Community leaders in northern Utah County say
that the location and design of the aqueducts to serve their area and
Salt Lake County were brought to final design stages without sufficient
discussion and dialogue. On the other hand, district and BOR officials
feel that both the Utah County and Salt Lake County interests were
consulted and kept informed throughout the planning and design phases.
The concern about aqueduct location and exposure has its roots in
problems that have emerged from construction of a large canal coursing
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through northern Utah County as a part of a previous project built many
years ago.
Communities have experienced certain drowning hazards and
circulatory disruptions from this open channel which they would like to
ameliorate. Since the new Jordan aqueduct to be constructed as part of
the Bonneville Unit, CUP, would parallel the existing canal, the communities of northern Utah County saw a potential for considering existing
and new conveyance needs jointly. They saw merit in combining the old
and new supplies in a single facility that would minimize right of way
requirements, eliminate some safety hazards, allow improved transport,
and facilitate operation of drainage works.
Since both the existing
and new aqueducts were Bureau of Reclamation projects, the communities
thought the redesign could be readily accommodated.
However, the combined aqueduct f'oncept entailed addit ional costs
and its reexamination could entail time delays in project construction
schedules.
Owners of the existing canal are reluctant to incur additional expense for capital or operat
costs not considered needed or
profitable.
Salt Lake County interests to be served by the new Jordan
aqueduct could not justify the added costs imposed by the design changes
sought. Neither did the northern Utah communities wish to pay the cost
differential to correct hazards and inconvenience arising from construction for the benefit of others.
Hence, agreement on combining the
old and new works became difficult to achieve.
It is not the intent here to chronologize the Jordan Aqueduct
problem.
The point of interest here relates to the informational
flow problem. Where an aggregation of public institutions is involved
in a complex issue, and ~ communication involves the decision making
apparatus of councils, boards, commissions, legal consultants, administrators and citizen cons tituency, there is much opportunity for
loss in the informational flow patterns. When problems of common
concern become drawn out spanning a number of changes in institutional
administration there is a certain amount of institutional memory loss
which may hinder understandings as certain decision points arrive.
In the instance of the Jordan Aqueduct, differing interpretations
of information available and lack of information exchange seem to be
a significant factor in the resort to political and legal avenues
for resolving issues. Resolutions were passed by various organizations
representing positions and points of view that were divergent. Special
studies, municipal zoning ordinances, court actions, and appeals to
political leaders are forms of informational exchange but may reflect
absences or lapses of good informational exchange at earlier times.
It is apparent that when project decisions are extended over
long periods of time, that changes in demographic conditions and
changes in institutional structures and governance results in institutional memory loss that hinders full understanding and hence, effective
communication.
Some community leaders and municipal water managers complain of
a "we know best" attitude on the part of BOR/CUWCD officials which
has been a problem in establishing and/or maintaining a dialogue with
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communities who are counted on to purchase project water.
The communities know they are already paying for a project water supply
through the ad valorem tax but they have only vague notions of when and
at what price CUP water will be available.
These communities perceive
they are "locked in" to a district from which there is no apparent
extraction. Yet, they find it difficult to fit the CUP commitment into
the normal planning and decision-mak
process of optimally integrating
the CUP source with existing supply sources and modes of delivery.
Communities know how they would prefer the CUP water to be made available but these preferences may not coincide with the delivery plans of
the CUP.
Not only do communities express apprehensions about what might
be "imposed from above" without their input and knowledge, they also
have a perception that no one listens when they make overtures; buckpassing and pigeon holing prevent questions from getting resolved.
Taxpayers in both rural and urban areas of the Central Utah WCD are
wondering more and more about decisions and policies of the Central Utah
WCD.
In urban areas, people complain of lack of voice and representation in proportion to population and property evaluation.
People in
areas of water origin feel they are inadequately represented or involved
in decisions about water allocation and charge structure.
They wonder
if some of their ad valorem taxes are subsidizing costs of making water
available to the Wasatch Front communities. The rural counties in the
Great Basin part of the district are getting more restless about prospects for their receiving water benefits from CUP while the ad valorem
taK contributions continue year after year.
In short, those from both
urban an,d rural areas of the Central Utah WCD are wondering more and
more about getting return on the monies collected. The District Board
of Directors seems to be doing very little to mollify these concerns.
There is little evidence on the part of the district to provide complete
information about the way costs are being distributed throughout the
district in comparison with the expectation of benefits.
Complaints
about lack of voice in district policies and decisions may not be so
much a matter of imbalance in board representation as it is in lack of
meaningful information dissemination to taxpayers in general.
The district has opposed initiatives of certain communities to
develop what they consider to be their own water resources and hydropower.
It has also made suggestions that the preference customer
status of certain communities for obtaining power from Bureau of
Reclamation projects be eliminated so that the added income can be
applied to project repayment.
Actions of the CUWCD have been interpreted by some as opposition to desires to utilize groundwater resources
and dual water systems.
These actions nettle those affected.
The
motives and rationale of the district in taking positions in specific
instances need to be better communicated if propitious interactions are
to be preserved.
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Institutional Authority and Responsibility

The more prominent kinds of water management organizations in
Utah, whose authori ties and responsibi l i ties may occas ionally counter
one another, are mutual irrigation companies, municipal water departments, special improvement districts, water conservancy districts,
water sub-conservancy districts, metropolitan water districts,
and
private domestic water companies. Where warranted (as in joint project
sponsorship) some of these different organizat ions may join to form a
water users associat ion which can serve as agent and manager of their
jointly sponsored project.
For example, the Provo River Water Users
Association was formed to be the agent organization for the Provo River
Project with membership including many of the organizational types
outlined above.
Water service orgiinizations have tradi t ionally been
given rather broad powers to achieve stated mandates.
While these various kinds of water organizations commonly interact with one another, ofttimes in cooperative ventures, they all have
independent and broad powers to expedite the water management objectives for which they were formed.
Their interaction is not legislatively outlined or regulated. There is no formal operating relationship required. Consequently, there is potential for occasional friction
as they exercise autonomous powers under different authorities.
A
cursory examination of these authorities may help to appreciate sources
and nature of problems that occasionally arise.
State Organizations and
Oversight Responsibility
By state law, the Water Resources Division of the Utah Department
of Natural Resources has the responsibility for statewide water resources planning with a mandate to guide water planning and development
so to assure optimum utilization of the resource. The statutes implicitly require that there be a planning, monitoring, and oversight function exercised by the Division and its policy making Water Resources
Board so that all public interest gets properly reflected in water
development and management matters of either inter- or intra-state
nature.
Similarly, the Division of Water Rights, under the direction of
the State Engineer is expected to pursue equity, order, and stability
in the allocation, reallocation, and use of water over time through
a codified system of rules, regulations, and procedures for establishing and transferring rights to the use of water.
However, functions
normally reserved to the Office the the State Engineer can be delegated
under certain conditions.
For ex amp Ie, the superior capabil ity of
the Bureau of Reclamation in the design and construction of dams is
recognized and given statutory exemption to normal State Engineer
approva Is.
Both of these state agencies--the Water Resources Division and
the Water Rights Divison--encounter situations creating some concern
1n the discharge of their responsibilities as they interact and relate
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to the actIvItIes of large WCD's and MWD's.
Both feel an overriding
responsibility for water planning, management, and administration
calling for a measure of oversight, especially over large and active
organizations.
While voluntary coordinating efforts and meshing of
large district and state plans have been operative and helpful, the
autonomy of water conservancy districts makes assurance of sustained
state-district program compatibility tenuous.
As state planning turns
more toward consideration of extending the utility of water already in
use through more innovative management measures, close cooperation with
multiple purpose conservancy districts will be required to implement
these opportunities.
The broad authorities of Utah Water Conservancy Districts has
been described in Chapter II.
The point to be made here is that the
enabling legislation specified no formal status for state government in
the operation of WCDs.
(Of course, WCDs must operate within the laws
that govern organizations in general.)
State agencies responsible for
planning, management, and administration of Utah's water do not formally
participate in the organization or operation of water conservancy
districts.
For example, these state agencies are not required to be
given notice that districts are being or have been formed. Further, the
statutes creating the state water agencies and outlining their powers
and responsibilities provide no formal administrative control over water
conservancy districts.

Federal Government Relationship to .Districts
Legislative authority given to Utah water conservancy districts
permits a strong formal linkage to the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
as a partner in water development.
As a consequence, the Bureau has
significant influence on management decisions of a district, and subsequently. the interact ive relationships a WCD has with other organizations.
The BOR influences the decision process in several ways.
First.
the Bureau generally supplies technicians and technical support data
for the design and construction of its own projects.
As a result.
where plans or designs are called into question, they must be resolved
using Bureau information rather than information from an independent
source.
The high cost of obtaining and analyzing information relating
to large and complex water projects, may, therefore, discourage some who
might otherwise wish to challenge certain plans or policies.
Interactions, to be effective and equitable, must be based on a free flow of
objective information to all participants.
When the informational flow
is obstructed, participatory decision making is restricted, and the
total management process is likely to suffer (Sowell 1980).
A second avenue of Bureau influence comes through financial repayment contracts.
Under such contracts, the repayment obligation
begins when water is made available and for the amount of water subscribed for.
As a consequence, the district decision process is often
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directed toward s tabi lizing the repayment revenue flow and limi ts the
consideration of socially desirable alternatives that may alter or
jeopardize that revenue flow.
Special state treatment of BOR-district projects with respect to
due diligence requirements of water rights law is in recognition of the
fact that major projects requiring many years to plan and build need the
assurance that water will be available when the costly facilities are
in place.
Utah law permits water filings for such projects to remain
valid far beyond periods normally allowed individuals and small projects
for showing I1due diligence" in putting water to actual use. This is to
prevent the long-term public interest from being negated through random
allocations for small projects that could cumulatively reduce or nullify
the benefits possible in larger more comprehensive development.
While
the justification for withdrawing certain appropriable waters from
appropriation is certainly valid, the implementation of the policy
through federal-district arrangements reveals some problems. Typically,
the State Engineer allocates a block of water to the Bureau of Reclamation for a somewhat vaguely conceived project as the Bureau begins its
project studies.
The filing is based on a general description of the
nature and places of-contemplated uses. The BOR may in turn assign all
or part of its entitlement to a WCD under a delivery contract. In turn,
the WCD makes subcontracts to other districts or subdistricts and so on
down to the ultimate user.
While the State Engineer makes the initial
allocation in the public interest as then perceived, there is no
statutory provision for any further influence on the actual pattern of
suballocation in accordance with changing current public interest. This
is not to say that the State Engineer does not have continuing and
general responsibility to protect existing rights in any such suballocation. A district may protest an application to appropriate water
filed with the State Engineer on the basis that no unappropriated water
exists and then turn around and make the water available under purchase
agreement from the district itself.
District allocations are made
according to WCD criteria and may not meet the ordinary tests and
conditions the State Engineer by law applies to other applications to
insure maximum resource utility and protect statewide public interest.
The BOR-WCD ties are extremely close throughout the congressional
appropriation process and the design, construction, contracting, and
operating phases of new water development.
The close working arrangements between federal agencies and districts, neither of which are
required to cons ider broader interfaces with other projects from a
regional or statewide perspective, overshadow the relationship state
water agencies have with either entity. The federal approval and
funding authorization process is directed at individual projects and
contractual arrangements with districts whose boundaries are drawn
to encompass only the area served by a proposed project.
Contractual obligations with the government of the United States
binds the WCD to development planned, designed, and constructed by
federal specialists and carried out under the general policies of the
federal agency involved.
Complying with these federally mandated
requirements may significantly restrict the district from carrying
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out the full range of its legislated authorities and prerogatives.
For example, if the federal agency prefers a policy of developing
surface water and marketing that water supply as a primary source to
the water users, a contracting conservancy district might be unable
to effectively seek out other sources such as groundwater or presently
developed supplies of agricultural water.
Even if such sources could
be cons idered, the district may be compelled to market these other
supplies as secondary sources even though marginal economic efficiency
may favor their use as a primary source.
When a weD is significantly dependent on federal water development programs and projects, its responsiveness to local and regional
political interests could become secondary. To the extent that the WeD
is compelled to subordinate its authorities and prerogatives to those
of the federal government, it becomes in effect a quasi-agent of the
federal government.
Yet, at the same time, its own operating policies
cannot be strictly mandated nor monitored by national political representatives.
Thus, it is in a position of possessing some powers and
authorities of local governments with no links or accountability to
other state and local governments and acting as an agent of the federal
government, again with minimal formal ties to local political oversight.
Finally, the decision process is strongly influenced by the
stipulations of Reclamation Law which binds the district with respect
to transfers in use of water; with respect to ownership and operation
of facilities; and with respect to management options in general.
Operationally, conservancy districts may be without the advice and
consent of other political subdivisions in its operation even though
appropriate governmental interactions require a well ordered representation of all affected parties.
Moreover, linkages between the
electorate and the district officials, a prerequisite of democratic
government, are also tenuous.
While the authorities and functions of the water conservancy
district may become the outlets for federal policies and prerogatives,
under certain conditions resulting in less responsiveness to local
interests, it should be noted that the relationship between the districts and the federal agency is voluntary. It is a contract willingly
entered into by both part ies, both agreeing to abide by the terms. For
example, in the contracts between the Bureau of Reclamation and the
wen's, the WeD's have received the professional expertise of the Bureau
staff, long-term loans, and significant de facto federal grants for
the construction of local projects.
The WeD's have, in turn, agreed
to act as the local financing agent for the projects in addition to
providing some management capacity.
That local interests might become
subordinated to federal interests might be seen as compensation for the
inflow of federal grant money to subsidize the project construction.
That certain local interests might resent this condition, yet be unable
to change objectionable policies, may suggest statutory weaknesses
regarding the formation and governance of weDs.
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Water Conservancy District
Creation Procedures
A basic source of impediment to appropriate institutional interaction grows out of the district creation procedure.
The water conservancy district in Utah is formed not by legislative action, popular
majority vote, nor collective action of existing political subdivisions
of the state, but by petition to a district court. Moreover, opposition
to creation of a WCD faces structural discrimination since significantly more protest signers are required than district advocates.
Where
organizations with broad authority can be initiated by minority interests, the lingering potential for serious impediments in later interactions is obvious.
The formulation of majority public opinion normally comes through
a process of participation and compromise.
This process establishes
communication among diverse interests, educates them as to the tradeoffs and options available, and builds a broader base of understanding
as a bas is for resultant act ions.
Participants in this process establish both formal and informal bases for continual interaction.
The
process for creat ion of a water conservancy district does not follow
this model. Not only is the broad based participation lacking, but the
important element of compromise is eliminated.
This resulting lack
of pub lic unders tanding and potent ial for impos ing a minority wi 11 on
the general populus clearly introduces seeds for jeopardizing future
relationships among affected parties.
Public Voice and Representation
A distinctive feature of the water conservancy district organization in Utah has been the selection of a governing board by a judicial
unit rather than by direct election or legislative appointment.
That
feature may have been a major impediment to appropriate interactions in
that it compromises the most traditional and effect ive communication
channel linking a political subdivision to its constituency and to other
political subdivisions of a state government.
Officers selected by
the court mayor may not be representative of the water district's
constituency.
The 1983 Utah legislature saw fit to change this procedure and remove the appointment process from the judiciary.
Prior to the statutory modification, it had been often alleged that
water conservancy districts operate with substantial immunity from
pressures and direct ion of those over whom they have broad powers to
tax. The justification cited for judicial appointments rather than by
the executive or legislative branch of government or free elections is
to "take politics out of water development. II Those intimately involved
and knowledgeable about wen operations candidly admit that the courtappointed mechanism cannot be free of politics but also find problems
with alternative selection processes. For example, they point out that
the elective process does not attract a meaningful number of voters.
Voters lack knowledge of the qualifications most suitable for effective
service on a board of a WCD. Voter apathy and low voter turnout make it
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possible for an unqualified candidate to get himself elected to a board
where his credentials would be found wanting by a wise judge or water
executive.
Some have observed that a district is more viable and effective
where board members are respected leaders whose current role in community or regional affairs make them sensitive and responsive to desires
and preferences of the people they represent.
Yet, it has been very
common for reappointments to continue a board member in office long
after his community role has diminished and he has lost close contact
with those he was expected to represent.
Unless the district court
that makes the appointments was cognizant of such situations, reappointments were generally automatic.
On the other hand, there is a point
to be made about the value of experience and continuity brought to the
board through reappointments. At any rate, consideration might well be
given to limiting the number of reappointments, particularly in larger
districts where a director may represent multiple counties.
Sensing the citizens disapproval of the court appointed system,
the legislature in 1983, during the period in which this document was
being written, amended the law to remove board appointments from the
judiciary and to place the responsibility upon the county board of
commissioners or upon the governor when a district boundary embraces
more than one county.
The senate must also concur in the appointments
made by the governor.
It is assumed that this method will improve the
linkage between board members and constituency and possibly solve some
of the proble~s noted under the former method.
At this writing there
is little experience to indicate how effective the Qnew appointment
method wi 11 be.
Impressions gained from those interviewed indicate two different
perspectives about what a director of the district should do and
what his qualifications should be.
Some were concerned about the
court appointment as opposed to an election from the standpoint of
appropriate representation.
They felt that to be representative, the
board members (directors) should speak for the citizens residing within
a given geographic boundary and give allegiance to those who have to
pay taxes to support the district. The directors should therefore have
knowledge of the economic pressures within the area, should understand
the effects the building of water projects would have on the area, and
know the costs and the benefits that will be imposed upon their constituency as result of actions taken.
The director should have the
courage of his convict ions and be able to listen and communicate with
his "constituency."
On the other hand, there were those who expect directors to suppress parochial concerns, and apply their judgment to district "business," perhaps being informed and guided by agency staff and less led
in their judgments by constituency concerns per se.
Directors are
expected to lend their distinct abi lity and influence in furthering
the activities and programs of the district and in helping to overcome
obstacles to the fulfillment of project goals.
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District Taxing Authority
The ability of the districts to levy ad valorem taxes generally
throughout their boundaries, and in specific subareas such as municipalities through the Class "B" ad valorem tax, has caused some to
complain about "taxation without representation."
The statutory provisions for utilizing the Class "B" tax adequately provide for taxpayer
input as the commitments are first undertaken.
However, once in
operation there is little year to year publicity and the general public
is poorly informed about changes that may be negot iated between the
district and the municipal government.
It is possible to utilize tax
levy powers in lieu of bonding to provide construction funds without
having to hold a bond election.
After the petition for au allocation is accepted, the district
board makes an annual determination of the amount of money necessary to
be raised by ad valorem taxes on all real and personal property within
the municipality in order to meet the water charges.
The municipality
may elect to pay a part of its assessment in cash in which instance
the board modifies the Class B tax assessment downward accordingly.
After the initial hearing, the city and the district negotiate
on a yearly basis without any further formal public input. Class "B" ad
valorem taxes are not limited as are the Class "A" taxes.
The amount
of this special levy appears on each individual tax notice as a district (not a municipal) special levy so the user is informed of its
magnitude.
However, the average municipal water user would have
difficulty converting his Class IIAII and Class "B" mill levies to dollar
amounts for combination with his municipal rate charges to determine
his total water bill.
Relation Between Water Suppliers
and Public Health Agencies
Another point of interaction that is of importance with respect
to water supply organizations is in connection with health related
programs.
Those providing drinking water services are monitored for
compliance with standards prescribed by the Department of Health.
Whether a WCD is engaged in wholesale or retail water services will
make a difference in the particular kind of interaction necessary
with the Department of Health.
This study does not analyze the institutional
sulting from water quality considerations.

interactions

re-

Metropolitan Water District Authority
and the Interactive Process
Once empowered, the board of directors of a metropolitan water
district is given broad discretionary authority to carry out its
necessary functions.
However, any activity that requires the MWD
to incur indebtedness for meeting
obligations must be submitted
to the electorate for approval by a majority.
Furthermore, it is
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legislative intent that the district pay its obligations, so far as is
practicable, from water sales under a rate structure.
Should rate
charges not produce sufficient income to cover the operating and indebtedness expenses, a tax may be levied, but only until the indebtedness is repaid.
This emphasis on the use of a rate structure is
somewhat different than the taxing emphasis characteristic of many
water conservancy districts.
Where users pay for water or water
services through a rate structure, both users and water managers are
more sensitive to cost effective delivery.
Where charges are a function of usage, costs are equitably borne. On the other hand, if costs
are assessed through an ad valorem tax, the benefit received is not
specifically required to have a direct relation to the tax burden of any
given taxpayer.
Although municipalities are commonly active 1n acquiring and
protecting water rights, constitutional constraints about disposal of
water rights make them cautious about pursuing opportunities for sale
or lease of water to other entities even on a temporary basis.
Free
from this constitutional concern, a MWD can engage in exchange and
lease arrangements that are advantageous to its constituency. If
active and aggressive in such activities outside its immediate boundaries, its interactions with other water management institutions may
become extensive and cogent.
Salt Lake City MWD and Provo City MWD have been more actively
utilized in the continuing process of water acquisition, protection of
water rights, financing system imprbvements, etc.
With the passage
of time, the Utah County MWD's serving the smaller municipalities
have become fiscal agents accepting billings for Provo River Project
water and receiving payments from the client community to make the
annual payment to the Secretary of the Interior according to contract
terms.
MWD's are not generally involved in retail distribution of
water.
However, the Salt Lake MWD has constructed and operated water
treatment plants, financed the drilling of wells, and constructed
storage reservoirs for the benefit of Salt Lake City and County residents. The two large MWD's, Salt Lake City and Provo, have been rather
prominent (Provo more recently) in interagency matters, and in pursuing
strategies for meeting long-term supply needs. The interaction between
municipalit
and counterpart MWD's has been generally good. Although
the MWD has rather substantial discretionary authorities, its exercise
is tempered by ex officio appointments of city officials to the governing board of the MWD.
The fact that both entities serve and tax the
same public, have identical geographic bounds, and enjoy some overlap
in managerial and' administrative personnel tend to keep the MWD 1n
phase with policies and programs of the municipality itself.
The Provo MWD has gone through a more recent metamorphosis of
roles from merely being a sponsor of the Deer Creek Project to a more
dynamic collaboration with the Provo municipal water department.
The
Provo MWD has been given major responsibility for looking at possibilities for increasing water supplies and examining management measures to
increase the utility of presently owned supplies.
Matters related to
water right purchases, identification of new development opportunities,
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and interfacing with other organizations are receiving major attention
by "the MWD.
The municipal water department takes responsibility for
operation and maintenance of all facilities and the delivery of water to
all residents.
The Salt Lake City MWD has been rather active in the management
of waters held in its own name.
Since its authority to market water
is not limited to city boundaries, the MWD can hold, buy, sell, and
develop with minimal restriction.
Consequently, it has acquired water
rights through purchase and exchange and has traditionally suppl ied
a large portion of the water distributed by the Salt Lake County WCD.
Since the Salt Lake MWD normally has excess water, it is alert to
water needs throughout the Provo River Project region and has made
water available on a year to year basis to some irrigation companies
and has entered into service contracts for domestic water in certain
summer home and resort areas. Thus, the presence of the Salt Lake City
M\ID is very promi nent throughou t the Provo-Jordan River drainage.
Since it owns the majority of Deer Creek Reservoir water, it exerts
great influence on the management policies adopted by the Provo River
Water Users Association.
Conflict of Interest Potential
The vertical relationship between water conservancy districts,
metropolitan water districts, subdistricts, special improvement districts, communities, etc., presents some interesting organizational
interfaces which bear some comment.
It is not uncommon to find an
officer or board member of one such district also an officer or board
member in another district with which there are contractual ties and
operating agreements.
Similarly, it is not uncommon to find the same
legal or engineering counsel serving several contractually connected
entities. There is potential for conflict of interest in such arrangements.
With such arrangements, there is a danger of limiting the perspective on water problem solutions to options found within the framework of
a contract with the federal government. The potential for limitation of
independent appraisal and evaluation of policy and project options in
such arrangments should be of concern to retail users.
There are some
possible advantages to providing legal and technical advice to entities
in the chain which comes from a good background of how all of the
user-suppliers of the expanded system operate and relate.
If counsel
to a large project district is extended and multiplied throughout
the lesser organizations subject to linkage by a series of contractual arrangements, it can have a substantial cumulative influence on
development patterns.
If such counsel is ill-advised, then the resulting mistakes become large and costly.
If there is too much reliance on
a single option, then other attractive options may never be exposed. A
greater diversity of advice and counsel at the different organizational
levels may facilitate consideration of a wider range of alternative
solutions.
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While there is much potential benefit in single counsel based on
a good understanding of the coupling nature and individual objectives
of a set of related organizations, the potential consequences of inadequate independent checks on council recommendations would suggest the
desirability of avoidance of even the appearance of conflict of interest
situations.
Institutional Operating Style/Policies
Statutes, charters, and organizational constitutions and bylaws set out the authorities, powers, and functions of institutions.
However, the organization has choices and options as to how it exercises its authorities as it operates on a day to day basis.
Such
operating policies vary with time and circumstance.
Since a change in
operating policy of one entity may directly or indirectly impact on the
operation of another, any unilateral implementation of discretionary
operating rules may be a source of institutional friction.
Because of
their size and broad and independent authority to finance and build
water works for a multitude of purposes, the day to day actions and
policies of WCD's are particularly important in this regard.
Although
WCD's operate under the same enabling statutes, their operating policies
may be quite different at any given point in time depending on factors
such as status with respect to new development, level of indebtedness
and type of debt, character and capability of physical facilities, and
supply sources with respect to demand patterns.
This section identifies some interactive problems stemming from
discretionary operating policies of water conservancy districts in
Utah.
Conflicts with Community
and County Planning
Community and county planning have received increasing attention
in recent times, stimulated by availability of help and funding from
state and federal sources.
Some county and community planners suggest
lack of sensitivity to a need for initiating close integration with the
local planning process despite the central importance of water in such
plans. Some have suggested that this is because of the strong political
power base of WCD's which can assure their own plans and objectives will
materialize regardless of what plans are made by local entities.
Perhaps a factor also is that communities within a WCD are automatically
sustaining the WCD planned allocation through their ad valorem tax
contributions.
Thus, whether the ultimate WCD supply matchup is compatible or not, community planning activities may be of lesser importance to a WCD. Yet, it would be poor use of citizen tax funds to have
one agency support community planning whose implementation may be
negated by another tax supported agency.
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Salt Lake and Utah Counties offer some interesting contrasts in
ins t itut ional interact ions assoc iated with the operat ional presence or
absence of a WCD.
The Salt Lake County WCD was created and placed in
operation quite some time ago to provide a more adequate service to
unincorporated areas and small but growing communities within the
county.
No such need has ever been given parallel expression in Utah
County.
Master plans in Salt Lake County, which originally sought to
regulate growth patterns by strict zoning ordinances, have become
rather severely compromised if not abandoned altogether over the years
as communities have incorporated and initiated their own planning
programs.
Although the county does not permit indiscriminate and
incompatible uses to take place as urbanization proceeds, it no longer
attempts to confine growth to areas adjacent to existing community
boundaries where it can be readily served by orderly expansions of city
services. However, Salt Lake County still attempts to conLrol growth to
areas which are practical, reasonable, and economically feasible.
Planners have concluded that the total urbanization of Salt Lake Valley
1S inevitable, although certainly not imminent.
A factor in the relaxation of controlled growth policies in Salt
Lake County may well have been the willingness of the Salt Lake County
WCD to provide service wherever requested for municipal and industrial
purposes.
Policies of the Salt Lake City MWD in providing water to
the southeastern part of Salt Lake County ~as a factor in the growth
patterns that emerged there. The Salt Lake County WCD has provided both
wholesale and retail water services. When expanding communities or new
subdivisions requested additional water service, the Salt Lake County
WCD was a visible potential for meeting that need. As service has been
extended by laying new supply lines, additional access to water created
by the pipeline itself has a tendency to attract development in proximity to the new pipeline.
Salt Lake County government has adopted a
positive stance with regard to providing municipal services to county
residents of unincorporated areas.
The policies of the county and
the county WCD with respect to the providing of needed services has
accommodated growth in unincorporated areas but with standards of
service not greatly inferior to those provided by incorporated municipalities. In some respects, developers have been able to "shOp" between
the cities and the county for needed utilities and services.
On the other hand, Utah County has been able to hold to a cluster
development concept, although some differences in operat ing policies
between cities and the county are now negat ing the original zoning
intent ions.
Neither growth nor policies to regulate growth have led to expression of a need for a countywide water conservancy district such as that
formed in Salt Lake County.
Of course, Utah County is within the
l2-county Central Utah WCD, but that district has restricted its
perview to the marketing of yet-to-come CUP water. The Salt Lake
County WCD has procured water from a variety of sources and over time
has developed an extensive distribution network so that as domestic or
industrial needs are generated the district is a prospective supplier.
In Utah County, municipalities have not had such a wholesaler to turn
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to, nor have unincorporated areas and subdivisions been able to look to
any single major supplier of water services to meet either wholesale or
retail need.
In Utah County planning officials expected that zoning laws would
confine residential growth to areas next to the cities and the cities
would provide services.
However, the Utah County municipalities have
generally refused to provide water and sewer services unless the areas
needing such services were annexed.
The rationale for this policy is
that providing water service beyond city boundaries will encourage
development with inadequate standards for roads, sewer, sidewalks,
water, etc.
When the day comes that subdivisions want to annex, the
city would be faced with a difficult task of upgrading utilities.
Unless development in these transition (adjac€nt) areas could be served
by municipal water and sewer systems, lot sizes in some areas would have
to be enlarged to allow use of individualized water supplies and septic
tanks. Since there is no "non-municipal" water supply organizat ion to
turn to, individual wells and septic tanks must be employed. Thus, to
accommodate requests to build, county zoning was changed to require 5
acre lots. (A modification allowing I acre lots if there was an adequate plan and provision for roads and drainage was made later.)
A
standard of 5 acres per lot for a res idence adjacent to a city has
essent ially stopped residential development under the cluster pattern
originally desired and expected. The cities would not extend water and
sewer and the county has no water or sewer service to offer.
The spectre of higher development costs with annexation to a
city and moratoriums on growth by some cities has led to unexpected
pressures for more development in areas zoned for rural residences in
Utah County. The county has generally been willing to change zoning so
that development could proceed if it could be satisfied that adequate
water and sewage services would be provided. Since no areawide water
suppl ier exists in Utah County, each subdivision has had to assume
responsibility for acquiring and developing its own sources and facilities for managing water supply and wastewater.
This has led to the
creation of water and sewer districts and several private water systems
where subdivisions were contemplated.
The special districts have not
generally survived long, either being superseded by incorporation or
abolished as result of inactivity. Many of the private water companies
are being set up as mutual companies not subject to oversight and
regulation by the Public Service Commission. Inasmuch as these mutually
owned domestic water systems are not required to establish any depreciation account nor set aside reserves for replacement, they may lack
some of the user protections that a private utility operating under the
PSC provides.
The fact that some Utah County developments near the Salt Lake
County-Utah County border may in the future obtain water service from
the Salt Lake County WCD may be an indication that an areawide governmental kind of water suppl ier appeals as a counterpart to a private
water supplier or existing city.
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Whether the presence of a countywide WCD, willing and anxious
to provide water service, influences county policy about active and
direct provision of other needed utilities and services, or whether
greater willingness to provide services by a county favors the creation
of areawide water service, is unclear.
In any event one seems to
influence and be compatible with the other.
Yet, even if the county policy is to avoid direct involvement
in providing municipal services in unincorporated areas, its zoning
pOlicies or those of its municipalities may force development to unincorporated areas. When this happens, utility needs and services must be
arranged on an individualized basis.
The fact that many Utah County
communities have entered into cooperative regional arrangements for
managing wastes and wastewaters and are exploring similar kinds of
cooperation in some instances with respect to water supply would suggest
a recognition of advantage in a more integrated operation which a
properly structured WCD might provide. In Utah County, one cannot point
to a wen as being a contributor to the breakdown of planned growth
patterns.
But once the pattern of clustering growth around existing
cities breaks down, the justification for a regional water supply
organization is more readily appreciated.
It may be that the several MWD's in Utah County could cooperate
1n providing water supplies that would better serve the regional ne~ds
of Utah County residents.
Community leaders in Utah County feel that
water availability and ownership will play a key role in future growth
and development patterns.
Many are apprehensive about depending on
separate and independent private companies for meeting domestic water
needs.
The concern about the water supply function being outside the
~ontrol of the city is at the root of apprehensions about both private
water companies and the cuwen.
The Weber County planning office indicates no formal interaction
or review process with the Weber Basin WCD in planning functions.
The planning commission must approve land uses and where activities of
the wen require the construction of facilities on the land surface,
permits are required.
This process produces some information transfer
as to contemplated services.
However, water related activities involving underground pipe are not required to go through the permitting
process which involves the use plan and siting information. The county
planning commission has greater involvement with municipalities and
special districts closer to the retail water supply level.
In other
words, while the Weber Basin WCD engages in wholesaling to other water
organizations who will retail the water, the focus of the Weber County
Planning Commission is on "final water use" considerations rather than
"regional water system" considerations.
A consequence of the county planning commission's lack of responsibility for subsurface pipeline construction is that it may not
be advised of certain annexations based on water availability from
pipelines which the commission knows little or .no.thing about.
The
responsibility for considering water needs and dec1d1ng on water s~p~ly
options is left with the communities and the water management ent1t1es
who supply culinary and industrial water.
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Implications of the Central Utah
WCD Water Treatment Plant Policy
Under some pressure to demonstrate M&I water need by firm commitments to purchase CUP water when available, the Central Utah WCD
adopted a policy of constructing and operating water treatment plants
where beneficiaries were willing to petition for CUP water for eventual
use in the plant.
While awaiting availability of CUP supplies, nonproject water is treated in the facility.
The first water treatment plant constructed under this policy was
the Jordan Water Treatment Plant located in southern Salt Lake County.
The plant was sited such that CUP water supplied through the proposed
Jordan aqueduct could be conveniently available to the treatment
facility.
In the meantime, Deer Creek Project water is purchased from
the Salt Lake MWD (previously treated in MWD treatment plants) and
is brought to the Jordan Water Treatment Plant via the Provo Reservoir
Canal. The Salt Lake County WCD is the recipient of the water from the
Jordan Water Treatment Plant and has subscribed for 50 ,000 acre feet
of CUP water as it becomes available.
The Central Utah WCD has subsequently cooperated with the Cities
of Orem and Duchesne in building water treatment facilities.
In each
instance, petitions to purchase specific quantities of CUP water when
available were obtained.
The Central Utah WCD policy of constructing and operating water
treatment plants has generated some significant institutional reactions
and interact ions centering on equity and efficiency issues.
Reques ts
by other communities to rent use of available plant capacity to treat
owned nonproject supplies, but without commitment to purchase CUP
water, have been denied by the Central Utah WCD.
Planning and financing of water treatment facilities are outside
the traditional scope of Bureau of Reclamation projects.
If project
water supplies need to be conditioned for particular uses, the Bureau
has left that responsibility to the user.
In parallel, large WCD's as
agents for BOR projects, have commonly restricted their service to the
wholesaling of raw water.
For example, the Northern Colorado WCD
provides substantial quantities of water from the Big Thompson Project
for uses in the rapidly growing region between Denver and Fort Collins.
Responsibility for treatment and the financing of needed treatment
facilities is left entirely to the local water using entities.
Purchasers who need water treatment provide the facilities and levy user
taxes or rate charges to cover the costs. In contrast, the Central Utah
WCD uses districtwide ad valorem tax collections to finance the construction and operation of water treatment plants.
In fact, the decision of the Central Utah WCD to provide water treatment plants was one
of the justifications for seeking legislation allowing the doubling of
the general taxing authority from one to two mills.
since this increased levy applied to all counties comprising the Central Utah WCD,
the enabling legislation required that areas outside Salt Lake County
(the immediate case) be treated similarly.
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A "need to get our share" ripple has spread throughout the district by this policy decision with regard to financing and operating
munic ipal water treatment pI ant s.
Wh i Ie dis tric t taxpayers have
had the impression that their tax assessments were advance payment on
some future benefit from the completed CUP, they also have observed that
district-wide tax collections can be used to subsidize water treatment
for a localized and well-defined set of water users. The realization of
this has resulted in requests for district support for other non-CUP
related projects such as cloud seeding, reservoir spillway reconstruction, and others.
Using general tax monies to support local projects
outside the general CUP framework leads to pressures for giving taxpayer
groups throughout the district support for their worthwhile but non-CUP
projects, also. Having set a precedent with support of water treatment
plants, one could expect that the district will find it inrreasingly
difficult and discriminatory to deny requests for financial support for
other local projects.
It would seem that such a policy, initiated to
strengthen the financial integrity of the CUP, could result in a weakening of the overall repayment capacity.
Where funds have been accumulated ostensibly for project repayment
and then used to build localized projects outside the configuration
of the project for which the tax collections were justified, it may be
considered a disinvestment of part of the assets set aside for project
repayment. Having started down this road with the construction of water
treatment plants, the Central Utah WCD will have to convince taxpayers
throughout its boundaries that they are receiving benefits commensurate
with tax collections by the district.
Water Rights Issues
Of all the factors which could operate to impede harmonious interaction between organizations, disputes over water rights is one of the
most sens1t1ve. Water right filings by the Central Utah WCD and Bureau
of Reclamation for 300,000 acre-feet of winter water in the Provo River
drainage has created apprehension and resentment on the part of certain
Utah County communities and canal companies that may have diverse and
lasting impacts on institutional interrelations.
The filing was made
without fully informing those who might be affected concerning the
justification and rationale.
Communities and canal companies owning
large quantities of Class A water in the Provo River system feel that
this legal action may result in curtailment of water entitlements so as
to limit development potentials of their own.
Utah County communities and canal companies are troubled to find
themselves in opposition with an organization of which they are a part
and which should be operating in their interest as their agent or
surrogate.
They view this assertion on the part of the Central Utah
wen and Bureau of Reclamation as a legal strategy to obtain water for
ultimate sale back to its present claimants as high priced CUP water.
This legal action with respect to winter water has been a catalyst
in unifying entities in Utah County to probe more deeply into .the
objectives and potentials of the CUP/CUWCD as well as more broadly 1nto
alternative potentials for satisfying projected water needs.
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Community officials indicate that they are looking more closely
at options for water transfers and exchanges as well as ~mprovements
in administrative and management policies that could be initiated although they still generally support the CUP. They point to an abundance
of good quality irrigation water that could be obtained at a fraction of
the cost of CUP water.
They suggest a much greater use of what they
term an excellent supply of underground water, but real ize that such
utilization would hinge on some purchases or innovative exchanges
with water rights holders below Utah Lake. . They also point to the
advantageous use of dual water systems to extend the utility of high
quality potable supplies.
Some have also suggested that there is substantial opportunity
to expand M&I utility of Deer Creek Project water through improved administrative and management policies.
Community leaders maintain that
as long as these options and opportunities exist their constituencies
will point them out.
The relative abundance of local water and water
development options is a fact that CUWCD must face in marketing project
water and setting the price to be charged.
Some communities feel that
if they developed their options completely they would have surplus water
to lease or sell.
Yet, they feel that because of the seeming regional
importance of CUP they should not criticize it in general.
Some
officials cite negative benefits from CUP in terms of district oppos1t~on to measures they propose as best solutions to meeting their
own supply needs.
They also point to the added cos t of solving their
water supply problems independent of CUP since they must cont inue to
pay the ad valorem tax while perceiving no benefit from that action.
The attempt to obtain legal title to the winter water claimed
by Utah County entities has brought unified opposition and has created
a forum for comparing and reevaluating community relationships with
the district and with each other.
Federal Program Relationships
Federal policies and programs have very substantial effects
on state and local institutions and directly or indirectly influence
their relationship with one another.
The tracing of institutional
impacts resulting from the implementation of exponentially growing
federal programs allied to water is a task well beyond the time and
fiscal resources of this study.
The emphasis on stimulating economic
development and/or reducing economic loss, which characterized federal programs during the first half of the 20th century, has more
recently emphasized concern for protection and enhancement of environmental values.
Within the past two decades, a number of federal
enactments, spawned by the environmental movement, have broadened the
scope of federal involvement and have introduced regulatory features
that have required varying adjustment in the operating functions of
water management institutions.
Some noteworthy examples of legislation having significant impact on water institutional structures and
interrelationships are the Water Resources Planning Act, the wild
and Scenic Rivers Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (and amendments), the National
72

Flood Insurance Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Endangered
Species Act. . The initiatives of the federal government under these
acts not only effect institutional interactions but influence growth
and development policies for the state as well.
In addition to the
regulatory compliances, conditions placed on the acceptance of federal
dollars available in some of these programs commonly result in modification of institutional operating policy.
Many of these federal enactments are inadequately coordinated at
the federal level and are oblivious to the policy and institutional
impacts that implementation induces at state and local levels.
Some
recently initiated federal programs have been both duplicative and
overriding of state institutional structures and functions and have
triggered new kinds of institutional interactions not previously
experienced.
Where progr~ms nem~nd too much of institutions, and
alter their customary relationships and roles significantly, the
likelihood of smooth program implementation is low.
Federal programs and policies often become internalized in the
operations of local participating organizations.
One of the best
examples of this is the federal reclamation program which has been in
existence since 1902 and its influence on water conservation districts.
Water conservancy districts are a direct outgrowth of Bureau of Reclamation programs, and policies of that federal agency are noticeably
reflected in the operating policies of contracting districts.
Federal
contracts for repayment of project costs are for long periods of time
and all water delivery contracts between the district and its customers
must be endorsed by the Se€retary of the Interior.
Thus, terms of the
federal program with respect to project design and construction standards, operation and maintenance, water pricing, etc., are controlling.
While it may seem inconsistent and contestable that one user from a
given supply facility is charged $5.00 per acre foot for the very same
water another user may be charged $100 per acre foot, development under
reclamation law proscribes such differential charges.
"Preferential ll
water and power customers are specifically provided for in cost recovery
policies which do not require full reimbursement according to purpose
for costs associated with each beneficiary.
Regardless of the social
merits of such a policy, the ability to disassociate the cost burden
from the point of benefit results in project configurations and water
pr~c~ng patterns that are different than if economic efficiency were the
primary measure of project feasibility.
A commonly voiced criticism of federal programs is that policies
and guidelines are made in Washington far removed from a knowledge
of local realities.
Some of those interviewed felt that the Bureau
of Reclamation policies have become the perspectives and positions
of an unquestioning Central Utah WCD.
They believe that the singular
focus of the Bureau on developing new water supplies has retarded
the examination of potentials involving the use of groundwater and
totally integrated management concepts.
Solutions involving conjunctive use of surface and groundwater supplies, interlinking of
community systems, reuse of sewage treatment plant effluents, use of

73

dual systems for delivering potable and non-potable supplies, blending of supplies of differing quality, etc., are not adequately considered.
The nat ional concern for protect ion and enhancement of envi ronmental values, as mirrored by some of the enactments alluded to previously, have stressed state and local institutional structures in many
ways. The environmental impact evaluations and the review and comment
process have slowed water development and necessitated modifications in
management measures and project operation.
The added federal regulations and permitting authorities have certainly altered the operating
interactions of state and local institutions in subtle as well as
obvious ways.
Federal water rights.
Federal prerogatives extend into the area
of water rights.
The federal government claims rights to sufficient
water to carry out purposes for which a land reservation was made and
with a time priority dating to the date of the land reservation.
Similarly, Indian water rights are claimed consistent with the needs of
Indian Reservations. These implied rights have not yet been completely
quant ified.
In Utah, great efforts have been made to quant ify Indian
water claims and fix these by negotiated agreements. While yet to be
finalized, such agreements are viewed as vital to orderly development
and management of water.
Lack of quantification of water rights
creates great uncertainty for state and local water managers, and
especially those of the large water service districts.
Congressional prerogative.
Congress authorizes federal programs
and then appropriates the funding to carry them out. Program recipients
soon discover that authorization is one thing, appropriation of funds
another.
Thus, federally supported i nst itutions must face cont inually
the possibility that the conditions of their contract with the federal
government will change, especially as a consequence of the change in
political administrations in Washington.
The Central Utah project planning and construction has thus far
spanned a period of nearly 20 years and completion is still many years
away. The social demography of the service area has changed dramatically and certain demands that the project was designed to meet have been
altered.
These changes could logically require alterations in project
design that would possibly require the securing of new permits for
environmental modification.
Congressional prerogatives also modify agency perspective. Threatened changes stimulate the districts to accelerate project activities so
as to minimize the probability of project disruption, and often to
complete less valuable portions of the project first so as to build a
more compelling case for project completion.
Conversely, federal
budgeting may result in a lengthening of project completion time.
The CUP has been characterized by a drawn out completion schedule
dependent on federal financial participation. This participation seems
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to fluctuate with the mood of the White House, although there has been
general support for its completion.
With a drawn out construction schedule, if changing needs suggest
major project modification, congressional re-authorization is required.
Also, over time, the political coalitions which secured
initial approval may have weakened and new coalitions may express
strong reservation to the continuation of a public investment 'which
they do not now feel to be in the public interest. Because of the real
difficulties in making adjustments as may be incrementally desirable, a
contracting district may be compelled to perpetuate inflexibility in
its relations with other local entities .
.Judicifll review.
The pcssibility of project exposure to judicial
review also introduces uncertainty in operations at the local level and
affects interactions between water districts and other local entities.
Induced uncertainty creates a demand to remove that uncertainty.
The
natural response is to reduce that uncertainty by keeping fact ions
sufficiently satisfied so as not to initiate court action.
For the
district, it means gett ing commi tments for water purchases as soon as
possible.
Thus, the threat of judicial review may tend to lock development and use configurations prematurely.
The Reclamation Law.
The Bureau of Reclamation has been the
implementer of Reclamation Law.
Water conservancy districts in
Utah have been the favored agent for BOR collaboration in promoting
projects, seeking federal authorization, and contracting for federal
financing.
This relationship between district and Bureau strongly
influences the operating policies of the district.
Observations of the Utah situation indicate a BOR-WCD preference for surface development of water supply.
A significant role of the Bureau in working with water conservancy
districts is in providing information.
Consequently, the public tends
to see elements of water development through the eyes of the Bureau and
its agent, the water conservancy district.
Needless to say, this
places other water management agencies at a significant disadvantage in
questioning the policies of the district or suggesting modifications
that are believed to reflect the correct pattern of social preference.
Information is crucial to informed and effective interaction. A monopoly of such information has potential to impede productive interaction.
Influence of State Programs and Policies
State programs may be classified as either regulatory or mission
oriented.
The regulatory programs are carried out through the Office
of the State Engineer and the Division of Environmental Health.
The
mission programs are carried out through the Division of Water Resources.
The state has emphasized financial aid in its mission programs.
Three such programs have been imp lemented:
the Revolving Construc t ion
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Fund, the Cities Water Loan Fund,
Development Fund.

and

the Resource Conservation and

Under the Revolving Construction Fund, through June 30, 1978,
the state had expended more than $27 million of which only $4.7 million,
or 17 percent, had been spent in the Wasatch Front urban area.
Of the
$4.7 million, only about $1/4 million, or 5 percent, went to culinary
water projects.
A review of "the State of Utah Water-1980 11 indicates
that the majority of this funding went for capital replacement in small
irrigation companies.
One exception was a $1,000,000 loan to the
Central Utah Water Conservancy District to aid in the construction of a
water treatment plant.
This loan was repaid in two years and was the
only participation of a large multi-purpose water district in the
state's program to 1978.
Loans made under the state RCF program are generally to user
groups for renovation, repair, or replacement of facilities.
Normally, the water rights of the organization seeking a loan are used as
collateral.
This lien could conceivably present some encumbrances in
future collaborative arrangements with other users.
However, there is
little evidence that the RCF program introduces obstacles to effective
institutional interaction in either horizontal or vertical directions.
The loan approval process includes a series of sign offs which insure
that local, county, and regional planning or management entities are
made aware of the project and its implications.
There are no explicit
restrictions regarding transfer of equity interests in the water works
over the life of the loan.
Consequently, the program does not interfere with the normal oper~tion of water markets.
There is one type of project supported under the RCF program which
has potential for generating institutional conflict.
That is when a
community wishes to install a separate system for outside lawn and
garden watering.
The Division of Water Resources supports the use of
dual systems as a water conservation measure and a cost effective way
of using available supplies. Many such systems are in use in all parts
of Utah and their use is increasing.
About half of the water delivered
through municipal water systems ~s used for watering lawns, parks,
gardens, etc.
Such uses do not require water of drinking quality. The
one area of resistance to the use of dual systems is in Utah and Salt
Lake Counties which also happen to be the principal market areas for
M&I water produced under the Central Utah Project. Dual systems pose a
threat to the demand for municipal grade water.
Under the Cities Water Loan Fund, through June 30, 1978, the
CWLF had participated in only five projects in the Wasatch Front
area.
Of a total cumulative budget expenditure of $6,508,300, only
$449,000, or 7 percent, has been spent in the Wasatch Front.
This
would seem to indicate the state's desire to emphasize assistance to
the rural counties of the state instead of the more financially able
urban areas. However, as additional monies have been added to the fund
and as other funding programs have enlarged also, larger communities in
the urbanizing Wasatch Front area have sought support.
In fact Salt
Lake City has applied for a $5 million loan to upgrade and expand its
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water supply system. While there may be some institutional differences
as to the preferred criteria for making this loan money available to
cities, implementation of the program has not created any new or
troublesome operating interactions within the institutional framework.
The Resource Conservation and Development Fund was created in
the 1978 legislative session for the specific purpose of funding
large water development projects mainly in rural counties.
This fund
was enlarged in 1980 although few of the original or the subsequent
large projects had undergone necessary feasibility tests. Consequently, the State Board of Water Resources began opening eligibility to other projects not originally specified in the second bond
($25,000,000). The policies which are being followed in the use of the
RCDF monies are very much like those that have evolved under the federal
reclamation program of the Department cf the Interior. The legislative
intent of the RCDF is to support larger and more expensive projects
having multiple water purposes. As these projects are evaluated some of
the same issues about project feasibility criteria, distribution of cost
burdens, applicable discount and interest rates, etc., are surfacing.
Like the Bureau of Reclamation, and for the same reasons, the Division
of Water Resources is recommending creation of water conservancy districts as contracting entities for repayment of RCDF loans. Hence, one
might predict the kind of institutional problems that could develop from
the state financing program by examining the experience of existing
water conservancy districts.
Special Interest Group

Relatio~hips

The influence of special interest groups on the operation and
interactions of the water service districts varies over time and
with respect to issues.
Special interests can serve a useful purpose
in the airing of issues. However, it is important that they be recognized for what they are as they strive for political advantages. Four
major types of groups (commercial, environmental, governmental, and
agricultural) seek to influence water policies and decisions.
Some
relate to the WCD's through contractual relationships, such as to
purchase water; and others are only interested "bystanders" indirectly
affected by district programs.
The commercial interest group generally provides vocal support
for the activities of the districts under a presumption that water
availability fosters development opportunities. However, this group is
seldom directly involved in the affairs of the WCD. To the extent that
district actl.vl.ties influence urban growth rates, they simultaneously
influence urban commercial activities.
For example, the extension of
water trunk lines into rural areas of an urbanizing county is often
thought to encourage development of that area.
Obviously, where such
causation exists, those who engage in such commercial activities as
home building, real estate market ing, retail market ing, and util it ies
marketing may also be significantly benefited.
While there is some
disagreement as to whether the availability of a water supply can
induce growth, there is little doubt that absence of a water supply
constrains growth where other factors are favorable.
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Environmental groups are generally in conflict with district
goals. Those more amenable to water development, and who are generally
in support of water projects, view the warnings and objections voiced
by environmentalists as calculated not to facilitate wiser choices but
rather to prevent making any choices at all.
They have come to feel
that much of the environmental activism is based on total acceptance of
only those results that fit their preconceived prejudices.
In dealing
with "hostile" groups, the districts have a choice of postures. On one
hand, they can take measures to incorporate the group's values into
district decision processes and thereby bring about a working relationship that minimizes the delay and expense of legal challenges. On the
other hand, the districts might choose to develop a power base to
oppose the activity of the environmental group.
Such a power base
begins at the local level and extends through the federal agencies to
Congress.
Differences are settled more by political appeal than by
technical merit.
The Utah Water Conservancy Districts have a tradition of a broad
power base but have not successfully incorporated environmental groups
into this power base.
One problem is that the environmental group is
generally not a local group, but rather an alliance of groups from
across the nation.
Moreover, these groups frequently express values
that may not find support from the population of the local service area.
Districts have difficulty in balancing such broad based concerns against
the desires of the local populus whom the districts have been created to
serve.
One environmental concern of recognized importance ~s to do
minimal damage to the scenic and recreational attractions"
The interactions between a district and environmental group tend
to occur during project planning and construction phases.
Once the
environment has been altered, there can be little satisfaction in a
legal decision.
Thus, districts not currently engaged in construction
or planning for construction will face far less interaction with the
environmental groups.
Municipalities have no statutory standing in the conservancy
district operation outside of those created through the water sale
contracts. However, the municipalities possess significant powers that
can be exercised to prosper their special interests.
Communities are
largely supportive of conservancy district activities and see the
district activities as an "insurance" that water will be available for
their growth.
However, where plans run counter to municipal desires,
they can exert substantial pressure for change, particularly if they
join together.
The WCD' s sometimes compete with the commun~t~es in the retail
water market. While there have been some disagreements over the proper
role of the various water suppliers in such instances, the communities
continue their overall support for district activities.
The agricultural interest group is perhaps the dominant "friendly"
group supporting the water conservancy districts which provide agricultural water.
This ~s because the water conservancy districts were
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created as local liaison for the national reclamation program which
holds out substantial subsidies for agricultural water users. Municipal
and industrial components were largely supplemental purposes to the
original reclamation mission.
Agricultural water was or inally the prime purpose of the Central
Utah Project.
However, changing social demography and the need for the
project to sell water at higher prices have changed what once might have
been considered equitable representation to overrepresentation.
The
districts have benefited from the political power of the agricultural
interest group in Utah.
Agricultural interests are active in Utah
legislative politics and generally carry advocacy of district activities
into the legislative arena.
The way governmental agencies impede effective interaction amcng
water institutions has been discussed in previous sections. However, it
is proper to mention the role of governmental bureaus as special interest groups.
Governmental officials derive considerable political
advantage precisely from their not being recognized as interested
parties.
Possession of certain data and knowledge gives the bureaucrat
a decisive advantage in stating a case or position.
The influence of
governmental officials greatly exceeds their numbers because they are
generally perceived as being objective experts occupying high moral
ground.
We commonly attribute to governmental officials a public
watchdog role in which they more nearly represent the "public interest."
However, it should be kept in mind that bureaucrats have preferred
options just like any other special interest group. They are dependent
pn the backing of a political power to impose their preferred options on
the people.

Financing Sources and Options

It has been said that water flows down hill and toward money.
It has also been alleged that when people turn to government for
water development financing it is likely an indication that development cannot be sustained from local resources.
The lure of federal
financing for water projects in Utah has been a very major factor
in shaping the pattern of water development and the character of
water institutions.
For example, the Bureau of Reclamation was largely
responsible for the original water conservancy district legis lation.
WCDs have become the "agent" organization for the acquisition of investment capital available through the Bureau of Reclamation program. Thus,
WCD's have come to be esteemed in Utah for their favored status with the
BOR which could offer low cost (subsidized) investment capital and a
reservoir of technical expertise to plan, design, and construct water
projects. Perceiving financial and economic advantages from the federal
program, state policy has been to avoid political controversy which
might jeopardize congressional funding possibilities.
Acceptance of project financing under the reclamation program
means acceptance of certain conditions under which marketing and
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sale of water must be made.
Subcontracts for sales and/or service
must be in accordance with legislation and agency rules and regulations.
Therefore, the conditions imposed on the "agentll institution
(the water conservancy district) must be reflected in any subsequent
subcontracts cascading on down to the user level.
A master contract between a WCD and the Secretary of the Interior
makes the U.S. a party of all subcontracts.
wnile the master contract
IS in effect (and this is for a long period of time) no changes In
exclusion of taxable lands, consolidations, mergers, dissolution, or
assignment of control can be made except upon consent of the U.S.
Water cannot be sold or otherwise disposed of without the approval of
the Secretary of the Interior (the State Engineer is not a necessary
party).
Generally, the federal government expressly absolves itself
from ani responsibility for the distribution of water after delivery to
some specific point.
If the district does not utilize the contracted
amount of water it does not relieve the obligation to pay for the water
in the same manner as if the water had been delivered. The expenditure
of funds and performance of work by the BOR under the governmentdistrict contract is contingent on the congressional appropriation of
money.
While no liability accrues to the U. S. in case such funds are
not appropriated, the district is not relieved of obligations to pay for
water committed by block notices.
Water rights are generally acquired
in the name of the BOR.
However, the contracting district is required
to defend those rights in any legal action if requested to do so by the
BOR.
Thus, bound by the federal master contract, with repayment a
paramount concern in fixing the terms, the WCD must reflect these
conditions into its subcontracts.
Similarly, subdistricts and municipalities must incorporate into their policies, management, and
rate structure the constraints of their own subcontractual arrangements.
The rigidity with which the above contract ing arrangements
set the pattern of use and development creates problems in adapting
to changing situations and in maintaining the optimal mix of project
and nonproject water at the user level over time.
The contractual obligations between the Bureau and the district
are made with the expectation that prospective users will in turn
petition for the supplies made available.
However, except for general
expressions of intent, communities generally wait until the availability
of project water can be realistically predicted before proceeding with
the petition.
In its "middle man" position, the district obligates
itself to the Bureau with the expectation that the obligation will be
conveyed to the actual users.
Making certain that this financial
obligation gets assumed by users is a paramount concern of the district.
In a sense, the district has guaranteed to the Bureau that the water
use projection patterns used to plan and build the project will indeed
come about.
Yet, if development drags, use projections may change as
result of demographic changes and intervening independent water development.
As charges for project water become more clear, the demand for
project water will adjust accordingly. Thus, the operating policies of
the district are closely related to what threats it perceives to the
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repayment structures it must secure.
If the charges the district must
make for p~oject water are less than users would need to pay for alternative sources of supply, there is little problem in maintaining financial integrity.
If district supplies are not least cost to a prospective buyer, the district may embrace operating policies designed to
capture water markets in spite of cost disadvantages and/or to obtain
repayment monies independent of water subscriptions.

Property Taxation

A characteristic of water conservancy districts is their power to
levy general property taxes. Revenue from taxes is viewed as the key to
maintaining the financial integrity of district projects.
Securing
needed revenues by taxing allows cos ts to be borne by taxpayers--not
necessarily water users.
A rationale for use of general property
taxation is that everyone benefits, directly or indirectly, from a water
project. Therefore, everyone should help pay. However, since the point
of the tax is disassociated from the location of the benefit it 1.S
difficult to tell whether benefited parties pay their true costs for
services received.
A problem for the district is to try to balance out
the benefits or services provided to its members whatever their uses or
location may be.
For geographically small districts serving homogeneous water
markets, maldistribution of costs and benefits through use of tax
revenues may be inconseCiuential.
Problems of inequity are greatest in
larger multi-county conservancy districts. _ Some portions of large
districts have little immediate hope of benefit from tax contributions.
Certain cities located within district boundaries continue to pay the
general ad valorem tax but have adequate sources of supply from other
sources.
Even though supplies appear adequate for the foreseeable
future, some of these communities view the CUP potential as an "insurance" against possible acceleration of water needs should higher than
expected growth take place. Some water managers have indicated that the
year by year tax payments to the district become a "sunk cost."
Such
payments are viewed by some as an investment, the return on which can
only be secured if the community opts for district water supply when
available.
The assessment of special taxes (i.e., B, C, or D) can have a
substantial influence on the character of interaction between institutions, also.
This has been quite clearly demonstrated in the concerns
expressed by CUP officials as Salt Lake County voters considered
consolidation of governments within that county.
Officials noted that
repayment obligations of the Bonneville Project of the CUP could not
possibly be met with the maximum allowable Class A levy and that the
special assessment in the form of additional ad valorem taxes for those
subscribing for municipal water will be necessary.
The authority to
impose the Class B tax is operative for any district, subdistrict, or
municipality whose petition for an allotment of water has been accepted
and notice of water availability has been given.
Since only the Salt
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Lake County Water Conservancy District had petitioned for CUP water, a
large part of the county represent ing a major part of the county's
assessed valuation could not have been subject to the Class B tax.
Also, there were some communities within the present boundaries of the
Salt Lake County WCD, and thus subject to the Class B tax, that were to
be excluded from the new unified government. Thus, there was a question
as to whether the Class B tax could be imposed on those communities
after the unification. This unloosing of a taxing potential already in
place, coupled with what could be serious obstacles to qualifying the
balance of the region for imposition of the Class B tax, was considered
a serious problem toward getting the financial guarantees needed to
meet the Bonneville Project commitments of the Central Utah WCD.
Since
the steps needed to assure the possible use of the Class B tax throughout the area of the new unified government was not taken prior to the
move for unification, the financial underpinnings of the Bonneville
Project were believed to be threatened and the proposed governmental
unification was actively opposed by project advocates.
The importance
districts attach to protecting a tax base as the preferred mechanisms
for project repayment is quite obvious.
The need for preserving and
enlarging ad valorem taxing potentials can and does become an important
factor in the positions and policies districts follow in their dealings
with other entities.
Another feature of district taxing is that taxes collected in
any given year and not needed for current obligations may be carried
over.
Thus, unlike municipalities and others, districts may accumulate
funds, hold them in reserve, invest them until needed, etc.
This is
a decided advantage to the district in managing its fiscal and financial affairs and providing flexibility to collaborate with other
entities in ventures of mutual benefit.
For example, reserves accumulated from ad valorem taxes pending availability of project water
have been used to finance water treatment plants and other projects.
Although WCD' s have authority to issue revenue bonds and general
obligation bonds their use is seldom considered.
Ad valorem taxes are
the preferred measures for raising needed revenues to insure repayment.
For sound projects universally supported by project beneficiaries it
should matter little which financing alternative is used.
The choice
of method used to generate income to repay project costs obviously
relates to the district's appraisal of palatability to those who must
pay and risk of default problems over the repayment period. Persuading
an investor that a steady stream of revenues will be forthcoming to pay
off revenue bonds may be difficult if the charge rate structure must be
unusually high.
General obligation bonds must be voted on by tax
payers and, if there are project vulnerabilities, approval may be
denied.
Once people have embraced a district, the least painful and
most secure mechanism for deriving repayment revenues is by taxing.
While the general taxing authority (Class A) is limited, the Class B
tax is not.
Municipalities may favor payment of obligations to a WCD through
use of the Class B tax imposed by the WCD.
The advantage to this to
municipal officers is that the citizen user rate structure can be lower
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as payment from proceeds of metered water is less and/or general fund
allocations to water departments may be less by the amount collected in
taxes by the WCD.
Thus any poli tical liabi lit ies that result from
water charges are passed from municipal officials to WCD officials. A
disadvantage may be that the municipality must pay for an agreed upon
quantity of water whether actually used or not. However, the use of a
Class "B" tax as a general lien on subscribing municipalities may reduce
financing costs for a district such as a Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District.
If municipalities are purchasing water for future
growth, a purchase which requires immediate financial commi tment, the
use of the Class "B" as an act ive source of revenue may allow the purchase of such supply insurance while distributing the costs evenly among
all residents. Neither the Central Utah Water Conservancy District nor
the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District have yet collected
revenues from a Class B tax.
Municipal residents may enjoy an income tax advantage if water
services are partly or wholly paid by taxes in that such taxes are a
deductible item.
A decision as to what financing mechanism a municipality may
desire to use in financing water service needs depends upon the water
service situation of the community.
To meet current needs, direct
financing provides an excellent tool.
If, however, the municipality
h as pur ch as ed water for future use, as provi s ion for an tic ipa ted
growth, the advantage shifts to using an indirect method of financing
such as taxation. And if taxation is selected, the municipality has an
incentive to pass on costs, both political 'and financial, to the
district and county governments.
District income from water sales to individual municipalities
remains the same regardless of the financing options that cities select.
However, some districts prefer the use of the Class B property tax so as
to encourage municipalities to purchase the district water as an insurance policy against ant ic ipated growth.
Revenues for the sale of
future water can begin immediately and aid the district in its current
development activities. The economic impact is to transfer costs from
the future to the present generation. This transferred cost becomes, in
effect, an insurance premium paid by the residents of the municipality
to prevent future water shortages.
Financial autonomy allows the water service districts to carry
out the mandate of their creation, the development and management of
water. Some degree of autonomy is necessary; however, it is customary
to link the financing powers of any governmental entity to either the
immediate political constituency or to the elected representatives
of that constituency.
The metropolitan water district preserves, somewhat indirectly,
this control mechanism through close links with the legislative bodies
of the participating municipalities. No such feature is present in the
case of the water conservancy district. This omission in and of itself
mayor may not affect interactions between the districts and the other
83

land and water management agencies.
However, the greater security of
its tax revenues facilitate passage of financial constraints from the
conservancy district to other interacting agencies.
If, for example, a water conservancy district places high priority
on maintaining a high degree of financing stability, there is litt le
purpose in negotiation with other water and land managers. The district
is restricted to explanation of its policy and activities which will
foster public acceptance of that position.
This problem is often
intensified when a project requires a long completion period.
The
society that authorized construction evolves into patterns having
different needs and preferences. Yet, the contract must be honored.
The lack of financial oversight may significantly reduce a districts incentive to cooperate with other units of state and local
government.
It may foster more restrictive contracts between the
district and its customers, and perhaps most importantly, it may
concentrate responsibility for financing to the district and subsequently limit the involvement of other, perhaps state level, actors
devising creative alternatives to current financial schemes.
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CHAPTER IV
MEASURES TO OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS
In the previous chapter, examination of points of inst itut ional
interact ion revealed some problem areas.
Many of these impediments
to appropriate interaction have been recognized and measures have
been introduced by affected entities to overcome them.
Measures to
improve communication, make governing boards more representative,
integrate the operation of separately owned water supplies and facilities, and other measures have been successfully initiated as outlined
below.
Decis

Process

Integrated Management
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District is, according to
its general manager, a "water company's water company," primarily a
wholesaler of water serving unincorporated towns, cHl.es, industries,
and other agencies. The district initiates programs or develops facilities upon specific requests for service. Some of the cities served have
local sources of supply, and the district provides supplemental water.
District water lines to provide wholesale serVl.ce have become
convenient sources of water for individual users so that the district
has provided retail service on request and now serves about 7,000
homes.
As cities annex these unincorporated areas, the district has
been faced with two kinds of situations. One is a request by the city
to purchase the system.
Sandy, Murray, and South Salt Lake have made
purchases.
Alternatively, the city may annex an area but lack the
capital or inclination to purchase the water system and request the
district to continue to retail water.
Such situations are found in
Murray, Midvale, and Sandy. When and if these cities indicate a desire
to purchase the water system and distribute their own water, the district and the community simply negotiate an agreement. The district has
been willing to work out financial arrangements allowing the community
to pay over a number of years at the interest rate charged on the
district's bond of indebtness.
Often, the water line sold to a city has a debt obligation which
the district must repay.
The only means to amortize that debt is
through the sale of water.
Therefore, before the district sells the
system, it may stipulate that the community agree to purchase a specified amount of water.
This kind of agreement has been no problem.
Neither have there been jurisdictional problems between communities and
the district as the communities have grown and wished to change the
character of the service required of the district.
The district
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attempts to specify realistic water amounts in its contractual arrangements, but does require a "minimum purchase" of 1ncome in order to
provide security for bond holders.
Subdividers have created some problems by going to the cities
and indicating that if they cannot get the needed water from the city
they'll go to the district.
When developers come to the district with
an approvable subdivision, they cannot be refused if there are supplies
and facilities and if they are within the district boundaries.
If the
property in question is contiguous with a city, the district advises the
developer to go to the city to work out arrangements.
However, if the
developer insists the county water district has little option but to
provide the water but may require the developer to participate in the
costs af extending waterlines and facilities to his development.
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District utilizes a variety
of water sources which provides flexibility in meeting needs efficiently.
The district has wells, springs, and a supply available from the
metropolitan water district.
The county WCD integrates these supplies,
and makes exchanges with communities served where this results in more
efficient sendce.
For example, the City of West Jordan has a well on
the east side of the valley.
The pipeline which formerly transported
water from the well to the city deteriorated so the district now
operates that well, utilizing the water wherever appropriate, and the
city is given credit.
West Jordan is delivered water through WCD
facilities with a charge for transporting the water through district
lines.
At the present time this carrying charge is about $25 per
acre-foot.
This exchange operation and carrying charge is presently in
operation for the cities of West Jordan and Sandy, as well as Taylorsville Bennion Improvement District.
The district expects to utilize these kinds of cooperative exchanges to a greater extent as time goes by.
This kind of function
seems to be especially appropriate for a large district whose customers
have partial supplies of their own.
However, the exchanges require
considerable metering.
For example, Sandy City has a series of wells.
Pumpage is reduced greatly in the wintertime, but in the late summer,
all pumps are operating. The district installs dual meters on key wells
where the water might be utilized within the city system or alternatively diverted into the district system.
The meters are read, and
the district pays the municipality for whatever water has gone into the
county district system.
This works well because the county system is
large enough to absorb a fairly substantial amount of water.
The
district can alter the pumping rates at its own wells to accommodate
the input from these city owned wells.
Integrated management of water supplies throughout Salt Lake
County has been given both formal and informal consideration over the
years.
Attempts at unifying city and county governments on two recent
occasions included combining the present operations of the Salt Lake
City Water Department, the Salt Lake MWD, and the Salt Lake County WCD
into a single management entity.
Although consolidation of general
purpose governments was voted down, the managers of the three major
water supply agencies operat ing in Salt Lake County have cont inued
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informa 1 meetings and discussions aimed at improving cooperation and
coordination.
These three major water supply organizations have
initiated areawide studies of potential development opportunities from
all supply sources.
There have also been discussions about legislative enactments
permitting the establishment of a regional or countywide authority.
Such an authority would concern itself with nonagricultural water
supply.
It would retain many of the broad powers of present WCD and
MWD organizations with modifications in the selection and composition
of governing boards and in the organizational and functional relationships with member municipalities.
Improved Communications
When water management agencies take unilateral actions; they
frequently interfere with facilities or operations of other entities.
To avert conn icts in the cons truct ion of new faci 1 it ies in Salt Lake
County, local agencies exchange annually a schedule of intended facilities installation and maintenance activities.
Information on private
development plans are commonly sought from newspaper articles, chambers
of commerce, or industrial promotion agencies who are apprised of
developer's plans.
However, county and city planning commissions are
often the first point of contact by private developers. Good communication with such offices can be of substantial benefit to water managers
trying to anticipate future growth patterns.
State Participation

~n

Board Meetings

Since state agencies have no ex officio relation to WCD 's, they
watch agendas of the major districts and send representatives as
deemed appropriate.
Because of the greater statewide implications
of the Central Utah WCD decisions and actions, the Water Resources
Division has recently made board meet
a matter for regular attendance. This more nearly assures that programs can be coordinated and
potential problems resolved at the onset.

Authorities and Functions

Improving the Composition
of District Boards
Some districts have implemented measures to counteract some of
the criticism about the manner of selection of board members.
While
district officials have not suggested statutory changes in the court
appointment process, they have taken steps to make appointments somewhat more competitive and more representative.
The Salt Lake County WCD, for example, identified 10 geographical
subdivisions of approximately equal population (40,000), each of which
is represented by a director on the board. Although appointments have
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been made by the court as prescribed, the district has encouraged
municipal officials in each subdivision to make recommendations to the
court regarding appointments.
As city councils and mayors made nominations to the court, the appointees become representatives of local
units of government and more answerable to the electorate.
The Central Utah WCD devised a method to provide opportunity for
citizens to have more input to the appointment procedure, also.
As
the term of office for each board member approached the expiration
date, public notice of this was given in a newspaper inviting those
desiring appointment to submit their qualifications to the district
Court.
The court then scheduled a hearing at which time candidates or
others could make comment. Following this, the court determined whether
the present member would be reappointed or whether a new member would be
appointed as a replacement.

Operating Policies

Joint Planning and Management Arrangements
To avoid conflicts among several jurisdictions operating independently in an area, cities and counties can join together in an
integrated approach to planning and management.
The Timpanogas Sewer
District and the Wasatch County Sewer Improvement District are examples.
With this form of organization, the sewage disposal operations
for several cities are provided by districts governed by boards made up
of councilmen from the cities served.
Experience wi th int erlocal agreements regional cooperat ion in the
handling of municipal wastewater and solid wastes has been quite
positive within the Mountain Lands COG region.
The cooperation in the
regional management of wastewaters has provided a forum and a unifying
vehicle for neighboring communities to consider water supply problems
jointly.
Communities are finding that regional systems offer the
benefits of scale economies without great sacrifice in community policy
if properly s truc tured.
Community res pons ibili ty with respect to the
service within their own boundaries is little changed, and the answerability to community citizenry remains the same.
Yet elected officials
have a voice in overall policy and operating decisions of the region of
which their community is a part.
The Mountain Lands COG believes such
cooperative endeavors in the provision of services will increase with
efficiencies impossible to achieve where many separate jurisdictions go
their own way.
Mediat ion
One measure to cope with the recognized impediments IS found in
mediation.
Through this process, a third party possessing Some degree
of informal authority (in that particular situation) is brought into
the negotiation process to facilitate the appropriate communication
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This party is not called on to
and act as a diplomatic intermediary.
make any decision affecting the final outcome of the conflict; the
mediator is not a judge.
One recent example of the use of mediation in resolving the
disputes among Utah water institutions can be seen in the involvement
of the state's chief executive, Governor Scott Matheson, to settle
a dispute between the Central Utah Water Conservancy District and the
Timpanogas Planning and Water Management Association which represents
several northern Utah County communities.
The policy in dispute was
that of aqueduct placement by the district within the corporate boundaries of several of the communities.
Aspects of that particular dispute
have been discussed elsewhere in the report.
That the governor of the state has the informal authority necessary to successfully mediate such a conflict is not in question.
The
appropriateness of using the state's chief executive as mediator of
first resort does raise some questions however.
Arguments that the office of the governor should normally be above
such involvements may be challenged by arguments that when timely
resolution of significant problems is called for, the luxury of starting
at the bottom and slowly working through other available channels for
conflict resolution cannot be offered.
Both lines of argument are
highly relevant, but miss the essence of the problem as it applies to
the specific area of Utah water institutions.
The essence of the aJ;jove statment is that when the legislature
allows or encourages the creation of governmental entities outside the
normal general purpose government structure, it abandons the mechanisms
which can usually provide effective conflict resolution within that
sphere.
Such mechanisms are rooted in the elec toral process and some
quasi-hierarchical formal relation.
Either these same mechanisms must
be recreated in the water institutions or some similar process must be
substituted to bring about the same relationship.
One function of elected legislative and executive officers is to
act as mediators for the numerous factions which compete for public
attention and sympathy.
To the degree that they are successful, they
maintain support from the general public and retain their positions.
When they fail, they are generally replaced.
One function of the
territorial separation of authority and responsibility 1S to place
inter-city, inter-county, and city-county relationships into a well
ordered sphere linked by contract and general statute, while maintaining a general policy responsiveness to the immediate constituents.
Such elements of traditional government lend themselves to intermediate
levels of mediation or legal remedy to solve disputes.
If a water district is created outside this sphere of order, the
natural mediators and coordinators are lost.
Those issues which might
have legal standing can be placed before the court, but many of the
general policy issues do not have such standing.
Without the opportunity for legal remedy and without elected bodies acting as formal
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mediators between contending parties, facilitating conflict resolution
1S not without difficulty.
Thus, the recent experience shows that mediat ion can be a viable
tool in adaptation and coping, but the involvement of the staters
chie f execut ive of ficer should be regarded only as an expedient or a
mediation of last resort.
Moreover, this suggests that future legislatures should be cognizant of such a revealed need and take the
necessary steps to make available a lower level mediator for such
disputes.
Such mediation can be far less time consuming and expensive
than the avenue of legal remedy for conflict resolution.
Coordination
Related to the role of mediation 1S the problem of appropriate
coordination of various functions of government including water supply,
sewage disposal, planning and zoning, fire and police protection, public
roads and other familiar services rendered by local government. Special
purpose districts usually serve one interest to the exclusion of others.
Their directors seldom occupy the statesman r s role of coordinating,
integrating and compromising the perceived needs of various gQvernmental
services.
When the legislature allows the creation of special purpose
districts they do it at the price of reducing the integrating and
coordinat ing role of general purpose local government unless requirements are imposed to submit to the coordinating role of general purpose
local governments or other integrating devices.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

States have a variety of institutions involved in the development,
management, and distribution of water.
They operate under state
statutes and interact with each other and with other private and
governmental organizations in various ways.
Perhaps the most significant of these organizations in terms of the breadth of interaction is
the water conservancy district.
There is variation from state to state in the authorities and
powers given to organizations of this kind, in the linkage to state and
general purpose local government, and in the legislative purpose for
their creation.
However, because of their size, scope of activities,
and taxing authority they playa pivotal role in the kind of institutional interactions that take place as water problems are addressed.
Providing a safe and sure water supply in the most cost-effective
way often requires cooperation and coordination between and among the
various ent it ies engaged in that object ive.
The need for harmonious
interaction is most apparent in urbanizing regions where there is
progressive need to upgrade and expand supplies and services.
It is apparent that agencies of state government should have
oversight responsibility over multi-purpose water- organizations whose
geographical and funct ional domains are broad and interact ive.
There
should be state involvement and approval in the creation of such
organizations.
The state should formulate standardized procedures
for maint aining budgets and account s, and for reviewing fisc al management.
The state should also coordinate the plans and programs of
multiple-purpose water districts with the programs of other units and
levels of government.
Certainly, the water distribution and allocation
plans of districts should be visible to the state regulatory agencies
who have responsibility for monitoring water rights and water quality.
The state role in coordinating and integrating institutional activities
is prominent in most states examined in this study.
However, the
water conservancy districts 1n Utah and Colorado lack some of the
structural ties that reflect the need for state sovereignty in water
management matters.
Water conservancy districts should be fitted to general purpose
local governmental structure as well as state governmental structure.
Allowing the creation of governmental institutions outside the traditional city-county-state pattern precludes Some important linkages that
could insure better visibility and accountability.
It would also
provide a better avenue for mediating differences that may arise
between the WCD and other entities.
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Water conservancy district statutes (or counterpart organizations)
in most states contain procedures for creation which assure citizen
voice and approval by the majority in order to establish a district.
Democratic procedures for the adoption of a district and in the selection of its officers should be standard.
However, statutory provisions
for creation of WCD's in Colorado and Utah are weighted to favor their
formation.
A small minority may successfully init iate a WCD through a
court pet lt loning process.
To oppose format ion is more di fficul t.
In
Utah, statutory changes have been made over time that make it almost
impossible for municipalities to remain outside a WCD when formed. All
other states provide for the voluntary inclusion if requested by municipal authorities or vote of the residents.
The assessed valuation
subject to WCD ad valorem taxes is attractive in making municipalities
a part of the WCD.
The statutory process for making appointments to
the governing boards of WCD's should be elective OJ: appointive through
legislative or executive branches of government.
The need for district interest and involvement in local planning
activltles may vary with operational status. Where a district has been
formed as an agent-manager for a particular project and that project is
completed and its water fully subscribed, the district may playa
more passive role in the various kinds of planning undertaken by
ci ties, counties, COG's, etc.
However, if the district is sponsor of
projects being' planned or in the construction phase, there is need for
active participation in planning activities.
In meeting expanding water needs, the decisions and actions of one
organization may induce countering, accommodating, or complementary
reactions from another.
In exploring various options for meeting the
next increment of water need, institutions often find it advantageous
to develop formal or informal cooperation.
As urbanization proceeds
and situations change, institutions customarily find their affinity
diverging from original expectat ions.
In such instances, the opportunity to adjust understandings and commitments may be needed for
cont inuance of good cooperat ion.
Part ies seek adjustments which are
advantageous to them and permi ts continuanc e of cost effect ive service
to their constituency,
The dec ision-making and policy-making process of a water management institution is strongly influenced by its connectives to federal
agency programs.
An institution, acting as an agent, may become an
outlet for federal policies and prerogatives and become progressively
less responsive to local interests and ideas about water development.
WCD's need to consider carefully the role and objectives of other
institutions as they exercise their own broad powers.
Institutional
harmony is assured when WCD's complement the functions and activities
of others as much as possible.
In this context it would seem a general
veri ty that a clearly appropriate role for a WCD is that of a water
wholesaler.
Retailers are legion.
District authorities and revenue
generating capability qualify them for undertaking larger scale projects and integrating a variety of supply sources.
If water development
options are carefully evaluated and selected there should be no problem
in finding retailers.
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Where WCD's get involved in act1v1t1es that are traditionally and
logically the province of others there is greater likelihood of institutional friction.
The financing and operation of water treatment plants
by the Central Utah WCD is a case in point.
The construction and
operation of water treatment facilities are typically a municipal
function that may be particularly questionable for a large district
serving both urban and nonurban needs.
Treatment plant construction by
CUWCD has led to reques ts for financ ial support for local proj ect s of
different kinds as locals seek to get "their share" of such localized
largesse.
Where tax monies have been collected for the ostensive
purpose of project repayment, and then used to build localized projects
outside the original understanding of what tax collection would be used
for, it may constitute a disinvestment of part of the assets set aside
for project repayment.
Municipal interests within the Central Utah WCD have suggested
that the weD consider divesting itself of treatment plants it has built
and is operating.
Equitable arrangements could be made to turn these
over to those benefiting from their use.
Maintain
a water wholesaling posture and avoiding the buildup of local pressure to "get our
share" should defuse potential sources of dissatisfaction 1n future
relations.
Where institutional bonding stems from a water buyer-seller
arrangement, institutional expectations are realized as the selection and sequenc
of development/management options for satisfying
projected needs are decided u~on and implemented.
Because of increasing uncertaint ies as planning horizons are extended, deve lopment
in modest increments within relatively short time frames offers greater
assurance of making expectations converge with reality.
More frequent
opportunity for reevaluat ion of needs and opt ions to sat isfy them,
makes it possible for cooperat ing entit ies to more readi ly negot iate
changes which make for compatible continuance of the collaboration.
Incremental development allows the cooperating parties the kind of
periodic assessment and opportunity for "mid-course correct ions" that
assure more optimal solutions.
Where the institutional affinity is in connection with a large
federal water development project, maintaining congruent institutional
expectations is at least an order of magnitude more difficult.
Large
projects which may be undertaken once in the lifetime of a community
and involve large and complex physical works, require long lead times
to plan, design, work out financing and contracting commitments, and to
build. UI t imate cos ts and compl et ion dates are unpredictable.
The
evaluation of the social and economic consequences of large scale
development become much more difficult to project.
Yet, it is important to have good projections because of the tremendous investments
involved and the irreversible nature of the scheme once implemented.
Technological change, changes in interest rates, unpredictable environmental constraints that emerge during the long construct ion period,
deviations from projected population distributions, and many unforeseen
exogenous events that· directly or indirectly effect social priorities
can cause institutional perspectives to change between the time of
project initiation and completion.
The physical works of a large water
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project are permanent and limited in operating adjustment to better
meet demand configurations that materialize out of synchronization with
projections used for design decisions.
Because large projects are
capital intensive, financing and contracting arrangements are more
complex. The huge financial burdens and contract commitments associated
with large projects must be honored even though intervening changes
of the kind noted above may render the large project solution inefficacious.
Inst itutional reconciliations may be frequent and di fficult under such circumstances as each institution strives to limit
its liabilities and preserve its operational credibility.
Utah's approach to developing its share of the Colorado River
provides good illustration of the institutional problems that emerge
as many institutions mingle their expectations around a large and drawn
out prcject.
The steadfast state support of the lar-ge project solution
has had profound influence on local development policies and the
consideration of alternative solutions to particular water supply
problems.
This decision seems to have been made with an expectation
that water developed from this CUP source would be a least cost solution and therefore markets would exist ln a chronically water short
region for waters developed.
Where other options turn out to be less
costly and better fitted to existing supplies, expected markets may not
materialize.
However, financial integrity is maintained by the substantial and continuous accumulation' of tax revenues which are independent of water sales.
Nevertheless, where customers do not petition for project water as expected, relationships are often strained in
the inducements used to consummate contracts.
The repayment commitment for a large federally financed water
project places the district organization which serves as the contracting agent in the position of major risk taker.
In a dynamic
society where perspectives may change dramatically between project
initiation and completion, the district may have difficulty translating
its repayment commitment to ultimate users through purchase contracts.
With its financial risks minimized, the federal agency is anxious and
willing to move full steam ahead.
Yet potential purchasers of project
water generally cannot make firm commitments until conditions of
availability are more definite and actual costs are better known.
Thus, the agent district's policies and actions are motivated by the
need to shift its own heavy risk burden to ultimate water users or
taxpayers.
Institutional controversy often arlses out of this root
cause.
The federal agency exacts a firm repayment commitment up front
from the agent organization (WCD) but at that time the agent organization has only moral commitments from its only source of contract
backing, local users.
Where capital intensive and drawn out projects
are used to provide water services to a dynamic society, institutional
interactions will be strongly motivated by concerns about averting risk.
The need to maintain financial integrity as seen by the agent institution will inevitably clash with the need to maintain flexibility in
adopting management measures and supply options to meet needs as they
emerge as seen by ultimate users. Where policies of the state have been
instrumental in bringing on the problem, perhaps consideration should be
given to involving the state in risk sharing.
Where state policy has
encouraged a federally sponsored "big project" solution with all its
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physical and financial rigidities, and it later turns out that condit ions of water availabi li ty and costs are keeping the agent organization and potential water subscribers at odds, then the state may need
to fill a mitigating role in modifying project parameters to obtain a
more acceptable fit with local desires.
In accomplishing this, the
state would need to consider its own risk obligation as a participant
in a process of allocating risk more equitably among an enlarged!
updated pattern of potential beneficiaries.
For large undertakings that require institutional accommodation,
education and information dissemination become extremely important
if interactions are to remain amicable.
Too often institutions on
the "selling" end of the water system emphasize the great need for
water with the implication that the large federally planned, financed,
and constructed project is the ultimate solution.
Institutions on
the "buying" end desire information about costs and, more importantly,
how the costs are distributed so that they might sense their own
liability.
Those on the buying end also want the alternatives for
meeting needs fully evaluated and displayed.
Those commit ted to the
big project solution tend to thwart or downplay the examination of
water supply alternatives available to local entities.
The issue of
adequate appraisal of project alternatives is directly related to the
issue of contractual commitment. Institutions with early-on contractual
commitments have, in effect, settled on their "best" option while those
institutions not yet under contractual ties feel their options are
still open.
Mechanisms for dialogue and information exchange are
critical to resolving institutional differences that stem from the
selection of options and the distribution of cost burdens:
The interactions of the Central Utah WCD with other organizations
and institutions seem to be controlled or documented by a paramount
concern for maintaining the financial integrity of a project whose
economic viability continues to experience challenge.
Policies and
pos~t~ons adopted by the CUWCD and the way it reacts and interacts with
other institutions seems to be closely related to perceived threats to
the financial integrity of the CUP.
Where the CUWCD registers opposition, or when it takes a position counter to what is believed to be a
reasonable initiative by another entity, confidence by that entity in
the motives of the district is eroded regardless of the merit of issue.
As such instances multiply disaffection grows and solutions to controversy are more frequently sought in the context of political persuas~on.

As a possible way of stemming the progression of such political
and legal confrontations, state leadership might be exercised in
causing an open and full reappraisal of the financ ial and contrac tual
problems of the CUWCD.
Such an appraisal would need to address the
economic integrity issue of the CUP and see if there are some modifications which could improve profitability without abrogating present
contractual commi tments.
Because of the statewide impl ications, any
reevaluation should be accomplished by a team of professionals having
no vested interests or agency prede!ictions about Utah water matters.
The study should be structured and conducted so as to avoid any criticism of being a governmental evaluation designed to reinforce predetermined conclus ions or previous po !icy pronouncement s.
Rather, study
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participants should be selected on the basis of their national or
international professional reputations.
The team should be unconstrained in the kind of open and searching inquiry to be made so that
the general public could have confidence in the results.
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APPENDIX
INTERVIEW GUIDE - PROJECT WG257
Institutional Interactions in Formulation and Implementation
of Land Use and Water Development Policies and Programs
Decisionmaking Process
1.

How is the locatio~, kind, and size of physical works (i.e.,
pipelines, reserV01rs, treatment plants, etc.) decided? Are
water service needs set out in city, county, or state master
plans or must a water entrepreneur make independent decisions
based on its own projections of use patterns?

2.

How do institutions responsible for land use planning and management and water planning and management obtain information about
the intentions of each other and how do they provide comment and
input to the decisions of one another?

3.

Do suppliers of water in this area review or confirm projection
for services with county and city planners?

4.

Must water service plans of this organization be submitted to
other entities for review and approval?

5.

What are the provisions. for
in decisionmaking?

6.

What 1S the impact of special interest groups (i.e., realtors,
developers, land owners, etc.) on water management decisions?

7.

Are decisions influenced by federal programs or mandates?

8.

Are decisions influenced by state programs and controls?

9.

Do state laws authorizing cities and count ies to carry out land
planning and zoning activities influence operational decisions
of water suppliers?

citizen participation and

feedback

How?
How?

Institutional Authority and Responsibility
1.

Is there jurisdictional overlaps in funct ion and responsibility
How are these overbetween entities within your service area?
lap problems addressed?

2.

How broad is the planning and/or managerial responsibility of
your organization?
99

3.

Does this organization have regulatory responsibility?
this overlap with such responsibility of others?

4.

Does this organization have a supervising board, commIsSIon, or
committee?
Is that board governing or advisory only? How IS
membership achieved?

5.

What is your involvement or responsibility In water quality
planning/management?

6.

Does the issuance of permits to locate or build in specific areas
depend on prior arrangements for water service or the acquisition
of water rights?

7.

Does your organization get queries and suggestions from industrial
promotion organizations?

8.

Can your organization deal independently
in the provision of water supplies?

9.

What is the vertical line of accountability of your organization
to city, county, multi-county or state agency?

with

large

Does

industries

10.

Are there problems in these relationships?

11 .

Is your organizat ion prevented from doing some things it want s
and needs to do because of statutory organizational or institutional constraints?

12.

To what extent does your organization give guidance and help to
smaller entities?

13.

Is this organization limited as to the kinds of water service
it may provide (potable only, for example)?

14.

If your organization provides both potable and nonpotable water
service through dual water systems what problems and benefits
does this combination of service entail?

Institutional Operating Style/Policies
1.

Are your jurisdictional boundaries permanently fixed or are they
subject to change as the needs for water or wastewater serVIces
change?

2.

Do other entities provide similar services within your geographical
service area?
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3.

As boundaries change as result of urbanization (i.e., annexation,
etc.) do the resulting changes in governmental jurisdiction or
responsibility create new questions about who should provide
water and wastewater services?

4.

How are these jurisdictional problems handled where growth is
rapid and community boundaries are changing from time to time?

5.

How does annexation affect the efficiency or effectiveness of
your operation?

6.

Does annexat ion -expand or reduce your obligat ion/ opportunity for
water services?

7.

Are boundary changes sufficiently predictable that water serV1ce
entities can plan ahead to accommodate any change in service
requirement?

8.

When annexation processes introduce optional provisions for water
services, how are the determinations of an entrepreneur made?

9.

What policies or criterion does your organization use in deciding
whether your own or another ent ity should provide water service
when situations require a choice?

10.

Does your organization have sufficient developed water to satisfy
needs for new requests?

11.

What sources of information are used to project water needs?

12.

What is your policy with respect to providing service to meet
anticipated growth:
(a) in incorporated areas?
(b) in unincorporated areas?

13.

What is your policy with respect to providing total water service
and/or supplemental service?

14.

Are there peculiar and troubling problems 1n providing supplementary service?
in physical operation?
in the joint accommodations of separate management perspectives?
fragmentation of
delivery systems? realistic allocation of delivery costs?

15.

What problems does your organization face with respect to making
commitments for constructing facilities and equipment to satisfy
anticipated needs while at the same time securing commitments
from these potential users that the water will indeed be purchased
when available?

16.

Does your organization provide serV1ce on an individual basis?
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17.

What is the basis of organizational policy about clientele served
(i.e., wholesale or retail service)?

18.

In responding to needs for new water service, who has respons ibility for determining whether proposed use is in harmony with
any relevant city/county codes, ordinances, master plans, etc.?

19.

Are the customers for which your organization provides service
under standard service agreements or are contracts specially
tailored to fit particular desires?

20.

Do customers occasionally ask to be relieved of contractual
service commitments?
What situations lead to such requests?
What policy must your organization follow in reacting to such
contractual changes?

21.

Does this organization have an operating policy for
sale or rental of water that is in temporary surplus?

22.

Does this organization have access to sources of supply that can
be purchased or rented on a temporary basis when normal supplies
may run short?

23.

Are these arrangements for temporary sale or purchase of water
a satisfactory solution for meeting infrequent water supply
problems?

short

term

Federal Influences on Policies and Programs and the
Opportunity to Coordinate and Integrate Them

1.

Does your organization obtain loans
federal agencies?

2.

What is the nature of federal programs 1n which your organization
part icipates?

3.

Do the terms of agreements with federal agencies constrain your
services in any way?
(Limitation on kind of water service,
facilities design approvals, repayment obligation, etc.)

4.

Are your contractual
term or long term?

5.

How do the terms of federal contracts affect the service contracts
your organization negotiates with its customers?
Must service
contracts be written so as to not jeopardize terms of a repayment
contract or a regulation imposed by a federal agency?

agreements with
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or grants directly

federal

agencies

from

short

6.

Which federal regulatory agencies have jurisdiction over your
act ivi ties?

7.

What is the impact of these regulatory agencies on your operation?

8.

Have federal programs resulted in new institutions and institutional arrangements with which your organization must relate and
interact? Have you been able to accommodate to these new arrangements sat isfactorily?
So far as your own organizat ion ~s concerned, have these new institutional arrangements proven helpful
(i.e., better coordination, communication, cooperation, etc.)?

Financial Influences
1.

Does your organization obtain its operating capital from user
fees?
ad valorem taxes?
bonding?
state or federal loans/
grants?

2.

What do you see as the advantages and disadvantages of these
methods for your particular operation?

3.

Are the financial resources of this organization constrained by
law or by organizational policy with respect to permissible
services and/or functions?

4.

How has inflation affected your
obligations?

5.

How do repayment terms of any debt incurred effect your latitude
to develop operating policies and programs?

6.

How do repayment terms effect the terms and conditions of your
service contracts with those to whom you provide water service
(either wholesale or retail users)?

7.

Does this organization participate/cooperate in financial arrangements with related management entities?

8.

Are such cooperative financing arrangements
financial resources of this organization?

9.

Can this organization effectively use the authority of an interlocal agreement to enable joint financing?

10.

In cooperative financial arrangements would the contributions of
this entity take the form of cost-sharing, loans, grants in aid,
subcontracts, or expenditures internal to the organization?

financial policies and repayment
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constrained

by

the

11.

For revenues generated by sale or services or user fees, how are
the price levels and fees determined?

12.

How are system expansion costs distributed among clientele served?
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APPENDIX B
List of Individuals Interviewed
Arizona
Jack Bale
Pima Council of Governments

Sol Resnick
Arizona Water Resources Center

Zada Darter
Central Arizona Water
Conservancy District

Gloria Sandvik
Arizona State Land Board

Steven Davis
Tucson Water Department

Gerald Smith
Arizona State Land Board

James DeCook
University of Arizona

Wesley Steiner
Arizona Water Commission

Kathy Ferris
Arizona Groundwater Study
Commission

Larry K. Stephenson
Bureau of Water Quality Control

Bruce Johnson
Tucson Water Department

William L. Warekow
Salt River Water Project

Dick Juetten
Salt River Water Project

Don W. Young
Arizona State Land Department

Laurence Linser
Arizona Water Commission
Colorado
Fred Anderson
Colorado State Senate

Norman Evans
Colorado Environmental Resources
Center

Raymond L. Anderson
Ag. Econ., Colorado State
University

Phillip D. Foss
Political Science Department
Colorado State University

Henry Caulfield
Political Science Department
Colorado State University

Ft. Collins City Water

Duane Davis
Ft. Collins City Water
Department

Conrad McBride
Political Science Department
University of Colorado

Roger Krempel
Department
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Colorado (continued)
Buie Sewell
Colorado Energy Conservation
Office

Robert Smith
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District

Thomas Smart Jr.
Attorney at Law, Denver
Nebraska
Gary Krumland
Nebraska Policy Research Office

James Nelson
Division of Water Quality

Robert Kuselka
Assoc. of Twenty-four Nebraska
Natural Resource Districts

Lee Orton
Nebraska Natural Resource
Districts

Larry Kyle
Nebraska Natural Resource
Districts

Hal L. Schroeder
Lower Platt So. Natural Resources District

Gary Lewis
Nebraska Water Resources
Institute

Robert Wall
Nebraska Department of Environmental Control

Ralph Marlette
University of Nebraska
Oregon
Peter Klingeman
Oregon Water Resources
Research Institute

Herb Stovener
Oregon State University

Roger Kragnich
Oregon State University

Palmer Torvend
Tualatin Valley Irrigation
District

Wesley Kvarston
Department of Land Conservation and Development

Chris L. Wheeler
Deputy Director Oregon Water
Resource Department

Harold L. Sawyer
Department of Environmental
Quality
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South Dakota
Delvon Broz
Department of Water and
Natural Resources

John Smith
Office of Attorney General

Robert Neufield
Department of Water and
Natural Resources

John Weirsma
South Dakota Water Resources
Institute

Utah
James Ash
Sandy City Water Department

Lee Hooper
Hooper Water Improvement
District

Craig Barker
Weber County Planning Office

Robert Huefner
Institute of Government
University of Utah

Merrill Bingham
Thurgood and Associates, Provo

Daniel F. Lawrence
Utah Water Resources Division

Edward Blaney
Wasatch Front Council of Governments

Lavere Merritt
Brigham Young University

Carl Carpenter
Central Utah Water Conservancy District

Joseph Novak
Snow, Christensen, and
Martineau, Salt Lake City

Homer Chandler
Mountainlands Council of Governments

Lorin Powell
ARIX Engineers, Provo

Alten B. Davis
Weber State College

Ed Reed
Weber County Planning Office

Joseph Dawson
Roy Water Subconservancy
District

Clayne Ricks
Salt Lake County Planning
Commission

Robert Eldard
Odgen City Planning Office

Stan Roberts
Provo River Commissioner

J. L. Green
American Fork

Buck Rose
Utah County Planning Office

Max Greenhalgh
Bagley and Co. Developers

Blaine Singleton
Timpanogas Planning and Water
Management Agency

Wayne Hillier
Provo City Municipal Water
District

Vaughn B. Wonnacott
Salt Lake Municipal Water
District
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Individuals Interviewed on Previous Project
Douglas Campbell
Salt Lake County Planning
Commission

Lynn Ludlow
Central Utah Water Conservancy District

Edward W. Clyde
Salt Lake City Attorney

Clayne Ricks
Salt Lake County Ptanning
Commission

Wayne D. Criddle
Clyde-Criddle-Woodward Inc.
Salt Lake City

Buck Rose
Utah County Planner

Wi 11 iam Hague
Salt Lake Municipal Water
District

Graham Schirra
Weber County Planning Commission

Dee C. Hansen
Division of Water Rights

George Scott
Mountainlands Council of
Governments

Robert Hilbert
Salt Lake County Water
Conservan~y District

Dean Wheadon
Provo City Water Department

Jerry Larsen
Hunter-Granger Water
Improvement District

Charles Wilson
Salt Lake City Water Department

Daniel F. Lawrence
Division of Water Resources

Wayne Winegar
Weber Basin Water Conservancy
District
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APPENDIX C
REVIEW COMMENTARY AND AUTHOR RESPONSE
At the suggestion of the Bureau of Reclamation, reviewers of this
report were invited to have their comments appended.
It is hoped that
their inclusion will provide the reader with a more complete perspective
of the authors' conclusions and how they were perceived by others.
Those providing comment and criticism
report were provided copies of the final
to submit comment they would like to have
final publication.
This Appendix contains
response to that invitation along with a

on the first draft of this
draft with the invitation
included as a part of the
the
received in
response from the authors.

Comments are placed in alphabetical order by reviewer.
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City of Pleasant Grove
Town of Cedar Hi lis
City of Highland
City of lindon

TIMPANOGOS PLANNING AND
WATER MANAGEMENT AGENCY
20 North Main
Alpine, Utah 84003
(801)756 9550

City of Amerim Fork
City of Alpine
City of lehi

August 8, 1983

Mr. Jay M. Bagley, Professor
Civil and Environmental Engineering
Utah State University
Logan, UT 84322
Dear Jay:
We have reviewed your report entitled "Impediments to Effective Interactions
Between Mu It i purpose Water Di str i cts and Other Governmenta I I nst I tut ions In
Urbanizing Areas". The context of this report Is very timely considering the
serious problems that have been exposed during the past two years with metropo I Itan and conservancy d Istr Icts. We find the report very I nformat Iona I and
factua I.
Considering the extreme political pressures that can be brought to bear
concerning such controversial Issues, this report Is a bold challenge to all
water districts. The report should greatly assist those who seriously evaluate
these sensitive Issues, many of which have been kept from the public. Included
below are a few comments concerning specific areas of the report.
1.

Decisions (Pages 50,55, & 56)
The "we know best" att Itude I nd Icated on page 55 has been a ser lous
contention with Utah County Cities for years.
In 1978, the Central Utah
Water Conservancy District (CUWCD) .iQld. the Cities how much water they
wou I d need from the Project. The DIstr i ct eva I uatl ons were done with
almost nQ ~ from the Cities. Many of the Cities disagreed with these
evaluations, and nQ commitments were made.
Even so, the District proceeded with the construction of a treatment plant (Utah Val ley) that was
overs I zed I n many areas to accommodate North Utah County, and aqueduct
designs were completed for North Utah County. This was done even though
there was nQi £ single signed or committed user from North Utah County to
purchase the Project water.
From 1978 to 1983 (5 years), there has not even been an attempt by the
District to obtain Central Utah Project water user commitments from North
Utah County Cities. This is a prime example of the "we know best" pol icy,
as we I I as an I nd I fferent att i tude toward the water users based on the
assumption that the Cities are locked in to the project anyway through ad
valorem taxes.
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Page 55 also out! ines the serious problems that the proposed Jordan
4/Alpine 3 Aqueducts would impose in North Utah County. Contrary to what
Is indicated in paragraph two, the combined conveyance facility (lined
open cana I) Is actua I IY a much cheaper cost fac i I Ity and a Iso reta I ns a
9,000 KW power facil ity that wll I otherwise become obsolete. The plan was
the original U.S.B.O.R. plan for water conveyance through North Utah
County.
One of the most serious problems the Cities encountered was the delay
tactic. "Let's talk" was their slogan while, at the same time, proceeding
rapidly with the design. Under this procedure, they were able to spend
mill ions of dollars while delaying us and then showing those dollars as
sunk costs against the alternative proposal, as well as pointing to the
read I ness of the plans for construct Ion.
Our exper Ience with these
problems indicated a total lack of communication and responsiveness from
the District to Its constituents.
2.

Water ApproprIations
A typical example of the District protest pol Icy (page 59) on water
appropriatIons was Provo City's latest court battle with the District and
others to retaIn the use of 2.5 cfs of water they had acquired for use in
Provo City.
The statement on page 59 "a Di str i ct may protest an app I r cat Ion to
appropr I ate water f I led wIth the State Eng Ineer on the bas is that no
appropriated water exists and then turn around and make the water available under purchase agreement from the DIstrict Itself" was the basis of
the Provo City case.
Fortunately, the courts ruled in favor of Provo
City.

3.

Representation
We, along with many others throughout the State, have felt as Indicated on
page 63 that we have been taxed without representation. This was very
apparent a year ago when the Councl I of Governments from Utah, Salt Lake,
and Wasatch Counties fully supported a re-evaluation of the Jordan 4 Aqueduct proposal, and there was no response from the Central Utah Water Conservancy District until the Governor Intervened. The latest legislation
for District Director appoIntments wII I change this situation. However, a
fully representatIve board (selected by elected offIcials) wll I take
severa I years to accomp I Ish since ex I st i ng d I rectors wI I I rema In unt i I
their term of office is complete.
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4.

Planning Conflicts (Pages 66-69)
The context here seems to indicate that another water supplier Is needed
in the County areas since Cities have been reluctant to annex adjacent
properties, and the County planning Is aimed at expanding the Cities
versus broad County development. We strongly support municipal expansion
throughout the County.
Within the last few years, the communities In
North Utah County have spent mill ions of do I Iars to e I 1m i nate sewerage
problems.
If a .llill'i. ~ purveyor were available in the County areas,
then extreme pressures wou Id be exerted on the County for deve Iopments
utll izing septic tank/drain field sewage disposal, particularly, since the
developers do not have to construct a sewerage system and its associated
costs.

All of the Cities support annexation but require that the area be provided
with City services, among which Is a sewer system. Many times, this may
not be econom Ica I Iy feas I b Ie for a few years unt II add Itiona I growth
occurs. To al low septic tank/drain fields on a prolific basis throughout
the unannexed areas undermines the careful planning and large Investments
that have taken place. It also makes It virtually impossible at a future
date to I nsta I I a sewer system due to the aspha It and improvements
replacement costs and the lack of support from the homeowners since they
have already spent several thousands of dollars for their individual
systems.
5.

AlternatIyes (Pages 49.51,52,54.56,72,76, & 95)
As indicated on page 49, alternate ways of meeting water needs have been
constrained by the Central Utah Water Conservancy District. The U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency in Its comments on the "Central Utah
Project Bonnevi lie Unit M. & I. System Final Environmental Statement"
(pages 16-24, Vol. II) adequately addressed the lack of thorough evaluation of alternative water sources. These comments received only cursory
response, and the alternatives have never been fully displayed.
Such alternatives as dual water systems have been promoted by the State
for years as a conservation measure (page 76), yet receives no attention
from the District.
In fact, It makes the comparisons of such a system
with the present District pol icy of treatment plants almost Impossible.
Both methods are a means whereby Project water could be used; however, the
treatment plant construction cost Is fully subsidized by District taxes,
and the dual water systems construction cost must be paid directly by the
users.
Therefore, a city that bui Ids a dual system is actually doubled taxed:
once to construct Its dual system and once to pay the District Tax which
goes to construct a treatment plant elsewhere. We feel that the Cities
must have the opportunity to fully explore alternatives in order to best
serve their citizens.
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6.

Wholesale Water
We tota I I Y agree with the conc I us ions on page 93 that treatment p I ants
should be a municipal function. As Indicated on page 70, the massive Big
Thompson Project in Colorado wholesales untreated water and leaves the
choices to the user as to treatment, etc.
As mentioned ill the text,
wholesaling water would eliminate the problem that now exists with some
communitIes being provided treatment facl I Itles and others with no
ImmedIately perceivable benefit from the tax dol lars that have been paid
In to the District.

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments concerning this report.
Very truly yours,
TIMPANOGOS AGENCY

~rlstlansen
Chairman

tds
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Authors' Response to Mr. Christiansen's Commentary
Mr. Christiansen, speaking in behalf of an organization of seven
northern Utah County communities, offers some contrasting perspectives
to those presented by Ludlow, Clyde, and Novak with respect to decisionmaking, communication, representation, water appropriations, alternatives, and treatment plant policies.
Christiansen makes no specific
suggestions for modifying the manuscript but provides additional examples in support of particular findings.
Christiansen's comments with respect to conflicts with community
and county planning ~ugments what we have said with respect to Utah
County situation but perhaps draws some inferences we didn't intend.
Our impression was that the municipal expansion approach to growth which
had been mutually supported by both cities and Utah County at one time,
had more recently given way to development in unannexed areas as result
of changing county policy.
We had noted that the county had been
willing to change zoning so that development could proceed in unannexed
areas if it were satisfied that adequate water and sewer services would
be provided.
The problem comes in whether or not these services turn
out to be truly adequate. Problems were reported to us in this regard,
just as Christiansen observes.
Was the fact that the Salt Lake County
WCD had been requested to annex land across the border into Utah County
an indication that a regional supplier was considered preferable to the
options of either privafe water development or annexation to an existing
Utah County city? If so, could the regional organization that had been
successful in addressing wastewater problems in northern Utah County
direct its attent ion to addressing water supply problems of the same
region? Noting that there are severa MWD's and a WCD already in
existence in northern Utah County, we thought some consideration might
be given to utilizing these in a more active way if it might offer a
means of providing good water supply service without encouraging the
problem Mr. Christiansen wants to avoid.
From Christiansen's comments it is clear that the Timpanogas
Planning and Water Management Agency is well aware of the potential
problems that a water suppliers might induce with respect to sewerage
and sewage disposal. Hence, that agency might take some initiatives to
make sure that problems are addressed in an integrated manner.
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Professor Jay M. Bagley
Civil and Environmental Engineering
College of Engineering
Utah State University
Utah Water Research Laboratory UMC 82
Logan, Utah 84322
Dear Jay:
I have read the draft of your paper entitled "Impediments to
Effective Interactions Between Multipurpose Water Districts and
other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas".
It is, of
course, a biased attack on the Central Utah Project, but I have
been aware for a long time of your opposition to that project.
Opposition on your part as an individual is, of course, p+oper,
but I question the propriety of your using the Utah State University or the Utah Water Research Laboratory to support your
personal views.
As you probably know, I was on the governing board of the
University of Utah for nearly 18 years, both as a Regent and
later as a member of the Institutional Council.
I was chairman
of both organizations covering a total of about 14 years.
In
that capacity I never objected to professors becoming involved in
any kind of a cause, but I did object if they purported to do so
on behalf of the University.
Policy generally is a matter for
the President or for the Council.
If a law professor wanted to
become involved on one side or the other of a volatile issue,
like for example, abortion, it was our request that he do so as
an individual and not with University letterhead, and that he not
otherwise imply that he was speaking on behalf of the University.
If your paper is intended to be a research paper, it is inaccurate in many respects.
If it is intended as a policy statement, I do not believe that it should be done in the name of
either the University or the Research Laboratory.
With the above observation, I turn to the draft.
First, by way of overview, there unquestionably is water,
such as underground water, which we could develop next and at a
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price per acre-foot less than Central Utah Project municipal
water, but all sources will ultimately be needed.
My grandchildren or their grandchildren can develop our underground water, but
it is my firm opinion, after 42 years of concentrated practice in
the water law field that this is our best opportunity to develop
our Colorado River water.
The concept of the Central Utah Project i~ at least as old
as 1903.
I have seen a map prepared by a Utah State Engineer by
the name of A. F. Doremus, which reasonably well outlines the
project.
For at least 60 years it has been the official policy
of the State of Utah to first quantify our Colorado water entitlement by compact and then to get proj ects authorized by Congress
to put that water to use.
The first compact dividing the water
between the two basins was negotiated in 1922 and implemented
wi th the building of Hoover Dam and the adoption of the Boulder
Canyon Project Act in 1928.
The State of Utah and the federal government made a recognizant type survey of the five units of .the Central Utah Project
in the 1940s, but the Bureau in 1946 advised the Upper Basin
states that it would not proceed to develop projects in the Upper
Basin until the states negotiated a compact dividing the Upper
Basin water.
This was done in October of 1948. We then spent 8
years trying to get development authorized.
This occurred
when Congress enacted the Colorado River Storage Act in April of
1956.
It is this Act which authorized the construction of the
Central Utah Project.
The Vernal Unit was almost immediately
cons tructed, but it took an addi tional nine years to get construction money for Bonneville.
The repayment contract was
signed in 1965 and construction started that year.
Eighteen
years later we are about 40% completed; the federal government
has invested over $400 million and the Central Utah Water Conservancy District probably another $100 million.
The suggestion in your paper that the public officials of
the State are not in communication with the District on this
proj ect is nonsense.
Governor Clyde provided the leadership to
get the Central Utah District organized and to get construction
started.
He appeared prominently in the campaign to get voter
approval and to get congressional approval.
We have never had a
Governor who opposed the proj ect; in fact, year after year they
go to Washington to testify in support of funds.
He have never
had a member of our congressional delegation who opposed it, but
to the contrary, our congressional delegation and all of our
Governors have been in the forefront of Utah's efforts to build
this project.
The project has been submitted to the Utah State
Legislature for an approving vote on eight different occasions.
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On seven occasions support for the project by the Utah State
Legislature was unanimous and on the eighth occasion it was
unanimous in one house and had only one dissenting vote in the
other. When it was submitted to an approving vote of the people,
the vote was overwhelmingly in favor of the project. The
cision to build it was made years ago by both our elected officials
and by the people.
It seems to me irresponsible at the present stage of development for an institution like Utah State University and/or the
~vater
Research Laboratory to be urging that this proj ect be
abandoned.
The decision to go forward with the project did not
have its origin with the Central Utah District, and the District
is not a "voice in the wilderness" supporting the project while
the elected officials of the State oppose it. When the project
was put on President Carter's hit list, it was the Governor of
the State who organized our efforts to reverse that decision. It
seems to me that it would be foolhardy for the State and federal
government, after having spent $500 million, to stop half-completed construction or to abandon the project.
Utah is the
second driest state in the Union and it is the fifth fastest
growing state in the Union.
It seems certain to me that we will
ul timately need all of our water.
We are not able to turn a
project of this magnitude
and on like a light switch. It is
nearly 30 years since the project was authorized and if we stay
on our present construction schedule, it will take another 20
years to complete construction. A town in need of water can get
permission to drill a well and can do so in a matter of months,
but a project of this magnitude takes half a century.
The official position of the State of Utah through its
elected officials, is to build this project now.
To me that
makes considerable sense.
First, I think we are coming to the
end of an 80-year old era of federally financed reclamation
projects.
If these large mUlti-purpose projects are to be constructed in the future, there will almost certainly be a requirement for large cost-sharing at a state level and it is unlikely
that interest will be subsidized. Since this project was authorized under federal reclamation law, as it existed in 1956, the
agr icul tural water is subsidized by power revenues.
Municipal
water probably also can be subsidized by power revenues. In any
event, M&I water only pays interest at 3.222%.
~ve have
the
assistance of the Colorado River Development Fund in paying for
the project, as well as the power revenues from dams heretofore
constructed, such as Lake Powell.
For Utah to pull away from
this program and defer development of the Colorado River until we
have exhausted all of our other supplies and to then start the
long process of a different project makes no sense at all to me.
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There is a lot of unused water in the Bear River that we
ought to develop, but my experience would indicate that if vie
started right now with a concentrated state effort to develop the
Bear River, it would be decades before the projects could be
constructed.
Presently we have aqueducts in place which were
built to receive Central Utah \vater. We have treatment plants in
place for the same purpose.
I can understand somebody back in
1956 urging that we defer development of the Colorado River and
go to some alternative supply, but I have difficulty seeing any
merit in the contention that we abandon the project at this time,
or that we defer it while we drill our wells and start a new
project on the Bear River, etc.
Since we will ultimately need
the water, why not complete the project on which we have already
spent $500 million?
I am fully aware that water costs have gone up, but we are
taking what I think will prove to be effective steps to bring the
costs back down.
One is through the use of the power revenues,
which I think the 1956 Act set aside for Utah to help pay the
cost of municipal water.
Secondly, a decision has been made to
install a 1,000 megawatt plant on the Diamond Fork Power d~op.
The LP.P. Plant, 'which will only produce 1,500 megawatts, is
apparently going to cos·t something like $6.5 billion.
The Diamond Fork Power drop, which will develop 1,000 megawatts of more
valuable peaking power, will be built for less than $1 billion.
The use of these power revenues would bring the cost of M&I water
down to completely acceptable levels.
If the 1,000 megawatt plant is constructed, it will warrant
a reallocation to power of a great deal of the cost of common
facilities, like Soldier Creek Dam and the Strawberry Aqueduct.
To the extent the costs are thus allocated to power, it will
resul t directly in a reduction in the costs allocated to M&I
water. Thus, I am hopeful that we can hold the M&I costs down to
reasonable level s.
Efforts to do this make sense; efforts to
kill the project do not.
Now a few comments on the specifics:
1.
On page 3, the paper implies that because conservancy
and metropolitan districts are operating under statutes which
were enacted decades ago, they are out of touch.
I personally
see the fact that we have operated under these statutes for more
than 40 years successfully to indicate exactly to the contrary.
The Conservancy District Act was adopted about the time I came
out of law school some 40 odd years ago.
The Utah statute was
borrowed from Colorado, which in turn followed Ohio, so that we
have had a long-time experience with these statutes and they
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work.
The 1902 Reclamation Act is still the backbone of federal
reclamation law, and the fact that it is 80 years old, and is
still working is a plus.
2.
On page 4 you indicate that municipalities have found
water from large projects to be the most expensive.
This simply
is not true.
Deer Creek water purchased by Sal t Lake City in
1938, or thereabouts, is less expensive t~day than any other
al ternative source, including production from either new or old
wells.
As I am sure you know, ci
have a period in July and
August where the peak demands "move off the scale". At that time
streams are going dry and wells simply do not have adequate
peaking capacity.
What cities need is exactly what these large
projects provide:
Stored water on call, large aqueducts and
treatment plants to put this water into the cities' systems and
distribution storage.
In my opinion, there is no practical way
that Salt Lake County can meet its peak demands from the local
streams and wells.
Even with the 175 c.f.s. Salt Lake Aqueduct
and the 270 c.f.s. Jordan Aqueduct, we will have problems meeting
the peak demand on a hot summer day. This 445 c.f.s. of capacity,
backed up by stored water, should be compared in capacity with a
pretty good well which might yield 3 c. f. s.
The v'leber Basin
Project, built by a conservancy district as a part of a large
mUlti-purpose project, is indispensable to the water supply of
those counties and it is not the least cost effective.
The
Scofield water plays a similar role in Carbon County. The water
is cheap and they did not have better solutions.
The failure of
the paper to recognize the enormous benefits from these projects
in the past is part of the reason I state that it is not properly
characterized as a "research" paper.
3.
On page 7 the paper indicates that the law permits two
kinds of public water districts.
This is wrong.
Improvement
districts are in wide use. They are water districts.
4.
On page 8 the paper indicates that the Carbon Water
Conservancy District was organized to build the Gooseberry Project.
I haven't taken the trouble to check it, but I think that
is wrong.
I think the Gooseberry Proj ect would take water to
Sanpete County and that it is bitterly opposed by the Carbon
County District.
I think that district was organized to build
the Scofield Reservoir.
5. Also on page 8 you indicate that many of the conservancy
districts overlap. Again, I may not be sufficiently advised, but
I do represent many of the conservancy districts.
I drafted the
statute permitting one district to overlap another and have the
impression that the.only conservancy district that overlaps other
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conservancy districts is the Central Utah District.
However,
there are some sub-districts.
I am not aware of a single case
where Metropolitan Water Districts overlap.
6.
Also on page 8 you indicate that the District Court is
appointing directors.
This was true yesterday, but was changed
by the last legislature.
7. Also on page 8 you say that the specific powers of conservancy and metropolitan water districts are "essentially" those
of a municipal corporation.
I think that is wrong.
Municipal
corporations have broad legislative powers.
They can adopt
ordinances making certain conducts criminal.
These districts
have no such governmental powers.
Their ability to legislate is
essentially limited to the establishment of water rates and rules
and regulations for the use of water.
They are referred to as
quasi-municipal corporations, because their powers are significantly less.
8.
On page 25 you suggest that the articles of these districts are written by the incorporators.
I do not think that is
correct.
I think the "charters" for- these districts are contained almost exclusively in the statutes and that it is essentially impossible for the incorporators to change these powers.
Since these districts are special purpose districts, they have
only the powers granted to them by statute; they have no other
charter.
9.
On page 26 the paper talks of these districts as being
"independent" government. Again, I disagree. They are creatures
of the legislature.
The legislature retains jurisdiction over
them and exercises it. Statutes, such as control over the method
by which they solicit bids for construction, their budget process,
building and zoning permits, etc., govern and control these
districts.
In my opinion, they are not independent, except in
the narrow field of facilities to be built and in their rates.
Even these are subject to court review.
10. On page 33 the paper states that the districts seem to
prefer taxes to water rates as a source of revenue. If you have
researched this and have a basis for the statement, the paper
does not reflect it.
The Utah Supreme Court has frequently
reviewed the rate-making powers of cities and districts.
The
court recognizes that the sources of revenue include taxes,
connection fees, charges for water sold, etc, and has expressly
held that the mix is basically for the district, not for the
court; nevertheless, the courts occasionally set aside rate
schedules where they discriminate against a particular class,
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such as newcomers.
I f you have researched the matter and have
evidence that these districts prefer taxes, it would help the
paper to note it.
My own opinion as to policies of the several
districts I represent would be to the contrary.
11.
On page 37 the paper states that these districts have
great autonomy, with no tie to local or national government.
Again I disagree.
I think these districts are subject to zoning
and building statutes, general state statutes governing budget
and budget hearings; are subject to ehe open meeting law, uniform
accounting systeMs, etc. Their autonomy is basically in the area
of rates for the sale of water and rules and regulations for its
use. Even here they are subject to court review.
Further, the charge that the districts are isolated from
local government is certainly not true in the districts I represent.
In the case of the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy
District, the subdivisions used for selection of directors generally follow political boundaries.
Sandy is one subdivision,
Midvale is another, South Jordan and Riverton are combined in one
district, etc.
Other subdivisions involve local improvement
districts that distribute water on a retail basis.
The board
ini tially was comprised of the mayors of these towns and the
presidents of these improvement districts.
Over time, the mayor
elected not to stand for reelection, but the town has nevertheless urged the district court to continue to have that individual
represent that district.
In any event, the board members are
tied very close to the cities, water companies and water improvement districts that buy their water.
In the case of the Central Utah Water Conservancy District,
the initial board was largely made up of the same type of representative people.
In the Vernal area, Lawrence Siddoway, who is
the manager of the Uintah Basin Water Conservancy District, has
served from the inception.
Bryant Stringham was the Mayor of
Vernal.
In Duchesne County, we have had members of the County
Commission and presidents of the dominant irrigation companies.
In Wasatch County, Clyde Ritchie and Thomas Baum have both been
County Commissioners.
In Utah County, Sterling Jones and Marion
Hinckley carne on the board at the time they were County Commissioners.
Ross Garrett is chairman of the Juab County Commission.
John Lambert from Summit County was a state legislator. Herbert
Smart was the City Commissioner of Salt Lake City who headed the
water department and when he chose not to run for reelection to
the City Commission, Charles Wilson, Superintendent of the City
Water Department, was chosen.
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These peop Ie have from time to time changed, but the charge
that the boards are comprised of individuals isolated from other
local or regional government is simply not true.
Further, water rights are not a matter of control by these
districts.
They are controlled by the State Engineer. The districts themselves are not water users.
They develop a water
supply for sale to others and the relationship between a conservancy district and every city, improvement district, water utility,
etc., wi thin the district is contractual and voluntary.
Debt
beyond one year's taxes has to be submitted to the approving vote
of the people.
12. On page 41 the paper states that the Central Utah District has "blunted or retarded" the examination of other alternatives.
Again, I sharply disagree.
It was never the intent of
the Central Utah plan to develop all the water needed for the
next 30 to 40 years.
It has always been contemplated that there
would be simultaneous development of other sources of supply.
Numerous wells have been drilled in Salt Lake County.
None has
been: protested by the Central Utah District.
The Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District has recently issued a $22
million bond issue to build a water treatment plant and to gathe~
up water supplies from small streams in Southeast Salt Lake
County.
The rv1etropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City is
doing a half a dozen things to develop additional supplies,
including the building of Little Dell, and the making of an
exchange called the Jacob-Welby Exchange on the old Provo Reservoir Canal.
It has filed applications to drill wells and for a
reservoir site on Little Cottonwood water.
There have been protests by the Central Utah District of
well applications where the applicants seek to appropriate water
which we think has already been appropriated by the project, but
there is no general opposition to the development of other local
supplies.
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District has
even assigned well rights and sold water systems to the local
water agencies.
In no way does it retard other water developments.
13. On page 41 the paper suggests that there is going to be
a problem marketing the Central Utah water and that also is not
true. It may well be that the Utah County cities north of Provo
will decide that they do not want to buy any. On the other hand,
Salt Lake County has only been allocated 70,000 acre-feet and it
wants more water. Heber City and Wasatch County want more water
and landowners in North Utah County, located outside cities, have
applied for water.
In my opinion, there is no possibility that
the water cannot all be sold.
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14.
On page 43 the paper suggests that fixed amounts must
be paid--as though that were a problem.
Reclamation law, which
is now a well developed body of law some 81 years old, has generally required a repayment contract and like any standard contract
for the acquisition of a product, there are fixed payments. The
comment that building the Bonneville Unit is tantamount to closing out all other options is simply wrong.
The two largest
purchasers of municipal water, the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District and the Metropolitan Water District of Salt
Lake City, will purchase 70% of all of the water of the municipal
project and both are presently engaged in large projects to
develop additional water supplies and have in fact been doing so
continuously while Bonneville has been under construction.
15.
On page 44 the paper suggests that muni.cipal grade
water must be sold at municipal prices and that is not true. The
136,500 acre-feet of water brought to the Wasatch Front from
Strawberry Reservoir is all of a municipal qual i ty, but only
about 16,000 acre-feet of that water will be used for municipal
purposes now. At some future date it can be converted.
16.
On page 44 the paper states that Provo approached the
Central Utah District for water treatment in the Orem plant and
that the District has refused to treat Provo's water. Initially,
the board developed a policy of only treating project water, or
water for cities which had subscribed for project water, but that
policy was abandoned two or three years ago. Provo City has been
specifically told that it can put its non-project water through
the Orem plant.
17.
Also, on page 44 the paper refers to a "decision" to
serve North Utah County communities only with treated culinary
water.
Again, this is not true.
If we install Alpine 3 (A-3)
and all of the cities want untreated water, they can receive
untreated water through Alpine 3. There is absolutely no mandate
that it be treated.
On the other hand, if one or more of the
cities want treated water and the others want untreated water, we
have the ability to meet the needs of both.
A-3 can deliver
treated water and we can deliver untreated water through the
Provo Reservoir Canal. The canal owners have objected to putting
municipal water for Salt Lake County in the canal, because it
will be there year around, will causing freezing problems in the
winter, will require that the canal be enlarged and otherwise
modified, etc. We have not encountered resistance to furnishing
untreated water which is going to be used by exchange for irrigation or in dual systems.
Thus, we will be able to furnish
either treated or untreated water to North Utah County.
The
District has not reached a "decision" that the North Utah Counties must buy treated water.
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18. On page 45, the paper again makes the erroneous statement that the District will not treat non-project water, except
under a "piggy back" arrangement.
That just is not right.
The
District does recognize that it does not have sufficient money to
build a treatment plant for every community in the 12-county
district, and it has given a priority on the available funds for
treatment plants which will ultimately treat project water, but,
for example, in Vernal, where they have an immediate problem with
their water, we do not have any Central Utah District water to be
treated. Steinaker Reservoir was built under the Vernal Unit and
it was constructed under contract with the local conservancy
district.
The Central Utah District does not have one drop of
water in Steinaker. The Jensen Unit also was contracted for by
the local conservancy district.
Ultimately the Central Utah
Project will buy 4,000 acre-feet of water in the Jensen Unit when
they develop the next phase and install the contemplated pumping
facilities.
In other words, the available municipal water is
controlled by the Uintah Water Conservancy District, which has
contracted with Vernal and the other water agencies. The Central
Utah District is committed to build a water treatment plant in
the Vernal area to treat the waters of Ashley Creek/or Spring and
the waters of Steinaker and Red Fleet Reservoirs, which are not
owned by the Central Utah District.
It was at the time this
decision was made that the board reversed its decision on Provo
and concluded that when it has funds to build facilities or where
it has facilities in place, it would treat non-project water and
Provo has been so advised.
19. On p. 47 the paper purports to outline the dispute over
the Jordan Aqueduct and it does so only by stating the position
of the North Utah County communities. Jordan Reach 4 (J-4) is an
aqueduct badly needed by Salt Lake County and the Salt Lake
County agencies were consul ted.
The Bureau of Reclamation concluded, I believe in 1978 or 1979, that the initial plan to use
the open Provo Reservoir Canal should be abandoned and a closed
aqueduct should be constructed.
It so advised the Central Utah
District and the District concurred.
The Bureau then took the
matter to the board of directors of the Salt Lake County Water
Conservancy District, which will be the major agency making
repayment of this facility, and it concurred.
Charlie Wilson,
who had been the longtime superintendent of the Salt Lake City
water system, and Bob Hilbert, who is the general manager of the
Sal t Lake County vlater Conservancy District, were both on the
board of the Central Utah District and they both agreed. Three
public hearings were held and a rather clean-cut decision was
made to abandon the proposal to use the canal and to build A-3
and J-4.
The Bureau then proceeded to design the works.
It
also started the acquisition of rights-of-way and we were pretty
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far downstream on the project before the suggestion was made by
the North Utah County group to combine the Central Utah municipal
water with the irrigation water for some 44,000 acres of land in
a single closed conveyance facility.
The Bureau engineers and
the Central Utah District engineers looked at the costs in a
cursory way and concluded that this would cost approximately $100
million more.
Certainly the North Utah County communi ties have
not volunteered to pay for this extra cost. The matter was submitted to the Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City,
which is the other purchaser of Salt Lake County municipal water,
and by a vote of four to one, it approved J-4. Mayor Wilson was
the dissenting vote.
At the recent hearing of the new board of
the Central Utah District, the Metropolitan Hater District manager
told the board that if it brought the water to Salt Lake County
in an open canal, Metropolitan would probably not subscribe for
the 20,000 acreof water allocated to it.
At the instance
of the North Utah County communi ties, the Governor ini tia ted a
study, which basically confirmed the significantly greater cost.
The Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District adopted a resolution advising the Central Utah District board that it would try
to repudiate its contract to buy 50,000 acre-feet, if the Central
Utah District did not get some water available by 1985. This is
a date which we can approximately meet by building J-4 and by
making an exchange of project water with Deer Creek, but we could
not even get under construction if we go back to Square 1 to
negotiate our way into the canal, then start design, file new
environmental statements, etc.
Thus, delay became important.
The Bureau, throughout the entire period from 1978 to date, has
strongly favored the closed J-4/A-3 system.
I also support it
for what I consider to be legal type exposures and problems.
I will not prolong this by further stating the argtunent in
favor of J-4, but the decision was not made in a vacuum.
The
people who will have to pay for J-4 were consul ted in advance
(three years or so ago) and concurred. Your so-called "research"
paper, has researched the negative, but has basically ignored
what I think are cogent reasons for building J-4.
20.
Again on page 47 the paper indicates that it will be
the Central Utah District that will require the rights-of-way and
the zoning and permitting of the facilities.
It is this kind of
statement that makes me characterize the paper as shallow.
The
project is going to be built by the Bureau. It has acquired the
rights-of-way and it is settled law that the federal government
is not subject to the building permits and zoning requirements of
counties.
The U. S. Supreme Court squarely so held in the very
first Arizona v. California case, where Arizona tried to stop the
construction o~Boulder Dam because of non-compliance with Arizona
law.
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21.
The paper emphasizes the fact that Mayor Wilson, who
was a candidate for the u. S. Senate, urged further consideration, without noting that he was overruled four to one by his own
Metropolitan Water District Board; and while he was a candidate
for the Senate, he did not get elected. The man who did, Senator
Hatch, strongly supports the District and the Bureau, although I
do not know why either is material to a "research" paper.
22. On page 49 the paper makes the flat out statement that
the Central Utah District is opposed to ground water development
and dual systems. If you have any research to substantiate that,
I would certainly be interested in seeing it. I am not aware of
any such a policy decision.
I am not aware of anything the
District has ever done to oppose dual systems. We are not protesting wells, except where they seek to appropriate water which
we think we have already appropriated for the project.
For
example, we have appropriated all of the remaining water in the
Strawberry River and a well drilled in that watershed would take
project water.
we have protested those wells, but only as new
applications to appropriate. We have generally accommodated the
developers by selling project water and letting them use the
Provo water from a well by exchange. In any event, the statement
that the District opposes dual systems and ground water development is simply not true.
23. You also state that there is no initiative on the part
of the District to provide complete information. We are spending
tens of thousands of dollars trying to get the story out.
When
we have a controversy like J-4 it gets picked up by the media,
but again the statement that we have taken no initiative to
provide complete information is not true.
24.
The paper states that the District is doing little to
answer the people's concerns and that is not true.
In the location of the water treatment plant in Vernal, which was the subject of serious local dispute, the board held a special meeting
in Vernal to hear all of the divergent views. When Heber Valley
opposed getting storage on the Provo by raising the height of the
Deer Creek Dam, the project backed off and sought another site.
This repeated statement of the negative, while totally ignoring
what the District is in fact doing, presents a badly biased "research" paper, which really is not worthy of your talents.
25.
You complain on page 51 that special treatment is
afforded in the water code to the Bureau. That is a legislative
function which has nothinq to do with this District, but I think
special treatment is justified. The State Engineer does not have
capability, for example, in dam safety, which is superior to the
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Bureau. In fact the contrary is true. The Bureau has built more
dams than any other agency in the world and deference by the Utah
legislature to that experience and special talent makes a degree
of sense.
26.
The statement on page 53 that these districts
another arm of the federal government is erroneous.

are

27.
On page 66 the paper indicates that the independent
central district is requiring people to pay ad valorem taxes
without receiving any benefit from them.
Again, this
wrong.
There are few areas in this district that have not already received great benefits and all will benefit before we are through.
Thus, I inquire as to the source of your If research" that demonstrates to you that there is a significant problem of people
being taxed without benefit from the project.
In going through the report, I checked perhaps another 100
places where I thought the "research" was loose and the statements inaccurate.
It is my judgment that the "research" has been
poorly done and that the document is not worthy of publication as
a "research" document. As a policy statement, I, of course, have
no adverse comment about your opposing the project personally as
vigorously and as emotionally and as publicly as you desire.
I
do object to you doing so in the name of Utah State University.
Very truly yours,

~~~

EWC:ML

127

Author's Response to Edward W. Clyde Comment
General

Edward W. Clyde prepared extensive comment and criticism of the
first draft of the report.
He was out of the country when the final
draft was delivered to him and could not provide a response to that
version within the specified time frame. Upon his return, Mr. Clyde has
been engrossed in other urgent matters and has asked that his original
comments be included with our report with proper recognition of the fact
that many of the comments may have been satisfied in the current draft.
The first three paragraphs of Clyde's letter expresses some
general impressions that 1) the report represents a biased attack on the
Central Utah Project, 2) that the senior author harbors a long time
opposition to the CUP and uses the report as a vehicle to thus express
his personal views, and 3) that the authors' unsupported and inaccurate
statements are an attempt to imply Utah State University/Utah Water
Research Laboratory policy.
It is certainly true that the preponderance of examples of institutional impediments described are associated with the Central Utah Water
Conservancy District who is the sponsor of the CUP.
This was not
anticipated as the work plan was organized and the study initiated,
although in retrospect perhaps we should have foreseen this. After all,
the CUWCD comprises 12 counties whose residents are expecting benefits
from the several units of the large and complex CUP. The CUWCD and the
BOR are actively interacting with many different organizational entities
on a variety of problems and issues whose resolution is not simple. The
CUP is in an active stage of design, evaluation, and construction.
These activities involve much citizen and institutional interfacing.
As we began to summarize our interview information and sort out the
meaningful examples, that fact became clear. The authors did not create
the impediments identified nor manage their geographic or institutional
distribution. If they tended to be concentrated regionally, that may be
an interesting and meaningful fact, but we were primarily interested in
the identification of the impediment and the analysis of their nature
and mitigation potential.
Clyde expresses an awareness of the senior author's long time
opposition to the CUP and questions the propriety of using the University or the UWRL to support personal views.
Clyde does not produce
facts or evidence illustrating the senior author's opposition to CUP.
Can he cite membership in any organization openly opposed to CUP? Has
he made statements in opposition at any of the many hearings and other
forums that have invited that opportunity?
Has he implored state
government officials, local, state, or national legislators to oppose
CUP? Where in his publications, papers, or presentations has he stated
"opposition to that project?"
It seems that an occasional question
about some aspect of the CUP is sufficient for proponents to brand that
inquirer as an enemy of CUP.
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Clyde's characterization of the report as an inappropriate policy
statement in the name of the University or UWRL is discussed further
in the authors response to Mr. Novak who made similar assertions.
Universities don't take sides on external policy issues and everyone
understands that university staff cannot and do not speak for the
university.
Clyde's opinions about the opportunities and proper sequence
for water development are noted.
Such opinions need to be debated and
discussed.
They bear direct lyon one of the main points coming out of
our study, viz., that differing perspectives about the rationale and
approach to solve water supply problems is leading to institutional
incompatibilities.
One interpretation of Clyde's commentary is that
since all "later sources m11st be l.lltimately developed, no water proj2ct
should be considered an alternate to any other. This being so, Clyde
argues that the factor that should determine the development sequence is
opportunity and that the CUP opportunity is now.
Of course, Clyde's development logic could only hold true if water
from all potential sources or projects could be made available to the
user at the same cost.
That is not a valid assumption. Clyde himself
points this out in saying "there is unquestionably water that we could
develop next and with more cost effectiveness than the CUP."
Assuming capital is rationed, capital budgeting considerations
alone would suggest building least costly projects first even if the
cost per acre foot for different projects were the same. However
economic rationale'would suggest evaluation of the full range of alternatives for development recognizing that need could be met not only from
the development of new supplies, but also from market transfers of water
from lower to higher valued uses and better utilization of water already
developed. Under a presumption that we should add those increments of
new supply which are least cost, the basic questions are:
which supplies should be developed?
In what amounts? What should be the time
sequence for development of specific options?
From the perspective
Clyde outlines, these questions are immaterial.
If development proceeds under the assumption that there is no
better project option and no better development sequence than Mr. Clyde
recommends, and yet if indeed this were not true, then it is possible
that better alternatives may never be considered.
Certainly better
options cannot be selected if they are never considered.
AlthouEh Clyde is satisfied with the development logic he outlines,
the authors found many others who feel the need for evidence that there
has been an objective examination of options in the light of changing
situations.
The justification any municipality has for purchasing CUP
water is that such water can be provided at a cost no greater than if
the needed supply were acquired from an alternate source.
Mr. Clyde's comments on pages 2, 3, and 4 of his letter certainly
help to illustrate the incongruent perspect ives that we note in our
report as being a root source of institutional friction.
This is most
evident in the CUWCD region.
A bel ief that water supply creates its
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own demand; that there is really no choice between projects because all
will be ultimately needed; and that the development sequence of projects
is immaterial, is in stark contrast to the notion that water demand is
a function of cost, that development alternatives do vary in cost
effectiveness, and that, therefore, the sequence of development 1S
indeed important.
It should be noted here that the above extrapolations are correct
only to the extent Clyde's commentary is correct ly interpreted.
The
authors are not fully agreed as to what extent Clyde's comment might
permit inferences about his development perspectives.
Clydes historical accounts are interesting and if he could simply
avoid using them to create strawmen to knock down, the statements
would be more valuable.
By alleging that the authors are recommending
abandonment, Clyde goes to cons iderab Ie length to argue why the CUP
should not be abandoned. The intent of the study was to observe interactions between special purpose water districts and general purpose
local government and state government. It was not intended to raise the
question, "CUP: To Be or Not to Be?"
Specific Comment
Note:
Mr. Clyde's page references are to the first draft.
The
page location where the comment applies in the final draft is given here
1n parentheses.
1.
(p. 3) The implication that Clyde sees here is pec1,lliar to
his review.
We have made some slight modifications of subsequent
sentences in the paragraph which may be helpful.

2. (p. 5) Clyde raises a number of points here which deserve
comment but space and prudence may limit what we say. There is certainly much more to a cost comparison than Clyde's conclusions would imply.
The description or foundation we lay in this section is believed
necessary or helpful in understanding why different water entities
may encounter impediments as they collaborate in meeting water supply
needs.
We try to point out that "best" solution perspectives will
differ among various water supply entities at any given point in time.
Clyde senses in this description some wrongful implications, viz.,
that water suppl ies derived from large federally sponsored projects
is the most expensive.
He further suggests that our failure to recognize the enormous benefits from such projects is an indication of
biased research. (Neither do we recognize the benefits that are derived
from non-federal smaller projects.
But Clyde finds no fault with that
omission).
Clyde's statements point up the fact that highly subsidized
federal projects may reorder the normal development sequence for any
given community and we certainly agree that that may happen.
Clyde's
comment about peaking problems, large project advantages over other
options in terms of cost, indispensibility, etc., are interesting but
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unless they can be accompanied by objective analysis, we would withhold
our judgment.
3.
(p. 10) Clyde leaves off the important part of the sentence
with general taxing authority. See revised text in final draft.
4.
(p. 10) Clyde notes an incorrect association of the Gooseberry project with the Carbon Water Conservancy District. This has been
rectified in the final draft.
5. (p. 10) We have modified the description of overlapping districts
in the final draft.
6.
(p. 11) Parts of the manuscript affected by this change have
been made accordingly.
7.

(p. 11) Changed to quasi-muncipal corporation.

8.

(p. 23) Modifications have been made l.n final draft.

9.

(p. 33) See substitute wording in final draft.

10.

(p. 40) Modifications made in final draft.

11.
Clyde disagrees with our statement that Water Conservancy
Districts have great autonomy.
Our state by state comparison of
statutes, our evaluation of the Utah statute in particular, and our
evaluation of operating policies and experiences certainly do not
lead us to Clyde's conclusion.
Utah I s enabling s tatutes pre~erve no
formal status for state government or local general purpose government
in the operation of a WCD.
Clyde's description of a policy adopted
by the Salt Lake County WCD to improve Board representation is also
described by us on page 87-88 as a measure adopted to overcome the
representation problem.
Readers may find it helpful to consider
Clyde's other comments in the context of our discussion on opportunity
for input and/or approval of policy options on page 40, and our discussion on public voice and representation on page 61-62.
12.
(p. 49) Clyde sharply disagrees that the acceptance of the
CUP-Bonneville Unit has "limited or retarded" the examination of other
alternatives.
Although we have made changes in the manuscript to make
the point less forceful, we cannot alter the conclusion that the focus
on CUP has constrained the examination of alternate ways of meeting
water needs.
The examples Clyde cites of other options going ahead
despite CUP are the kind of options that should have been considered as
an integral part of the overall planning including the CUP potentials.
The active consideration of the option Clyde identifies has most
certainly been deferred because of CUP expectations. Without the focus
on CUP, their feasilibity would have been explored long ago. The fact
is, that total water management concepts have not been basic to BaR
project planning unt il very recently.
Thus, options outs ide the BaR
solution have been seen by BOR/CUWCD in a competitive rather than an
integrative light.
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13.
(p. 51) We have removed the paragraph pointing out that water
demand is a price phenomena and that high costs for water may lessen
demands for CUP water.
This was an unnecessary postscript to the main
point of the section noting the effect of the Colorado River Development
priority on the institutional decision making process.
We have to
agree with Mr. Clyde that the CUP water may all be sold but there
are indications that large parts of the cost may have to be shifted
to power consumers and other nonwater users before that happens, and we
realize there are plans in process for accomplishing that.
14.
(p. 51) Clyde incorrectly assumes that
contracts being for fixed quantities of water.

we

take

issue with

We have deleted the statement that "from the standpoint of the
BOR/CUWCD the decision to proceed with the Bonneville Unit is tantamount
to the c losing out of all other options for meeting the same water
supply objective."
The next paragraph is a more clear expansion
of what that sentence implied.
15.
(p. 52) Clyde says it is not true that repayment commitments
on the Bonneville Unit requires the marketing of municipal water
for which higher prices can be charged, as we have stated in the
report.
This isn't corroborated by any information we have and 1.S
a puzzling contradiction to statements Clyde himself has made in the
past.
How can Clyde IS refutat ion of our statement be reconc iled with
his own that " ..• the Central Utah District cannot possibly meet its
obligations to the Bureau from its limited taxing power.
Irrigation
sales are below cost, and will not produce significant amounts of
income.
The financial integrity of the project mandates the sale of a
large amount of M & I water." (Letter of Nov. 2, 1977 to Mr. Robert B.
Hilbert)
One author, Dan
of Clyde's comment on
pal prices. He feels
comment are taken out
question.

Hoggan, takes exception to this interpretation
the marketing of municipal grade water at municithat the statement in the report text and Clyde's
of context and the above reply is to a broader

(p. 52) Clyde notes there has been a change in the District
16.
policy regarding treatment of Provo City water in the Orem treatment
plant. We have made the appropriate changes accordingly.
17. (p. 52) The plan to serve, rather than the decision to serve is
more correct.
Clyde's amplification of the availability of either
treated or untreated water to the northern Utah county area is very
helpful.
18.
(p. 52,53) The comment also relates to no. 16 regarding the
policy to treat non-project water in District treatment plants.
Clyde provides background on the reason for earlier policies and the
adoption of the present one. We have modified our draft to reflect this
change.
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19.
(p. 54,55) Clyde believes our outline of the Jordan Aqueduct
dispute only states the position of the northern Uta.h County communities.
We might just comment here that reviewers on both sides of the
issue seemed to feel that we were describing the merits of the case.
Our message was that inadequate communication and dissemination of
information can create impediments to good institutional interaction.
The text has been modified to (hopefully) make the lat ter point more
clear. Commentary by Clyde and Christiansen should provide readers with
a better perspect ive of the issues and reasons for building or not
building the J-4 aqueduct in particular ways.
20.
(p. 55) Modificat ions in the text may have made this comment
moot.
Our statement was that the northern Utah County communities were
resorting to their zoning and permitting authority to deny the aqueduct
right of way if they could not otherwise get consideration of some
alternate solutions.
Clyde makes an issue over the fact that it was
the BOR not the District that would build the aqueduct, and that the
federal government is not subject to building and zoning permits.
Clyde's comment expresses better than the authors the attitude that so
upsets people. Resort to the negotiating process may be superior to the
bold assertion of authority.
21. (p. 55) The quote of Mayor Wilson has been deleted in the final
draft.
Clyde chides the authors for failing to note that Mayor Wilson
was overruled by his own board.
That fact was noted in the next paragraph of the draft report.
Clyde infers that Senator Hatch supported
his position on the aqueduct issue.
We know of no statement of such
endorsement, but agree with Clyde that neither the Wilson or Hatch
statements coming in the context of an election compaign are very useful
to the discussion.
22. (p. 56) The flat out statement about CUWCD opposing groundwater
deve lopment has been de leted.
Some of the act ions of the BOR/CUWCD
have been interpreted that way, even though no direct opposition
may have been intended.
For example, the BOR filing for many wells in
Utah County a number of years ago was interpreted by many as an attempt
to deny further access by others to that source but to direct them to
seek water through the District.
Many are aware of an earlier Weber
Basin WCD filing which had been made under that motivation. Some people
perceive that filings of the BOR/CUWCD in the upper Provo had been used
(as Clyde described) so that groundwater (or other) could only be
obtained by purchasing district water under an exchange or replacement
concept.
The early emphas is on groundwater development by the Salt Lake
County WCD with approved applications for over 200 cfs led to a rather
vigorous program of groundwater development up until the late 1960s.
However, the creation of the CUWCD and its promise of water from
the Bonneville Unit resul ted in expectat ions and encumberances which
appear to have greatly altered earlier management decisions about
groundwater use in Salt Lake County.
While such decisions cannot be
said to be an outright result of CUWCD opposition, the enticing policies
(i.e., providing water treatment plant) have certainly been a factor in
whether or not groundwater options have been exercised.
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Clyde's own express ion as reported in a 1981 Newsletter of the
Utah Environment Center of wanting to discourage Ted Arnow, USGS groundwater expert, from making public statements about vast groundwater
resources beneath the Salt Lake Valley is interpreted as opposition to
groundwater development, also.
23.
(p. 56) Clyde takes exception to our statement that the
CUWCD is showing little ~nltlative in providing complete information
about the way costs are being distributed throughout the district in
comparison with the expectation of benefits. If Clyde has some information to refute this statement it would be welcomed by the authors and
many others who have not seen such.
Clyde's examples in this comment
constitute oblique effort to counter a statement he fails to refute
directly. Regardless of the many good things the CUWCD may be doing to
mollify people;s concerns, the fact remains that motives and rationale
of the District in adopting policy and in taking positions must be
better communicated if good institutional collaboration with others is
to be preserved.
24.

(p. 56) Covered by 23 above.

25. (p. 58, 59) We do not "complain," we merely state the fact. We
also provide justification for this policy, as well as to point out a
potential problem with it. The BOR expertise is not at question in our
statements.
26.
"agent."

(p.

60)

Perhaps

"quasi-agent"

is

a more

correct

term than

27.
(p. 72) We identify in this paragraph of the report a number
of concerns that have been expressed to us.
Clyde selects a phrase
from the last sentence, contorts its usage and ascribes his distortions
to us, with the inference that bona f ide research would have revealed
the truth according to himself. Perhaps Clyde should ask himself why so
many counties of the CUWCD are openly asking how they might get out of
the District.
Certainly they would not entertain such notions if they
are "already receiving great benefits" and are convinced that "all will
benefit before we are through."
The fact that the last session of the
Utah Legislature was induced to materially alter the appointive process
for Utah water conservancy districts and especially the Central Utah
Water Conservancy District is res ipsa loquitur.
Perhaps a little
IIresearch" on Clyde's part would demonstrate to him, as it has to
many others, that there ~ a problem of the kind we identify.
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A CRITIQUE OF THE USU STUDY
Dr: Alten B. Davis, Professor of Political Science
Weber State College
The study team from Utah State University under the direction of
Dr. Jay M. Bagley is to be congratulated for their venture into the
thicket of intergovernmental relations in the area of water policy,
development, and management. Water resource development in the West
is becoming increasingly complex as urban and industrial growth take
place. California, Arizona, and Colorado have generally (up to this
point in time) had to deal with these factors of growth more than their
neighboring states.
However, all of the remaining western states are
now aware that multiple purpose projects mean supporting clientele
groups with differing reasons for supporting a given water development
project. Not only do mUltipurpose projects bring diverse clientele
support, they also bring the same increasing number and diversity of
opposing interests. To this picture must be added the institutional
factor of the special purpose district which has been utilized by local
governments and citizens throughout the country to deal with specific
problems within specific geographical boundaries. These organizations
have proven to be a boon in dealing with anything from slum clearance,
to mosquito control, to sewage disposal, and a host of other important
and less important problems. But the extensive use of the special
purpose district is now being viewed by government administrators and
citizens as a somewhat mixed blessing. Such districts are independent,
and individually governed and therefore prove to be difficult to expand,
abolish, coordinate or adapt to whatever may be needed in a dynamically
growing and changing society. (Perhaps any future study should scan
briefy the existing literature evaluating the special purpose district.)
The Utah State University study gives a much needed look at the
problems of water organization operating in the environment described
above in an attempt to establish some guidelines to permit water development agencies to function more rationally and effectively.
The strength of the study lies in its comparative approach to
create an awareness of approaches used by other states to meet specific
problems. The states selected offer an excellent mix of varying degrees
of impact and growth. California is in SOme respects so different from
the rest of its neighbors in the West that its omission is to be commended. The highlight of the study is the extensive table giving statutory
comparisons of the organizations created by each state to deal with
multipurpose water management. The study is also to be commended for
its emphasis on the increasing role of the state in water resources
planning, development, and coordination. The message of the study is
that water resource development in all western states has become increasingly complex because such development affects and is related to
all other types of development and hence impacts heavily on the operation
of state and local governments. These factors call for a more concerted
effort to clarify water development goals and to establish cooperative
and coordinating procedures to achieve those goals under the existing
institutional system.
The major shortcoming of the study lies in its attempt to develop
and use criterion to judge the existing system. The development of
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criteria and their validation would involve another extensive study.
The criteria utilized seem quite rational and pragmatic, but their
origin and justification are not dealt with. Furthermore, the study is
reluctant to apply its criterion. In at least one place in the study a
given state's activities are described after the necessary guidelines
have been spelled out and the variance of the state's action from the
criterion are obvious to the reader, but the study does not proceed to
the next logical step and label the state's actions as being either
ineffective or counterproductive.
I understand that this study and its conclusions are considered by
some to be controversial. That is not surprising in the light of my
analysis of the complexities involved. Some years ago another Utah
State University team did a study of the attitudes regarding the development of the Bear River Project. To their surprise they found a greater
support for the project from the urban residents of Ogden than they did
from the residents of the more rural areas of Box Elder and Cache
Counties, where the major benefits of the project would accrue. This
survey simply demonstrated the "built-in bias" that most westerners have
in favor of water development. But the growing complexity and costs of
water development projects in the West lead to a greater dependence on
the federal government for funding. Federal funds have always been
limited in the water resource development area so it was only logical
that Congress would evolve a rule of thumb that unless there was unified
local support for a project it could not expect to survive the authorization and appropriation process. Therefore significant local opposition
or criticism could mean the death of a project and so any citicism was
viewed in that light. In 1983 the realities are much more complex as
indicated by the continued growth throughout the West, the continuing
withdrawal of the federal government from the water resources development
area, and the increasingly important role of the state. These realities
have also changed the once rather simplistic process of federal support
noted above.
The study shows that there have already been some significant changes
in the powers and relationships of the existing system. The metropolitan
water districts in particular have had to deal with these new realities.
They have learned that to "notify" is not "informing." They have also
learned that "informing" is not all there is to a process of "coordinating
and cooperating." Furthermore, they are now aware that it may well be a
"myth" to assume that conflicts between the increasingly complex interests
in a developing state can be resolved by any amount of discussion,
cooperation, or compromise. There are farmers and water rights owners
in the Delta area of Utah who are certain that those who sold their
water rights to permit the operation of the Intermountain Power Project
sold their birthright for a "mess of pottage." The Salt Lake County
Conservancy District and its clientele need the Central Utah water
delivered to them for use in 1985 even if that means a covered aqueduct
constructed through the once agricultural areas and now thriving suburbs
of northern Utah County. Not all disputes are resolvable by compromise.
This study by the Utah Sate University team illuminates and puts in
perspective a growing problem area and indicates what actions have been
taken and possibly should be taken to reduce the areas of conflict. The
study did not create the problems and if these problems are ignored they
will simply grow in number and complexity.
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Author's Response to Dr. Davis Commentary
Dr. Davis applauds the authors efforts to give a "much needed look
at the problems of water organizations" operating in complex intergovernmental thicket which he describes succinct ly.
He finds some
shortcomings with the expression and justification of criteria with
which effective interactions are judged. He also indicates that we are
reluctant to label certain institutional actions as being ineffective or
counterproductive when the facts suggest that they are clearly at
variance with our criteria.
We cannot argue with Dr. Davis on the above observations. Had time
permitted, the report might have been reorganized co give the criteria
more prominence up front and more direct utilization in the discussions
about impediments.
Such treatment would likely have sharpened the
impact and clarity to most readers.
We also agree with Dr. Davis' observation that we should not
ignore the problems identified but rather illuminate them, put them into
perspective, and strive to reduce areas of conflict.
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ROBERT B. HllBE

SHELDON H. HOLMES. Chairman and Director
NOAl C. BATEMAN, Vice Chairman and Director

Generai Mana
Secretary, Treasu

August 11, 1983

Dr. Jay Bagley
Director
Utah Water Research
Laboratory
Utah State University
Logan. Utah 84322
Dear Jay:
In response to your latest draft entitled, "Impediments to
Effective Interactions Between Multipurpose Water Districts and
Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas, 11 I have
the following comments:
In general you have made many improvements since the
initial draft and this one appears much more objective.
Its general thrust still appears to be slanted towards
Central Utah. There is also a very unequal treatment of
water conservancy districts versus metropolitan water
districts. The comparative section on districts in other
states is very interesting.
On page 49, the first sentence in the last paragraph,
where is says, "From its early conception, the CUP has
sought to obtain Department of the Interior financing, 11 you
probably mean the CUP sponsors.
On pages 65 and 66 under your discussion of, "Conflict
of Interest Potential," you are probably right in regards
to engineers and legal counsel, but I am concerned about
the implications for board members. A District such as
mine which has a large stake in the outcome of the Central
Utah project deserves and is entitled to representation on
its board for the liaison and coordination of the
project development. Considering our financial stake in
the form of tax revenues coming from our District and the
future revenues that will be flowing to the Central Utah
District in the form or water purchases, we feel a great
need for representation on the board, though, I agree that
any type of relationship could be misused if unprofessional
people were allowed to be appointed.
138
3495 South 300 West. P.O. Box 15618· Salt Lake City, Utah 84115. (801) 262-7421

SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
Dr. Jay Bagley
Director
Utah Water Research
Laboratory
August 11, 1983
Page Two
On page 67, in the second paragraph, under your
discussion of the willingness of the Salt Lake County
Water Conservancy District to provide service, I would
like to give you a little better historical perspective.
Our District has two retail areas, the Granite Park area
between South Salt Lake and Murray and what we call the
1300 East area which extends from about 5600 to 9400
South. Both of these areas were clearly established by
need prior to the development and expansion of South Salt
Lake, Murray and Sandy cities into these areas. As a
matter of record, the 1300 East retail area was offered to
Sandy prior to Sandy's rapid expansion in the 1970's and
was turned down by the administration at that time. In
recent years South Salt Lake and Murray have expanded into
the Granite Park retail system through annexation. In
some of these areas we serve retail customers at the
request of Murray City and we are negotiating with both
South Salt Lake and Murray for the best possible service
arrangements for these areas. In the case of the 1300
East area, the initial retail systems in these areas were
established by private water companies. When they sought
to get out of the retail water business, they turned their
systems over to our District. We have not sought to
expand our retail system in these areas. but have only
filled in, in established areas. The competition, if
there be any in these areas, has been created by the rapid
expansion of Sandy, in and around our long-time existing
retail service areas. The role of our District in
assuming retail service responibilities in Salt Lake
County has been relatively minor compared to that of
improvement districts such as Granger-Hunter, Taylorsville
Bennion. Kearns Improvement Districts and private water
systems such as White City, Draper Irrigation Company and
the Bell Canyon Irrigation Company and others. It is a
long standing policy of this District that we will not
compete with existing municipal entities for retail water
service.
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SALT.LAKE COUNTY WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
Dr. Jay Bagley
Director
Utah Water Research
Laboratory
August 11, 1983
Page Three
On page 68, at the bottom of the page, comments
concerning Utah County developments near the Salt Lake
County-utah County border obtaining water service from
Salt Lake County is without any fact. We have annexed a
2,500 acre tract of land into this District and are
working with the developers to provide a wat~r supply for
these lands sometime in the future, but there is no such
service existing today. Your implications in this
paragraph and in the paragraph at the top of page 69 are
pure speculation and do not deserve treatment in this
text.
On page 78, the second to last paragraph from the
bottom concerning competition, I have already addressed
our position in this regard. If there is an overriding
weakness in this text, it is the generalizations that you
use for all water conservancy districts. It is impossible
to describe all sixteen water conservancy districts in the
State of Utah in the manner that you have attempted in
this study.
On page 81, in the third paragraph, you should define
what you mean by a small district and a homogeneous water
market.
On page 82, in the third line from the top, the use
of the word "would" is not appropriate. Perhaps "could"
would be a better usage since this is a future event.
On page 82, second paragraph from the bottom, your
discussion of bonds is inaccurate. All water conservancy
districts have the authority to issue a revenue and
general obligation bond, but not all districts can issue a
revenue bond. To say ad valorem taxes are the preferred
measures for raising needed revenues is surely an
unsupportable assumption on your part.
On page 85, your comments concerning the Salt Lake
County Water Conservancy District should be attributed to
its General Manager rather than its Director.
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SALT LAKE COUNTY WATER .CONSERVANCY DISTRICT
Dr. Jay Bagley
Director
Utah Water Research
Laboratory
August 11, 1983
Page Four

At the top of page 86, concerning a floor of income,
we. at the request of bond counsel, have now gone back and
rewritten all of our agreements to provide for a minimum
purchase requirement in order to provide security for the
bond holders.
In the second paragraph, we work with developers in
Salt Lake County to provide water only where it is
reasonable and cost effective, that is to say, where we
have existing waterlines or the developer is willing to
participate in the cost of extending waterlines and
facilities to his development.
In the third paragraph. the last sentence, you should
note that Taylorsville and Bennion are not cities. It is
the Taylorsville Bennion Improvement District.
You have made a number of very good observations in
this study. I still feel that your perspective is too
broad, including all water conservancy districts and
metropolitan water districts in this study when you are
truly only addressing one water conservancy district.
I hope that you will find my comments helpful and that
they may be included in the report. If I can be of further
service to you. please contact me.
Sincerely,

Robert B. Hilbert
General Manager
RBH/bt
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Author's Response to Robert B. Hilbert Commentary
Mr. Hilbert finds that the report is weighted with Central Utah
WCD examples. That there is considerable institutional disproportion in
the citation of impediments has been called to our attention by other
reviewers.
As has been said elsewhere, this imbalance was not by
design. Interviews were not concentrated in anyone area as the appended list will confirm.
The authors were concerned with ident ifying
experienced or potential impediments and considering how they might be
avoided or alleviated.
The specific institutional source of the examples was not of concern, although as the material was organized and
written it was c lear that the CUWCD was providing a disproport ionate
share of the examples.
A partial explanation of this is given on page
48 in the introductory statement to Chapter III.
p.

49.

The clarification has been inserted.

p.
65-66.
Hilbert expresses concern about implications of the "conflict of interest" discussion for board .membership.
We recognize that
ofttimes certain board members of some organizations are "ex officio"
for the very reason Hilbert cites for representation.
We don't ignore
the advantages that Hilbert and others have pointed out to us for
mUltiple board membership in terms of overall coordination and justified
by the size of the financial stake. On the other hand, the problem of
an individual adequately representing mUltiple constituencies on issues
for which compromises on policy decisions must be forged is very real
and deserves consideration also.
p. 67.
Hilbert r s historical perspect ive as it relates to evolving
policies of his District and its services is very helpful. Others have
provided historical perspectives which we have blended with those of
Hilbert in a highly compressed way.
p. 68.
We have changed the tense from present to future in the first
sentence. The paragraph at the top of page 69 is not pure speculation.
We simply do not draw a definite cause and effect relationship from the
facts we have gathered, and so state.
p. 78.
Interviews with community and special improvement district
water officials indicate somewhat different perceptions than Hilbert
about collaboration and competition.
We don't elaborate on these
differences, but must recognize that they have occurred and do occur.
While Chapter II may be applied quite generally, much of Chapter
III cannot. Chapter III is primarily concerned with WCD's operating in
urbanizing areas, as the title implies, and does not purport to describe
all sixteen WCD's as Hilbert presumes.
p. 81.

Revisions made accordingly.
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p. 82.

Revision made accordingly.

p. 82.
The statement that ad valorem taxes are preferred measures
for raising needed revenues for weD's is not an unsupportab Ie assumption but may be an over generalization.
Financiers, federal government or otherwise, place great weight on the security of repayment
an ad valorem tax provides.
The BOR has certainly shown a preference
for contracting with WeD's rather than entities that operate by assessments and user charges.
Hilbert's use of a "floor" of income from
purchasers (as noted in his p. 86 comment on security to bond holders)
is a use of the same justification for which ad valorem taxes are
preferred.
p. 85.

Revision made accordingly.

p. 86.

Revision made to include present provisions.

p. 86.
Second paragraph.
Hilbert I s comment adds clarification
criterion for providing service and has been incorporated.
p. 86.

Third paragraph.

Revision made accordingly.

143

to

/

2837 EAST HIGHWAY 193 • LAYTON, UTAH 84041 • PHONE (801) 825-1677

August 11, 1983
Mr. Jay M. Bagley, Professor
Utah water Research Laboratory
UMC 82
Logan, Utah 84322
Dear Professor Bagley,
I have reviewed your report entitled "Impediments to
Effective Interactions Between Multipurpose water Districts
and Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas."
I found it informative and accurate, to the best of my
knowledge. However, recent legislation has changed the
procedure for selection of the Board of Directors of water
Conservancy Districts. You might check sections 73-9-9 and
73-9-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953 for current procedure.
Thank you for sending us a copy of your report.
comments are helpful.

I hope my

Yours truly,

Keith G. Jensen
secretary-Manager
KJ/dh
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Authors' Response to Keith G. Jensen Commentary

Jensen noted the recent legislative changes in the procedure
for selection of Boards of Directors of Water Conservancy Districts.
The report now incorporates those changes.
Jensen found the report informative and accurate and made no
other suggestions for improving its content.
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P.O. BOX 427

Board of Directors
Genevieve Atwood
Thomas I. Baum
Virge N. Brown
R. Roscoe Garrett
Leo Haueter
Robert B. Hilbert
G. Marion Hinckley
James B. Lee
Dave McMullin
Joseph Novak
Eleanor S. Olsen
LaRue Pickup
David Rasmussen
Clyde Ritchie
L.Y. Siddoway
P. Waldo Warnick
Melvin B. White
Charles Wilson
Lynn R. Winterton

OREM, UTAH 84057

TELEPHONE 225-0042

R. Roscoe Garrett. President
G. Marion Hinckley, Vice President
Lynn S. Ludlow, Secretary/Manager

May 25, 1983

Mr. Jay M.
Utah Water
Utah State
Logan, UT

Bagley
Research Laboratory
University
84322

Dear Mr. Bagley:
By letter of 11ay 10, 1983, you transmitted to this District a
draft copy of a report prepared by authors representing the Utah
Water Research Laboratory at Utah State University. The draft
report is entitl ed, Impediments to Effective Interacti ons Between
Multipurpose Water Districts and other Governmental Institutions
in Urbanizing Areas. You requested comments prior to preparation
of a final draft.
II

1I

The District has not prepared specific comments in the form
you desired. Rather, the District wishes to make it unequivocally
clear that it vigorously objects to publication of the report in
its present context. The report has taken much of the information
that was compiled in the objectionable and unpublished 1977 report
entitled, "A Cursory Review of Utah \~ater Conservancy Districts-Their Role and Operation," and continues to contain the long
standing, well known and adverse opinions of the authors. The
contents of the report as presently written are not consistent
with the title, and do not represent the task as described in the
proposal for funding. A more accurate title would be, IIA Specific
Criticism of the Central Utah Water Conservancy District, Its
Mission, Role and Operating Policies."
Your transmittal letter states the proposed report II . . draws
heavily on results of interviews with a variety of individuals •.
The report reflects opinions of those interviewed who are
strongly adverse to the District and Central Utah Project. The
District is aware of only one limited and restricted interview
with a member of its staff and is not aware of any interviews with
Directors. Throughout the report interviews with others are
accepted and reported as facts without any effort to verify them
for their accuracy and with no attempt to report the District's
position. Had such an effort been made your report might represent
a more balanced and unbiased approach to the subject matter. The
purported interviews and facts really fall in the realm of heresay
rather than documented research.
• 11
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Mr. Bagley
Page 2
May 25, 1983

Chapters III, IV and V should include an analysis of Water
Conservancy Districts in Utah. Instead of an analysis of Districts,
the authors immediately begin an intensive negative campaign
against the Central Utah Project and in particular the Bonneville
Unit. They start out calling the project a "scheme" that has
blunted the examination of alternative ways of meeting water
needs. The scheme, or more appropriately the plan, was formulated
under the direction of the State prior to the creation of the
District. It has been quoted often by State officials and technicians that the Central Utah Project is the "backbone" for the Utah
State "'later Plan. The State also provided the leadership in the
creation of the District. The Central Utah Project does not set
out independent from other water development programs. Actually,
the project encourages and makes possible the full development of
all sources of water. The District also encourages and supports
the development of additional water by all water users throughout
the State.
The report is negative, narrow and an inaccurate assessment
of the problems facing the wpter Conservancy Districts. The
authors have extensively quoted this District's policies, which
have been established by a 19 member citizen board, yet neither
the authors nor anyone representing the authors have attended any
District Committee or Board meetings. In many instances the
policies they quote are simply not correct. In fact, instead of
research, the authors attempt to distort administrative decisions
without presenting the "pros or cons that faced the decision
makers at the time the decision was made.
ll

The proposed report concludes by calling for a team of professionals, unconstrained by anything or anyone, to make a complete
financial, contractual and economic re-evaluation of the Central
Utah Project to identify possible modifications. As a matter of
fact, timely modifications have been and are being made that are
justified and appropriate as is provided for in the repayment
contract between the United States and the Central Utah Water
Conservancy District. The District asserts that planning for the
Central Utah Project has taken place over time involving well
qualified and skilled professionals that are versed in legal and
institutional constraints and with a broad recognition of the
needs of as many water users and others as possible. There are
contract commitments that in the interest of continuity prohibit
modifications to meet every change that may be proposed by others.
The Bonneville Unit Plan as being constructed was specifically
approved by an overwhelming majority in a public election which
authorized the District to execute a contract with the United
States for its construction.
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Mr. Bagley
Page 3
r~ay

25, 1983

As stated previously, it is our strong oplnlon that the
report should not be published. It;s not a research report, but
a reflection of opinions of its authors and other anti~project
anti-District advocates and as written is a discredit to the
purpose served by the Utah l~ater Research Laboratory. If it is
published without being extensively modified, the District will
pursue every possible action to discredit this report, its authors
and any associated studies. The District will also oppose future
funding from any source to prohibit this type of distorted research
by the Utah State Water Research Laboratory.
Very truly yours,
.-

----
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~Lynn S.
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LSL: sr
cc:

Stanford Cazier

L. Dougl as James

Daniel Lawrence
Clifford Barrett
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General Manager

UTAH

STATE

UNIVERS!TY- LOGAN, UTAH 84322
UTAH WATER RESEARCH LABORATORY
UMC 82

COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING

May 27, 1983

Mr. Lynn S. Ludlow, General Manager
The Central Utah Water Conservancy District
P.O. Box 427
Orem, UT 84057
Dear Lynn:
Thank you for your M8Y 25, 1983, letter with regard to the draft
manuscript "Impediments to Effective Interactions Between Multipurpose
Water Districts and Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas."
You have indicated that there are inaccuracies and distortions in the
report. Although you didn't identify them specifically, we are anxious that
any errors be removed which, of course, is the purpose of the manuscript review
process.
If you do not wish to return a marked copy or offer specific comment
in writing, we would be most happy to come to Provo and receive them verbally.
As researchers associated with the university system, we have everything to
lose and nothing to gain by publishing material which proves to be inaccurate.
We did not include a listing of individuals interviewed in the draft report.
This list will be included in the final report so that readers may better judge
whether bias could have been introduced into the interview process. Your present
impressions, particularly with respect to lack of interviews with District managers,
is incorrect.
In your own instance, you will recall that I arranged an appointment with you personally. Upon arrival, I was informed that something unexpected
had come up and that I should visit with Carl Carpenter. After Carl and I had
spent the entire morning together, I left with him a copy of an interview guide
(set of questions) with the presumption its return to us would include your input.
As you know, I visited with Carlon one other occasion. Since the report is in
the draft stage, we can incorporate any additional information you care to provide
and will welcome any corrections to statements you know to be in error.
Your letter reveals a great concern that research work at UWRL be objective
and thorough. Just as you should expect university researchers to approacb their
tasks without any axes to grind nor vested interest in the research outcome, so
also should it be a comfort to you (and other citizens) to know that university
researchers findings cannot be suppressed or manipulated by threat or intimidation.
We look forward to getting together with you.
We would be willing to go over
the manuscript with you page by page in order to take full account of your comment.
SinO'e"rely yours,

\//}.

1..1

~1

Jai:M. Bq'ley, Professor
Civil and Environmental Engineering
JMB:bjh
cc:

Stanford Cazier, Bartell Jensen
L. Douglas James, Daniel Lawrence
Clifford Barrett
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Board of Directors
Genevieve Atwood
Thomas I. Baum
Virge N. Brown
R. Roscoe Garrett
Leo Haueter
Robert B. Hilbert
G. Marion Hinckley
James B. Lee
Dave McMullin
Joseph Novak
Eleanor S. Olsen
LaRue Pickup
David Rasmussen
Clyde Ritchie
L.Y. Siddoway
P. Waldo Warnick
Melvin B. White
Charles Wilson
Lynn R. Winterton
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TELEPHONE 225-0042

,

R. Roscoe Garrett, Presidenl
G. Marion Hinckley, Vice Presidenl
Lynn S. Ludlow, Secretary/Manager

June 15, 1983

Jay M. Bagley, Professor
Civil and Environmental Engineering
Utah Water Research Laboratory
Utah State Univer~ity
Logan, Ut 84322
RE: Impediments to Effective Interactions Between r~ultipurpose
Water Districts and Other Governmental Institutions in
Urbanizing Areas
Oea r Jay:
The District has received your letter of May 27, 1982, and
your invitation to meet and review our concerns about the above
reference manuscript. Since our letter to you on ~lay 25, 1983, we
have become aware of comments of others who have corresponded with
you reflecting their concerns on the research report. After a
review of their comments and our previously expressed concerns, we
again state that this research report should not be published in
its present context. If it is to be published, a total rewrite of
those sections essential to bring the report up to date and to
remove many biases and inaccurate comments about the Central Utah
Water Conservancy District, the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, and
the Central Utah Project would be imperative. I have to concur
with the general comments made in the letter to you from Joseph
Novak in which he stated the following:
(1) the subject matter of the draft document does not appear
to me to be an appropriate research project for the Utah Water
Research Laboratory.

(2) the draft document comprises an academic analysis of
political, legal and institutional issues, both real and imaginary,
and is lacking in objectivity.
(3) the draft document is now obsolete as to Utah Water
Conservancy Districts with the passage of Substitute Senate Bill
No. 11 (SB 11), during the 1983 session of the Utah Legislature.
(4) the draft document has a built-in bias against the U. S.
Bureau of Reclamation (BOR), Central Utah Project (CUP) and Central
Utah Water Conservancy District (CUI~CD).
I believe that in view of the numerous objections that have
al ready been provide to you a page by page review by tl,is District
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Jay ~1. Bagley
June 15, 1983
Page -2-

at this time vlould be ineffective. ~4e "/ould be glad to meet with
you after a redraft has been completed.
The District appreciated the opportunity to review this
report before it was published.
Very truly yours,

;t:;,,/;}

L·

.{ynn S, Ludlow
." General Manager
LSL:bf
cc:

Stanford Cazier
Bartell Jensen
L. Douglas James
Daniel Lawrence
Cl ; fford Ba rrett
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P.O. BOX 427

Board of Directors
Genevieve Atwood
Thomas I. Baum
Don A. Christiansen
Charles Crozier
R. Roscoe Garrett
Robert B. Hilbert
G. Marion Hinckley
Jamec: B. Lee
Rondal McKee
Dave McMullin
J. Neil Nielson
Joseph Novak
David Rasmussen
Clyde Ritchie
L.Y. Siddoway
P. Waldo Warnick
Melvin B. White
Charles Wilson
Lynn R. Winterton

OREM, UTAH 84057

TELEPHONE 225-0042

R. Roscoe Garrett, President
G. Marion Hinckley, Vice President
Lynn S. Ludlow, Secretary/Manager

August 5, 1983

f4r. Jay t~.
Utah \~ater
Utah State
Logan, UT

Bagley, Phd.
Research Laboratory, Uf'1C 82
University
34322

Dear Jay:
The District received a copy of the final report entitled,
IIImpediments to Effective Interactions Between t·1ultipurpose fJater
Districts and Other Governmental Illstitutions in Urbanizing Areas
on August 2, and was requested to furnish comments by August 5,
1983. The District would like to re-iterate its position regarding
this report as stated in its letters dated May 25 and JUne 15,
1983.
ll

Although the report has updated those portions relating to
the appoi ntment procedu res for boa rd members as changed by the
last State Legislature, it still contains many things objectionable
to this District. The title of the report bears little resemblance
to the subject matter contained therein. It appears to address
two different subjects viz., (1) a comparion of States· use of
special districts to sponsor water projects; and (2) a specific
and often misleading and unwarranted criticism of the Central Utah
Hater Conservancy District, its mission, role, and operating
policies. There is some merit to publishing the results of the
former but none for the latter. It seans to miss the objective
stated in UWRL/G-82/01, pages 11 and 99.
Very truly yours,

LSL:sr
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Author's Response to Lynn Ludlow Commentary
A partial response to Ludlow's letter of May 25, 1983 was provided
in Bagley's letter of May 27, 1983.
Although Ludlow has provided no
specific comment nor desired to meet with the authors during the revision process, he concurs with the general criticism offered by Joseph
Novak (letter of June 15, 1983) and still finds "many things objectionable to the District" in the final manuscript (letter of August 5,
1983).
Ludlow has circulated copies of comments prepared by Edward
Clyde, Joseph Novak, and Robert Hilbert which would indicate endorsement
of their comment and criticism.
Hence, response to comments of those
individuals may constitute at least a partial response to Ludlow's
concerns, also.
One characteristic of Ludlow's letter is that his message was
not to the authors in the interest of improving the manuscript, but to
those he believed might be influenced to prevent its publication.
Ludlow's assertions of "built-in" author bias against the Bureau of
Reclamation, the Central Utah Project, and the Central Utah Water
Conservancy District; his questioning of the subject matter as an
appropriate research topic for USU and UWRL; and his suggestion that the
contents of the report did not represent the task as outlined in the
proposal, are criticisms that have nothing to do with report substance
but are calculated to influence certain administrators who received
copies of his letters.
Apparently unable to counter findings of the
report he found objectionable or unflattering, Ludlow wants to suppress
publication.
Ludlow is critical of a suggestion to get at some of the root
causes of political and legal confrontation among entities, which
seem to be escalating, by fostering an open and full reappraisal
of the financial, contractual, and economic features of the CUP.
From the stout defense Ludlow makes for District policies and actions
one would think he would welcome such a review as a way of confirming
and publicizing the correctness of the mission, role, and operating
policies of his District. We see no reason why Ludlow should object to
an independent evaluation so as to convincingly put to rest some of the
questions that are surfacing. He should want to eliminate some of the
uneasiness that is being experienced amount certain groups.
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
STATE 0

F

UTAH

REP. GAYLE F. MCKEACHNIE
56TH DISTRICT
363 EAST MAIN STREET. VERNAL, UTAH 84078
COMMITTEES: APPROPRIATIONS (I!:XECUTIVE OFFICES, COURTS AND CORRECTIONS) • RULES, CHAIRMAN' ENERGY AND

NATURAL RESOURCES

May 23, 1983

Mr. Jay M. Bagley, Professor
Civil and Environmental Engineering
Utah state University
Logan, Utah
84322
Dear Professor Bagley:
I have received and examined a copy of your draft of the
work entitled "Impediments to Effective Interactions Between
Multipurpose Water Districts and Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas."
First let me say that I congratulate you for all the work
you have done in putting together the draft.
I have several
general comments.
First, you should be aware that the 1983 Legislature
changed the procedure for selection of directors of water
conservancy districts and the material on Page 30 of the draft
needs to be updated.
Senate Bill 11 now provides that County
Commissioners appoint directors in single county conservancy
districts and the Governor, with the confirmation of the State
Senate, selects directors in multi-county districts from nominations submitted by county commissioners. There is also a
provision for appointment by cities where districts are fully
made up of municipal territory.
You may be interested (if you do not already know) there
is presently pending a legal action challenging the constitutionality of court-appointed directors in Utah water conservancy
districts and the recent legislation was supported in part as an
effort to correct what many thought were constitutional
defects
in the existing statutes.
The question of constitutionality
revolves around two points:
(1) The judicial branch becoming
involved in the appointment process and (2) the ability of
conservancy districts to tax the citizens of a county when
those citizens have no voice in selecting either the directors
of a conservancy district or the judges who appoint them.
As your report points out, water conservancy districts are
often created to purchase water from large projects and to market
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Mr. Jay M. Bagley, Pro
May 23, 1983
Page 2

ssor

it in the state. The tendency on the
of some water conservancy districts, especially those which purchase water from
projects constructed by the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation, is to
consider the Bureau of Reclamation as
constituency rather
than the people who are the ultimate recipients of the water.
Conservancy distr
often receive a good portion of the
funding for the projects it is involved in from the Federal
Government and the constant association of staff with the staff
of the Bureau of Reclamation caused many to assert that conservancy districts have become simply an extension of the Bureau
of Reclamation.
Similarly, state officials have been concerned that
no real overall policy in the state of Utah regarding the
development of water projects and conservation. The many water
conservancy districts either adopt the Bureau of Reclamation
policies or each its own individual policy. There is something
to be said for that procedure because
gives some local autonomy.
However, concern exists that those offic
s in state government
who are charged with executing state water policy have no control
or often even litt
influence over the practices, programs and
projects of the water conservancy distr
s. Part of the reason
for including the governor in the appointments process for water
conservancy directors was to give the state some input into what
is going on in water conservancy districts which affect more than
one county.
I appreciate your sending me a copy of your work and would
be interested in receiving a copy of the final product. Thank
you.
Very truly yours,

~~-'\\\:L&tt~~
Gayle F. McKeachnie
State Representative
GM/mc
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
STATE OF UTAH

REP. GAYLE F. l\ICl{EACHNIE
56TH DISTRICT
363 EAST MAlN STREET. VERNAl... UTAH 84078
COMMITT£P:St APPROPRIATIONS (EXECUTIVE OFFICES. COURTS AND CORRECTIONS) • RUl.ES. CHAIRMAN· ENERGY AND

NATURAL. RESOURCES

August 8, 1983

Professor Jay M. Bagley
Civil and Environmental Engineering
Utah State University
Logan, UT 84322
Dear Professor Bagley:
Thank you for the copy of your project entitled "Impediments
to Effective Interactions between Multipurpose Water Districts
and Other Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas".
I believe the comments made in my letter of May 23, 1983,
contain my concerns.
I see that you have incorporated the
information concerning the new method of selecting directors
for water conservative districts.
I appreciate you letting me be involved.
you have done a very good job.

It looks like

Very truly yours,

A~~\f\~tU-Ov~
Gayle F. MCKeachnie
State Representative
dcr
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Authors' Response to Gayle MCKeachnie's Commentary
Mr. McKeachnie makes some specific suggestions on the draft
report which have been incorporated in the final draft.
He also
makes some general comments which are corroborative of our findings
and with which we agree.
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Jay M. Bagley, Professor
Civil and Environmental Engineering
Utah Water Research Laboratory
Utah State University
Logan, UT 84322
Re: Impediments to Effective Interactions Between
Multipurpose Water Districts and other
Governmental Institutions in Urbanizing Areas
July, 1983.
Dear Jay:
I respectfully submit the following comments to the final
draft of the above document. However, it should be noted that
the comments which follow are my personal comments, and not as
general counsel for Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake
or Provo River Water Users' Association or as a member of
the Board of Directors of the Central Utah Water Conservancy
District.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
I reviewed the above final draft in 1
of my comments
to the February, 1983 draft, outlined in my letter to you dated
June 6, 1983. While the final draft has been modified to change
or eliminate much of the language of the first draft which I
considered objectionable, the thrust of the document remains
essentially unchanged.
Since my above letter of June 6, 1983, you have refreshed
my recollection that several years ago you did in fact jointly
interview me and Vaughn Wonnacott, then manager of the Metropolitan Water
trict of Salt Lake City (HWD). However, that
interview was 1
ted to the organization and history of ~~vD,
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Jay M. Bagley, Professor
August 22, 1983
Page Two
its role in the development of the Provo River Project and
its relationship to Salt Lake City. Thus, the interview did
not follow the Interview Guide attached as Appendix A, if in
fact such existed at that state of the project.
GENERAL COJ.i.1I1ENTS
1.
The Final Document Comprises an Academic Analysis
of Political, Legal and Institutional Issues, Both Real and
Imaginary, and is Not an Appropriate Research Project for the
Utah State Water Research Laboratory.

I am mindful that 42 U.S.C. § 7801 of the Water Research
and Development Act of 1978 provides for a designated college or
university to conduct competent research and development,
including investigations and experiments of either a basic or
practical nature, or both, in relation to water resources, etc.,
which may include economic, legal, social and other aspects of
water problems.
However, I suggest that the subject matter of
the draft document is permeated with political overtones which
transcends the authorized scope of activities.
It appears from the title of the authors contained ln the
Acknowledgment page, that except for Lee Kapaloski, the remaining
authors are academicians employed at Utah State University.
I
suggest that any other qualifications of the authors relating to
the subject matter should be clearly stated.
Since the subject
matter of the document is most controversial, I believe those
qualifications are essential to any evaluation of the credibility
of the criticisms and conclusions stated therein.
I view the document as an academic analysis of what the
authors perceive to be the shortcomings of WCDs and rvrwDs in an
idealistic world. While insight might have been gained from
those interviewed, there is no substitute for experience in the
real world of WCDs and HWDs.
Furthermore, it cannot be ascertained whether the criticisms and conclusions reached therein
represent a consensus of those interviewed or are the personal
views of the authors.
I have no quarrel with academicians expressing their views
on controversial issues. However, it should be made clear that
such are the personal views of the authors and are not those of
the institution. To do otherwise under the auspices of one of
our respected institutions and thereby clothe those views with
credibility, is improper.
In substance, it seems to me that
the more appropriate research project for the Utah Water Research
Laboratory would be in the technical areas of water research
and development where qualifications are acknowledged.
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Jay M. Bagley, Professor
August 22, 1983
Page Three

2.
The Final Document Implies That the Individuals
Interviewed Lend Credence to the Criticisms and Conclusions
Contained Therein.

The discussions under Study Approach and Scope (pages 3-5),
relating to interviews being the source of information of the
document implies that the individuals interviewed for both
studies, as listed on Appendix B, concur in whole or in part
with the criticisms and conclusions stated therein.
I, for one,
strongly disagree with the vast majority of those criticisms
and conclusions and am advised that a number of those listed
share my concern. Accordingly, I respectfully suggest that the
above section contain a general disclaimer for those like myself
whose comments negate such endorsement. Likewise, I suggest that
either the above section or the attached Appendix B identify
those like me whose interviews were limited to specific areas
and the specific subject matter thereof.
3.
The
Describe its
Bias Against
Project (CUP)

Title
the Final Document Does not Accurately
Contents, Lacks Objectivity, and has a Built-in
the Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) , Central utah
and Central Utah Water Conservancy District (CUWCD).

I suggest that the subject matcer of the document is not an
objective discussion of "impediments".
Rather, it is a critical
attack on CUP and CUWCD under the guise of a general research
project of public water districts in the several states. The
materials contained in Chapter II for the most part are helpful
in making comparisons between the districts in those states.
However, Chapter III is permeated with an obvious and almost
obsessive bias against the BOR, CUP and CUWCD. Whether that
bias stems from the personal views of the authors, or from some
of those interviewed, is not readily apparent.
The format seems to be to launch the attack by way
example, and then zero
on all of the negative aspects of the
example.
In fairness to those who have dedicated their lives
to the efficient management and operation of these districts,
the positive aspects also should be stated. For example, the
document makes repeated references to the power
these
districts to levy taxes and the potential for abuse of that
power. Yet, nothing is said about the experience of MWD of
Sal t Lake city, which reduced its tax levy from blO mils in
1974 to one and a half mils in 1975 and 1976, to one mill in
1977 and to zero in 1978 and thereafter. This I called to your
attention in my letter dated June 6, 1983, but apparently it is
still unworthy of comment in the document.
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Jay M.
, Professor
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Throughout Chapter III, it is suggested that the BaR is
overly dominant and through political power imposes
preferred options on the people, which I believe is an unfair
criticism. Likewise, it is suggeste"d that WCDs, and in
cular CUWCD, blindly accept BaR
icies, which I be
both unfair and untrue. For example, on page 73, it is
that some of those interviewed be
that the BaR pol
s
become the perspectives and positions of an "unquestioning"
CUWCD. Had any of the authors attended any of the CUWCD
board meetings during the past year and a half, he would understand
t hand that such cri
is unfounded. The point
of it is that only the negative and none of the posi
is
stated throughout the document.
I suggest that the concluding paragraph on pages 95 and
96 will be most distressing to those who have devoted
lives to a realization of the CUP. The bottom line
seems to be to place the fate of CUP
the hands of a team
of professionals ostensibly to be selected from the
institutions which I believe would be a tragic mistake.
CONCLUSIONS
On the whole, I suggest that the final document is ill
conceived, misguided and is not an appropriate research
ect
for the Utah Water Research Laboratory.
I still believe that
to publish the document in its
form without wholesale
revision, will bring disrespect and discredit to the Utah Water
Research Laboratory and Utah State University. Accordingly, I
am still hopeful that the whole matter will be carefully reexamined and reconsidered by those who have the ultimate
responsibility for its publication.

IN: jm

cc: Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City
Provo River Water Users Association
Central Utah Water Conservancy District
Lee Kapaloski, Esq.
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Author's Response to Joseph Novak Commentary

At the outset, Novak stresses the fact his comments are not
prompted by his role as general council for the Metropolitan Water
District of Salt Lake City and the Provo River Water Users Assn., nor as
a member of the board of directors of the Central Utah Water Conservancy
District. We appreciate this disclaimer of an advocacy role.
We certainly do not agree with Novak's suggestion that the report
is permeated with political overtones.
It may well be that certain
findings will have political implications whose importance and proportions will be seen differently by different readers.
Novak seems to be
saying that the authors' objective was to deliberately introduce political overtones while feigning something else. This is nonsense.
General Comments
1.
Novak says this is not an appropriate research project for
the Utah Water Research Laboratory.
If Novak cared to peruse the
findings of congressional committees (perhaps beginning with the 1958
Senate Select Committee on Water Resources); the periodic evaluations of
research and research needs made by the Federal Council of Science and
Technology (primarily through its Federal Interagency Task Groups and
Committee on Water Resources Research); the deliberations and discussions preceding the enactment of the Water Resources Research Act of
1964 (P.L. 88-379); the assessment of water pToblems and the statements
of research priorities by the Office of Water Resources Research an? its
successor, the Office of Water Research and Technology; he would find 1)
that greater involvement of the universities in water research was a
prominent recommendation of experts from both administrative and
legislative branches of government, and 2) that more research emphasis
was needed concerning techniques and methods of water resources planning, the evaluation process by which the worth of water projects is
determined, the effectiveness of water laws and institutions, and the
ecological impacts of water resource development.
Whether warranted or not, framers of P.L. 88-379 expressed skepticism at intramural research conducted by mission-oriented agencies with
respect to the above topics.
Since its beginning, and furthered by its
affiliation with the OWRT program, the UWRL has promoted a broadly based
program of research which includes the legal, institutional, organizational, and policy aspects of water resources management.
The research
proposal under which this study was initiated was reviewed and evaluated
by campus scientists, members of the USU Citizen Advisory Panel on Water
Research, and by OWRT staff in Washington, D.C.
Its selection for
funding connotes a broad approval of its appropriateness and priority
as a UWRL project.
Contrary to Novak's view, universities are sought
out for analyzing institutional and policy problems because of the
atmosphere of free and open inquiry they enjoy, with freedom from
vested interest in research outcome.
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Novak observes that the document is an academic analysis by
individuals living in a dream world.
That being so, Novak should
have no difficulty finding flaws and errors in the substance of the
report. It is a common frailty that when troubled by truths that cannot
be refuted, one is inclined to malign their source.
Novak shows more
concern for qualifying witnesses than he does for examining the testimony itself. If it were editorial policy to include complete experience
resumes of authors in a report of this kind, we would be happy to do
so. In the absence of this, we would simply remark that the individual
and collective research and professional experience of the authors at
state, national, and international levels is indication of very adequate
credentials for researching water organizations and their interactions.
We invite Novak to prove otherwise.
Novak also alleges that the authors are allowing personal feelings
to cloud their judgment in reported findings while creating the impression that these personal views are those of the university in order to
infer credibility which presumably would be absent otherwise.
We are
not given the criteria on which this judgment is based.
We disavow
Novak's allegation of biased research in the strongest terms.
In case Novak doesn't realize it, the manuscript review process, a hallmark of university research, is a very efficaceous system
for enforcing standards of objectivity. The review and referee process
to which manuscripts are subjected prior to publication is a mechanism
for spotting weaknesses in the authors' assertions, and for discovering
deficiencies in objectivity, verifiability, and clarity of explanation.
It is intended that advocacy, or the twisting of facts to suit personal
views be weeded out in refereed science of universities. Over time, the
manuscript review process provides a mechanism for repeated reassessment
of whether an individual researcher's findings are legitimate and
provable.
The aggregation of review comments is invaluable in upgrading and
certifying the quality of a final research report.
Novak and 44
others were invited to be a part of this important process for this
report. Although authors must exercise their own judgment in accepting
or rejecting comment, that judgment is substantiated by 1) the first
hand experience in the conduct of the research itself, 2) the access to
an accumulation of information on the subject and intimate association
with its evaluation and utilization, and 3) the advantage of the comparative assessment of different review comments in the context of 1)
and 2).
While no claim is made for infallibility in this manuscript
review process, it is as good a system for guaranteeing objectivity as
has been devised.
When coupled with the reality that if a university
researcher loses credibility he loses everything, there is rather strong
incentive to be objective.
Multiple authors provide another check on
object ivi ty.
2. While others have not expressed concern that being listed
as one interviewed implied concurrence with research findings and
conclusions, Novak's point is well taken.
The Acknowledgment section
and the section on Study Approach and Scope have been modified to make
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to make it c lear that the perspect ives of those interviewed did not
always coincide, and the authors' report rendition, based on the composite of interview materials, should ln no wise imply concurrency by
all of those listed in Appendix B.
3. The allegation of Novak that the report is an attack on CUP and
CUWeD under the guise of a title indicating something else, and his
observation that the authors display an obsessive bias against the BOR,
CUP, and CUWCD have been answered in the authors remarks to Edward Clyde
and Lynn Ludlow who made similar assertions.
Novak scolds us for emphasizing the negative aspects of district taxing authority while failing to acknowledge the positive examples of the MWD of Salt Lake City which has had a progression of
decreases in tax levy.
In our draft report, page 11, 23, 57, and in
Table 1; and in the final report pages 13, 14, 64 and in Table I, p. 27,
we state quite clearly that the Utah MWD does not prefer taxes over rate
structure but is in fact instructed in the statutes not to do so. The
reductions in taxes Novak cites for MWD of Salt Lake City are most
certainly in keeping with that guide. For capital investments of MWD's
under a bonding program, the board is to levy a tax specifically for
repayment of the bonded indebtedness.
When the debt is paid, the tax
levy ceases. There is no such provision in WCD legislation. The final
draft has been modified to more correctly and completely describe the
use of a mix of rate charges and taxes by districts.
Novak believes our statements in Chapter III relating to BOR
policies and influences are unfair and untrue. If Novak could cite the
textual examples of this we could better evaluate his opinions. Novak's
interpretation of what is fair or untrue is contrary to views expressed
by others (see, for example, McKeachnie's letter which is appended).
While Novak's attendance at CUWCD Board meetings is commendable he may
benefit from getting out of the board room and closer to the constituency on occasion for a better appreciation of what we are saying.
Novak opines that our suggestion of a possible way of stemming
the increasing tide of political and legal confrontations involving the
CUWCD by inviting an open and full reappraisal of its policies, directions, and commitments will be most distressing to those who have
devoted their lives to the realization of CUP.
Why should that be?
Could it not be a way of confirming their efforts and silencing critics?
We see this approach as a way of relieving stress, not creating it.
Our report deals with institutions. We do not deal with personalities. If individuals become distressed with our findings, is the public
better served by protecting the feelings of its public stewards or by
having the kind of information by which taxpayers who are footing the
bills may better judge the act ions and decisions of their representat ives?
Novak's reading into the report a recommendat ion that academicians should be responsible for any proposed reevaluation and decide
the fate of the CUP is not intended.
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Conclusions
Mr. Novak's conclusions are obviously not intended for the authors
but constitute a message to "those who have ultimate responsibility
for its publication" not to allow this "ill conceived, misguided" report
to see the light of day.
It could only "bring disrespect and discredit
to the Utah Water Research Laboratory and the Utah State University."
Yet Novak's appeal has a hollow ring since his preceding comments
provide no rationale for such a conclusion.
His comments consist of
opinions which fail to call into question any of the contents or substance of the report.
Rather, Novak resorts to fault
the credent ials of the authors and their integrity, quest ioning the appropriateness of the project for UWRL sponsorsh , laments that being
interviewed may be construed as being in support of the authors findings, and asserts that the authors have obsessive prejudices against
certain entities.
Presumably it is the content of the report that
should determine its merits for publication.
When critics must seek
reasons outside the report content for objecting to its publication, the
merit of the report may have been given strong confirmation.
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